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Cover
A model from the Naval War College
Museum collection of a Korean “turtle
ship,” such as those that helped repulse
the sixteenth-century Japanese invasion
of Korea—a campaign vital to the spirit
of the modern Republic of Korea Navy, as
noted by Yoji Koda (Vice Admiral, Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force, Retired) in
this issue’s lead article.
The model, just over twenty-six inches
long and almost nineteen tall, was donated to the Naval War College in 1993
by Rear Admiral Ha Jong-keun, president
of the Korean Naval War College. The
original ship was 113 feet long, thirtyfour feet in beam; it displaced 150 tons,
mounted fourteen guns, and carried a
complement of 130. The spikes on the
“turtleback” deterred boarding; the iron
plates, which were bolted to wood sheathing up to a foot thick, made the turtle ship
the world’s first ironclad. The Mandarin
Chinese character on the model’s flag
signifies “Turtle.”
Naval War College Museum. Photographs
and design by the Naval War College
Visual Communications Division.
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FROM THE EDITORS
As we noted in the Winter 2010 Review, the Navy’s new maritime strategy places
a premium on maritime security cooperation, which in turn suggests that the
Navy has a heightened requirement to understand the maritime capabilities and
outlooks of its various security partners. That issue addressed the important
cases of the United Kingdom and Australia. In the present issue, the Republic of
Korea Navy is the subject of an informed and searching analysis by Vice Admiral
(Retired) Yoji Koda of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Admiral Koda
may seem an improbable choice as author of a piece on this subject, but in fact he
played an important role personally in initiating navy-to-navy staff talks between his country and the ROK in the late 1990s and has remained a close observer of Korean maritime affairs since that time. Admiral Koda provides an
overview of the modern evolution of the ROK Navy from a modest coastal force
in the 1950s to the increasingly blue water–capable fleet of today. His discussion
of Japanese-ROK interaction at sea provides valuable insights into what might
be called “third party” maritime security cooperation—something the United
States needs to be keenly aware of as it seeks to strengthen its own bilateral relationships with foreign navies.
The U.S. Navy has been highly attentive to the possible implications of global
climate change. The Arctic region has been a special focus of this attention,
given the magnitude of recent changes in the climate there and the opportunities they afford for increased access to the waters and resources of the north. In
their article “Arctic Security Considerations and the U.S. Navy’s Roadmap for
the Arctic,” Rear Admiral David W. Titley, USN, and Courtney C. St. John explore these issues, their potential impacts on the Navy, and steps the Navy needs
to consider in dealing with them. Rear Admiral Titley is Oceanographer of the
Navy and Director, Task Force Climate Change.
Robert C. Rubel, in “The U.S. Navy’s Transition to Jets,” tells the important
and neglected story of the Navy’s struggle to adapt to jet aircraft beginning in the
late 1940s. He argues that this transition was in fact not finally complete until
the late 1980s, when accident rates in the Navy finally declined to a level approximating those in the Air Force, and explores in detail the reasons this was so.
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Rubel, a retired naval aviator, is dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at
the Naval War College.
We return again in this issue to the seemingly intractable problem of Somali
piracy. Lesley Anne Warner, of the Center for Naval Analyses, argues in “Pieces
of Eight: An Appraisal of U.S. Counterpiracy Options in the Horn of Africa” that
the key to success in countering piracy off the coast of Somalia lies in conceptually linking the positive elements of current sea-based counterpiracy methods
with approaches designed to remedy the underlying instability ashore that produced piracy in the first place. This very comprehensive analysis strikes us as a
useful contribution to an ongoing debate.
“China’s Oil Security Pipe Dream,” by Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B.
Collins, gets to the heart of an issue that, perhaps more than any other, seems to
be driving China’s ambitious naval-modernization efforts. The authors argue
that overland pipelines will never prove to be a serious alternative to seaborne
transport of oil and gas for China, in spite of the strong support for them in
some quarters, and that the Chinese would be better advised to explore cooperative steps to safeguard free energy markets and the seaborne flow of energy imports. Erickson is currently, and Collins was formerly, an associate of the Naval
War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. Readers may want to consult in
this connection an article by Collins and William S. Murray, “No Oil for the
Lamps of China?” in the Spring 2008 Review.
Finally, W. Brad Johnson, of the U.S. Naval Academy, and Gene R. Andersen,
of the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership (COSL) at the Naval War
College, offer an extended analysis of a key issue in naval and military leadership, “Formal Mentoring in the U.S. Military: Research Evidence, Lingering
Questions, and Recommendations.” Our next issue will feature an (overdue)
discussion of the important and innovative work being carried out by the recently created COSL organization in Newport.
FORTHCOMING FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS
The next (and thirty-fifth) in our Newport Papers monograph series, Piracy and
Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies, edited by Bruce A.
Elleman, Andrew Forbes, and David Rosenberg, is in press and has been posted
on our website. Dr. Elleman, of the Naval War College Maritime History Department, and his coeditors have collected twelve case studies that allow conclusions
to be drawn on uses and limitations of naval antipiracy operations in the context
of new technology and modern national policy goals.
Also soon to be available for sale online by the U.S. Government Printing Office
is Nineteen-Gun Salute: Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and Diplomatic Naval
Leadership during the 20th and Early 21st Centuries, edited by John B. Hattendorf
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss2/1

NWCR_Spring2010_4.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\5399_NWC_Review_Spring2010\NWCR_Spring2010.vp
Wednesday, March 03, 2010 9:27:48 AM

10

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

FROM THE EDITORS

5

and Bruce A. Elleman. This collection of brief biographies of nineteen U.S. Navy admirals, from W. S. Sims to Joseph W. Preuher, with conclusions by the editors focusing particularly on leadership skills in the operational and strategic arenas, is
sponsored by the Naval War College’s College of Operational and Strategic Leadership and has been jointly produced by the Naval War College Press and the Government Printing Office.
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Rear Admiral James “Phil” Wisecup became the
fifty-second President of the U.S. Naval War College on
6 November 2008. He most recently served as Commander, Carrier Strike Group 7 (Ronald Reagan Strike
Group), returning from deployment in October 2008.
A 1977 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Rear
Admiral Wisecup earned his master’s degree in international relations from the University of Southern California, graduated from the Naval War College in 1998,
and also earned a degree from the University of Strasbourg,
France, as an Olmsted Scholar, in 1982.
At sea, he served as executive officer of USS Valley Forge
(CG 50) during Operation DESERT STORM. As Commanding Officer, USS Callaghan (DDG 994), he was
awarded the Vice Admiral James Stockdale Award for
Inspirational Leadership. He served as Commander,
Destroyer Squadron 21 during Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM after 9/11.
Ashore, he was assigned to NATO Headquarters in
Brussels, Belgium; served as Force Planner and Ship
Scheduler for Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces,
Pacific; and served as action officer for Navy Headquarters Plans/Policy Staff. He served as a fellow on the Chief
of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group; as Director, White House Situation Room; and as Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces Korea.
Rear Admiral Wisecup’s awards include the Defense
Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star,
and various unit, service, and campaign awards.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

Greetings from Newport

HARD AS IT IS TO BELIEVE, we’re halfway through our 125th anniver-

sary year here at the Naval War College (NWC). This coming June,
the six hundred or so graduates of the class of 2010 will be taking their places in
the long line of Newport graduates who have gone on to serve their nations and
their services with distinction. As the weather blows a gale here in Rhode Island,
I’d like to take a moment to reflect about the College’s mission of helping the
Chief of Naval Operations define the future Navy. The College has been doing
this for all 125 years of its history. To do this effectively, we have to think about
the strategic environment that is over the horizon, and this is something that has
been getting considerable attention here in Newport. In mid-December we
hosted a small group of eminent scientists and historians to talk about emerging
trends and phenomena, along with the lessons of history, as we proceed into a
complex and uncertain future. The discussion was fascinating and helpful as we
discussed subjects from the health of the oceans to climate change, causes of societal collapse in ancient history and their relevance for today and the future,
and finally what might be asked of the Navy in the future. I tell you this so you
will know the U.S. Navy is paying attention to the future, as you will see with
Rear Admiral David Titley’s article in this issue. Over a period of the past few
months, the Navy commissioned a science-based “Task Force Climate Change,”
which Admiral Titley, Oceanographer of the Navy, heads up. He spoke at the re1
cent United Nations summit in Copenhagen.
Another example is “Task Force Energy,” which is headed up by Rear Admiral
Phil Cullom. During the “Naval Energy Forum” in October 2009, the Secretary
of the Navy, the Honorable Ray Mabus, expressed five ambitious energy goals,
which he reaffirmed as recently as 21 January, when he signed an agreement with
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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the Department of Agriculture. In case you missed some of this, here are his
broad goals:

• When awarding contracts, appropriately consider energy efficiency and the
energy footprint as additional factors in acquisition decisions.

• By 2012, demonstrate a Green Strike Group, composed of nuclear vessels
and ships powered by biofuel. By 2016, sail the Strike Group as a Great
Green Fleet, composed of nuclear ships, surface combatants equipped with
hybrid electric alternative-power systems running on biofuel, and aircraft
running on biofuel.

• By 2015, cut petroleum use in the Navy’s fifty thousand–vehicle nontactical
commercial fleet in half, by phasing in hybrid, flex fuel, and electric
vehicles.

• By 2020, produce at least half of shore-based installations’ energy requirements from alternative sources. Also 50 percent of all shore installations
will be net zero-energy consumers.

• By 2020, half of the Department of the Navy’s total energy consumption for
ships, aircraft, tanks, vehicles, and shore installations will come from alter2
native sources.
What else could come into play as we look ahead? Food distribution/security?
The health of the oceans/rising ocean levels? Pandemic? Global economic meltdown? Some combination of these things? As I travel around, I feel there is a
sense of anxiety in the country, and you can’t help but feel it if you watch some of
the recent disaster movies. My message is this: the Navy, with the help of the
NWC, is watching and looking ahead at a wide range of possible futures, with a
view to anticipating future requirements.
I’ve recently talked with Mr. Tomas Ries, director of the Swedish Institute of
International Affairs, who provides a very interesting, overarching framework
that situates not only the developed world but the rest of the world as well, providing a framework for viewing potential sources of conflict. From where I sit,
the most interesting thing he highlights is that almost two-thirds of the world’s
population lives in what he calls “the zone of misery”—and today’s drama playing out in Haiti is only the latest example. Though the United States is engaged
in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the response to the agony and humanitarian disaster in Haiti shows how rapidly and effectively things can move into action
when this nation decides to do so. The military support of our government departments and agencies as I write this (a week after the quake) has been impressive. For most of the Navy readers, however, we know these operations happen
routinely, though normally on a much smaller scale. For example, during my
time in Ronald Reagan Strike Group, we provided emergency aid to typhoon
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss2/1
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victims in the Philippines, and we executed plans we had all discussed and
planned well before deploying—all part of normal preparations, though we
know each operation, each tragic disaster, will bring its own terrible, unique
challenges and complexities. This is all set out in the “Cooperative Strategy
for 21st Century Seapower”—it’s simply part of the deal today, at least the
backdrop.
Getting a useful grip on where the Navy should be headed is hard and continuous work. It requires a robust institution if it is to occur. The Naval War College
is such an institution—advancing knowledge in “all matters relating to war,
statesmanship connected to war, and the prevention of war,” as its founder, Rear
Admiral Stephen B. Luce, said. A quick scan of current NWC activities reveals
the scope and intensity of the effort. The China Maritime Studies Institute has
expanded and improved its library, our faculty is in demand, and we are working
3
on a wide variety of gaming activities as a matter of priority. The student/faculty research going on (Halsey, Stockdale, Mahan groups) is cutting-edge, very
interesting, and helpful. Another development, which has come about over the
past few years, is the solid connection developing with our fleet commanders as
the Navy improves its focus on the operational level of war—this is the goal of
our College of Operational and Strategic Leadership. To paraphrase Churchill,
we want to develop captains of war, not just captains of ships. The result is that
we are having a good bit of “saltwater pumped into Newport” directly from fleet
operations worldwide, and there is a nice balance in place.
The natural focus of the incoming students is today’s fight (one in three or
four is returning directly from Iraq or Afghanistan). This is where the wonderful
adaptability of our faculty comes into play—relating today’s fight to classroom
discussions and to our curriculum; however, we know here in Newport that our
task is also to provide frameworks to our students based on enduring principles
studied over long years. This has always been one of the primary, practical tasks
here at the Naval War College. I refer you to Admiral William Sims’s pamphlet
that he circulated in 1912 at his own expense to all the officers of the Navy; it can
be found online at www.usnwc.edu/presidentsjournal. We also chartered a “center for irregular warfare and armed groups” in November 2008, designed to capture the lessons of this fight for the future, with particular emphasis on the
maritime domain.
James Fallows quotes the president of Princeton, Shirley Tilghman: “U.S.
higher education has essentially been our innovation engine . . . even with all its
4
challenges at the moment.” That certainly includes the Naval War College, even
knowing that not every student officer will become a flag or general officer or
Chief of Naval Operations, and that not every paper, conference, or operational
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game will produce “game changing” ideas. As one of my faculty members put it,
investing in the Naval War College is almost like venture capital.
The lesson of the history of the College, at least as best I can decipher it from
my own reading, is that the value is in the persistence of study and insights
gained over time, the capability to sustain them being a function of a robust institution. The other lesson made clear to me during my first year here is that
frustration in problem solving leads to innovation—naval officers are nothing if
not problem solvers, and this would seem logically to lead to adaptation. A recent report from Britain’s Defence Academy indicates frustration with British
institutions, going as far as to call them “incapable of fighting modern wars . . .
and suggest[ing that] the Western education system was designed for a previous
5
age and [can]not adapt to future challenges.” Worth a look for sure. The research and gaming effort at Newport is only half of the equation. The College
works to help the Navy adapt to the future by providing a first-class, graduatelevel education to future military and civilian leaders, an investment in our ability to outthink our adversaries in future wars, and to adapt to changing
circumstances. When I was a student here in 1998, my professors helped me understand the lessons of insurgencies, including El Salvador and the American
Revolution. NWC graduates like Generals Odierno and McChrystal are applying
those lessons in today’s conflicts. Clausewitz said that war is “more than a cha6
meleon”; no two wars are the same. However, by providing students with a
framework and the intellectual tools we can equip them to think creatively about
how to deal with the unanticipated curveballs that are hurled their way. Along
with original research, these are the cornerstones of what we’re doing today,
what we’ve done here at the Naval War College for 125 years.

JAMES P. WISECUP

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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THE EMERGING REPUBLIC OF KOREA NAVY
A Japanese Perspective
Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (Retired)

O

n 21 May 1997 the author, then director of the Policy, Plans, and Programs
Division, in the Maritime Staff Office of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force, attended a preparatory meeting for proposed navy-to-navy staff talks for
the exchange of opinions on various maritime and naval subjects with the Republic of Korea Navy. My counterpart at this meeting, which was held at a navy
facility in Taejung, in the central region of the Republic of Korea, was the Naval
Policy Director of ROKN* Headquarters.
Navy-to-navy talks symbolize military exchanges between countries. The
JMSDF has had such talks with the U.S. Navy, an allied partner, for a long time
and also with the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy, regarded as a “father” of modern navies. During the mid-1990s the JMSDF began to have such talks with the
Royal Australian Navy, which has close relations with the navies of many Southeast Asian nations. The JMSDF hopes that the Australian navy can help it bridge
historical gaps in relations—arising from the wariness in these countries caused
by the bitter experience of World War II—between the JMSDF and Southeast
Asian navies. Military-to-military exchanges developed rapidly in those years, as
a part of the new international exchanges that arose in the post–Cold War era, so
the establishment of a close relationship with the ROKN had become a serious
and urgent issue for the JMSDF. For all these reasons, I, as an official responsible
for JMSDF policy in MSO, proposed to meet with my counterpart in the ROKN
as a preliminary measure.
Because our meeting was held before the start of official exchanges, and because we did not know each other, the atmosphere was awkward at first. However,

* All abbreviations used in this article are expanded in the sidebar on page 16.
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as time passed, we gradually became friendly, finding that we had much in common as sailors. A number of exchanges followed fairly quickly, and in the years
since then the relationship between the two navies has deepened. Still, the history
of this official relationship between the JMSDF and the ROKN is very short—only
about ten years—when one considers the geographical proximity between the two
nations; true mutual understanding has yet to mature. Much can still be done to
bring the JMSDF and ROKN closer together.
It is for that reason, and from that perspective, that I, as a former leader of the
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, would like here to examine comprehensively the Republic of Korea Navy. I will discuss the whole service, except for
(though they are officially part of the ROKN) the ground forces of the Republic
of Korea Marine Corps.
WATERBORNE FORCES IN ANCIENT KOREA
The history of maritime armed forces in the Korean Peninsula originates with
those that fought during the unification of the peninsula. The chronicles of the
Three Kingdoms of Korea—Baekje, Goguryeo, and Silla—record the activity of
these waterborne forces. For a typical example, in the latter half of the fourth
century, King Kwanggaeto of Goguryeo attacked and conquered Baekje by effective use of naval forces.1 His conquest is remembered today in the name of the
first ship of the KDX-I destroyer class—Kwanggaeto Daewang (Kwanggaeto the
2
Great).
When the Mongolian Yuan dynasty, which had conquered China and central Eurasia, invaded the Korean Peninsula in the mid-thirteenth century, the
Goguryeo dynasty evacuated its capital to Ganghwado Island, two kilometers
off the coast. The sea forces of Goguryeo protected their island capital from
fierce Yuan attacks for about thirty years. The Yuans, whose Mongolian cavalry
was overwhelming on land, were poor at combat on the water; nonetheless,
this success was a noteworthy event in the history of the waterborne forces of
3
the peninsula.
The next prominent event in Korean naval history was the successful protection of its coasts from Japanese pirates, known as the “Wa-ko,” whose lawless activities became significant in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.
Korean forces protected the population and coastal villages from Wa-ko assault
and later neutralized the pirate base in the islands of the Tsushima Strait, between Kyushu and the peninsula.4
In the late sixteenth century a Korean hero, Yi Sun-Shin, became an unforgettable figure in the history of the Korean Peninsula. Hideyoshi Toyotomi, who had
emerged supreme after a century-long reunification war in Japan, twice sent huge
expeditionary forces to the Korean Peninsula, as part of his strategic goal of
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss2/1
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conquering the Ming dynasty of China; however, the Japanese forces were, in general, unsuccessful. Yi Sun-Shin interrupted the Japanese supply lines at sea several
times, sometimes causing serious problems. In 1598 Hideyoshi suddenly died,
and the Japanese forces started to withdraw. Taking full advantage of this change
of tide, Yi Sun-Shin, together with Ming naval forces, attacked a retreating Japanese convoy off the coast of the peninsula. He made good use of intelligence, local
topography (marked by islands and narrow straits), tactics (especially surprise attack and separation of the enemy), and equipment (such as “turtle ships,” which
were heavily protected by iron armor casements of a turtleback shape) and finally
defeated the sea forces of Japan. The Korean-Chinese combined force reportedly
sank two hundred out of five hundred Japanese ships, putting an end to a
seven-year-long war on the Korean homeland.5 The tragic loss of Yi Sun-Shin in
the final action made him a true hero—a man who saved the Korean nation at
the cost of his life. Even today, the Koreans respect him as a savior of their country. To commemorate his achievement, the lead ship of KDX-II destroyer class
was named Yi Sun-Shin.
THE FOUNDING OF THE ROKN: THE IMPACT OF THE
KOREAN WAR
On 11 November 1945, soon after the end of World War II in the Pacific, a merchant mariner, Son Won-Il, established the Maritime Affairs Association, which
later developed into the Korean Coast Guard. With the establishment of the
ROK government on 15 August 1948, the coast guard was renamed the Republic
of Korea Navy, with Son as its first Chief of Naval Operations. Of the four services of the ROK Armed Forces, the navy has, accordingly, the longest history.
(In 2007 the first of the ROKN’s cutting-edge Type 214 submarines was named
Son Won-Il, after this father of the South Korean navy.)
The Korean War erupted with a surprise attack and invasion by North Korean
forces in June 1950. The ROKN participated in the fighting that followed, together with the navies of the United Nations coalition. Maritime operations in
this war were exclusively in favor of the UN forces; the North Korean navy had
only a coastal capability, whereas the UN naval forces, with elements of the U.S.
Navy at their center, had overwhelming power.
At that time, the ROKN was not yet able to wage modern maritime warfare
beyond coastal seas; it was still too immature, the outbreak of the war having
come immediately after its establishment. The personnel strength of the ROKN
was about seven thousand, to the North Korean navy’s estimated fourteen
thousand.
Continued on page 17
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ABBREVIATIONS
AMS
AO
AOR
APD
ARL
ARS
ASR
ASROC
ASUW
ASV
ASW
CVSG
DD
DDG
DE
FAC
FFG
FFS
FRAM
FS
FSG
JML
JMSDF
KDX-I
KDX-II
KDX-III
KSS
LPD
LSM
LSMR
LSSL
LST
MCM
MHC
ML
MSC
MSO
PC
PCE
PCF
PCS
PF
PG
PKM
PLA
PT
ROK
ROKN
SLOC
SMG
SS
SSN

auxiliary minesweeper
auxiliary oiler
auxiliary replenishment oiler
auxiliary personnel transport destroyer
auxiliary repair light
auxiliary rescue/salvage ship
auxiliary submarine rescue ship
antisubmarine rocket
antisurface warfare
antisurface vessel; antisurface vehicle [e.g., Lynx helicopter]
antisubmarine warfare
aircraft carrier strike group
destroyer
guided-missile destroyer
destroyer escort
fast attack craft (gun)
guided-missile frigate
fast frigate, small
Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization
frigate, small
guided-missile frigate, small
Japanese minelayer
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
first generation of destroyers designed and built in South Korea
second generation of destroyers designed and built in South Korea
Aegis DDG, third generation of destroyers designed and built in
South Korea
Korean midget submarine
landing platform, dock
landing ship, medium
landing ship medium, rocket
landing ship support, large
landing ship, tank
mine countermeasures
minehunter, coastal
minelayer
minesweeper, coastal
Maritime Staff Office [JMDSF]
patrol craft (submarine chaser)
patrol craft, escort
patrol craft, fast
patrol craft, sweeper
patrol frigate [World War II construction]
guided-missile patrol boat
patrol killer boat, medium
People’s Liberation Army
patrol torpedo boat
Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea Navy
sea line of communication
Strategic Mobile Group
conventionally powered [diesel-electric] attack submarine
nuclear-powered attack submarine
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Continued from page 15

With regard to large combatant ships, the ROKN had in 1951 only two outdated, World War II–vintage patrol frigates capable of operations on “blue water”—that is, on the high seas, away from home waters. Beyond these two ships,
there were only about ten coastal minesweepers of U.S. and Japanese build, as
well as ten small patrol craft (see table 1).
TABLE 1
ROKN STRENGTH IN 1951 (MAJOR COMBATANTS)
PF

2

U.S.-built, 1,500 tons

PC

4

U.S.-built, 1,300 tons

AMS

13

U.S.-built, 300 tons, wooden coastal minesweeper

JML

10

Details unknown, minelayers of the Imperial Japanese Navy

LSSL

2

U.S.-built, 230 tons

Others

Japanese-left gunboats (22), former Japanese coastal patrol crafts (8), self-propelled oil barges, tugboats, and various service craft

Source: All numerical data in the charts in this article are from the Jane’s Fighting Ships of each year. The type designations (DD, SS, PGM, etc.), which vary in successive editions of Jane’s, are the author’s own. See the sidebar for a legend.

In spite of these handicaps, the ROKN took great pride, and found a strong
spiritual foundation, in the fact that though the smallest service in the South Korean Armed Forces, it had engaged in combat with great courage and effectiveness
6
in the war’s most difficult period, the first years after the state’s establishment.
The highest operational command billet—Commander in Chief, ROK Fleet
—was established in September 1953, soon after the armistice agreement was
7
signed in July.
1960 TO THE EARLY 1980S: LAYING THE “BEDROCK”
Over the next two decades, the ROKN continued to build its fleet as a main pillar
of deterrence against invasion by North Korea, in full compliance with its national defense commitments under the ROK-U.S. alliance. At that time, because
of the nature of the South–North confrontation, the nation had no other option
than to emphasize building up the army. The core of the ROK fleet comprised
surface ships given by or rented from the U.S. Navy (see table 2).
Around 1960, the ROKN beefed up the numbers of both DEs and PFs and increased its force of patrol boats, such as PCs. Additionally, the navy rapidly reinforced its amphibious-warfare ships, including LSTs. The ROKN was trying to
improve its capabilities in coastal defense against small craft from the North,
and in amphibious warfare, which would provide South Korean ground forces
operational flexibility in case of invasion.
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TABLE 2
ROKN STRENGTH 1960–80 (MAJOR COMBATANTS)

Total Personnel

1960

1970

1980

16,600

16,600

20,000

DD

5 U.S.-built, 2,500 tons

DD

2 U.S.-built, 2,200 tons

DD
DE

3 U.S.-built, 2,000 tons
2 U.S.-built, 1,500 tons

DE
PF

2
1 U.S.-built, 1,500 tons

4 U.S.-built, 1,500 tons

PCE

1

4
3 U.S.-built, 900 tons

PC

4 U.S.-built, 650 tons

8

PC

5 U.S.-built, 300 tons

4

PCS

3

3

2 U.S.-built, 250 tons

APD

1 U.S.-built, 1,400 tons

PT

3 U.S.-built, 30 tons

6 (ex-high-speed transport)

PG

8 U.S.-built, 250 tons
4 Korean-built

PG

1 U.S.-built, 250 tons

PKM

6 Korean-built, 80 tons

MSC

3 U.S.-built, 320 tons

6

AMS

10 U.S.-built, 300 tons

5

LST

8 U.S.-built, 1,600 tons

8

8

1 U.S.-built, 1,000 tons

1 (ex-LSM with rockets)

11

11

1 U.S.-built, 2,400 tons

1 (ex-LST repair ship)

1

1

LSMR
LSM

12 U.S.-built, 800 tons

LSSL

5 U.S.-built, 230 tons

ARL
AO
Others

1 Norwegian-built,
1,400 tons

8

Patrol crafts, self-propelled oil barges, tugboats, and various service crafts

Source: The official personnel strength of ROKN is not available in open sources like Jane’s. The total number of personnel in the ROKN used in the charts was
calculated by subtracting ROK Marine Corps strength from the sum of the “active duty service members” and “draftees” given in Jane’s.
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In about 1970, the ROKN introduced U.S. Navy Fletcher-class destroyers,
which, though already obsolete, were superior in surface combat capability, with
their five-inch guns, to what the navy had possessed in the past. In addition, the
ROKN steadily introduced new patrol craft. As a result, deterrence was strengthened against the North Korean navy, which was estimated to be good at
small-craft operations. In regard to amphibious ships, the ROKN by 1970 still
had the same strength as in 1960; apparently it had achieved its goal at this point
as far as the number of landing ships was concerned.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the ROKN received from the U.S. Navy a
number of Gearing- and Allen M. Sumner–class destroyers that had gone
through the American Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization (FRAM) pro8
gram. As a result, the operational capability of the ROK fleet jumped. However,
the ASROC (antisubmarine rocket) system, which was one of the centerpieces of
the FRAM modernization of these still-capable World War II–era destroyers
that were retained in U.S. service, was not installed on the units transferred to
the ROKN.
Perhaps at this time the ROKN preferred to improve its capability in surface
combat rather than that in ASW. If so, a reason might have been that Western navies at that time estimated the threats posed by North Korea to be

• Sea denial against U.S.-led naval forces, by submarine force and mines
• Confusion, spread by special operations forces
• Surprise assault landings, by large numbers of small landing craft and
boats.
However, the most likely reason for a strong emphasis on surface combat instead
of ASW is that the South Korean navy put more focus on the second and third of
these threats than on the first. The ROKN might have based such an assessment
on an internal evaluation based on shared national origin—that is, on unique
insight, unavailable to analysts of other navies—of the operational capability of
the North Korean navy.
In this period the ROKN decommissioned old U.S.-built ships that it had
used since its founding. At the same time, it replaced obsolete patrol boats with
new guided-missile patrol craft and small patrol boats, built by the Tacoma
Shipyard in the United States. In addition, some PGs were built in-country. In
this way the ROKN improved its capability in the area of coastal operations by
small patrol craft.
In contrast, however, the buildup of the mine-warfare and MCM forces, including coastal minesweepers, was slow. Apparently, the ROKN was uninterested in building up its MCM force. The South Korean navy was similarly
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uninterested in underway logistics; it purchased only one large oiler, from Norway. The main mission of the navy in this period was still coastal defense, not
blue-water operations.
In these years the Republic of Korea participated in the Vietnam War, with the
ROKN deploying transport ships to the South China Sea. In home waters, on 19
January 1967 a U.S.-built PCE was sunk in the Sea of Japan north of the Military
9
Demarcation Line by North Korean shore batteries. In June 1970, an ROKN
vessel that had been broadcasting propaganda to the North was captured by a
10
North Korean patrol craft.
During the 1970s, the administration of President Pak Chung-Hee developed and announced an “eight-year national defense plan” intended to build a
11
self-reliant national defense capability. On the basis of this plan, the ROK
started to construct a fleet using its domestic technology and industrial resources. Noteworthy products of this plan were the Ulsan-class frigates, with
displacements of two thousand tons, and the Pohang-class corvettes, of one
thousand tons. The ROKN eventually constructed, respectively, nine and
twenty-four of these types, which have been regarded as the workhorses of the
fleet in coastal operations. Since then, the ROKN has constructed almost all of
its own major combatants, at several shipyards.
LATE 1980S–2000: STABILIZATION, THEN RAPID ADVANCE
In the latter half of the 1980s modernization became conspicuous, with the introduction of new equipment, state-of-the-art technology, and new ships of domestic construction (see table 3).
TABLE 3
ROKN STRENGTH 1980–2000 (MAJOR COMBATANTS)
1980

1990

2000

20,000

35,000

40,000

SS (209)

1 German-built
2 Korean-assembled

8 Korean-built after fourth
boat

KSS

6 Korean-built,
midget submarines

11

Total Personnel

KDX-1 (11)

3

DD

5 U.S.-built, 2,500 tons

7

DD

2 U.S.-built, 2,200 tons

2

DD

3 U.S.-built, 2,000 tons

5
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TABLE 3 CONTINUED
ROKN STRENGTH 1980–2000 (MAJOR COMBATANTS)
1980

1990

2000

FFG

7 Korean-built, Ulsan

9

FS/FSG

18 Korean-built, Pohang

24

FS

4 Korean-built, Dong-Hae

4

5

DE

1 U.S.-built, 1,500 tons

PCE

3 U.S.-built, 900 tons

PG

8 U.S.-built, 250 tons
4 Korean-built

8

PG

1 U.S.-built, 250 tons

1

PKM

6 Korean-built, 80 tons

36 Sea Fox

PCF

32 Sea Dolphin

54

PCF

2 Wildcat

47

ML

1 Wonsan

MSC/MHC

1 Yangyang
3 licensed production,
Swallow

MHC
MSC

8 U.S.-built, 320 tons

8

8

LST

8 U.S.-built, 1,600 tons

8

6

LST

4 Alligator

LSMR

1 (ex-LSM with rockets)

LSM

11 U.S.-built, 800 tons

ARL

1 (ex-LST repair ship)

AO

1 Norwegian-built, 1,400
tons

7

3

AOR

3 Chunjee

ASR

1 Chunghaejin

ARS

2 U.S.-built, 1,500 tons

2 U.S.-built, 3,000 tons

Others

An oceanographic research ship, a variety of auxiliary ships, and various service craft

The ROKN selected the German-developed Type 209 submarine for its
first-generation submarine (known as the Chang Bogo class). The navy imported
the first boat; the South Korean shipbuilding industry assembled the second and
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third boats; and the fourth was built in-country, from keel laying to final fittingout. By this means, the ROKN, which had started its submarine force from nothing, paved the way to a real undersea-warfare capability—establishing training
procedures for the crews, developing operational concepts, and learning the technology needed for building diesel-electric submarines.
Additionally, while introducing the new SSs, the ROKN planned to establish a
submarine-rescue posture, indispensable for a submarine-operating navy. To
this end the navy introduced two submarine-rescue ships from the U.S. Navy
and ordered a Korean-built unit, Chunghaejin, along with the other measures
necessary to realize an appropriate and viable submarine-rescue capability.
As for destroyers, the ROKN seems to have set itself a goal of about ten DDs
that were superior in surface combat power to those of the North. In this period
it replaced six of eleven old, U.S.-built destroyers with three KDX-I units (the
Kwanggaeto Daewang class), trading a reduction in the total number of units for
improved capability.
Furthermore, the ROKN replaced its diverse collection of U.S.-built patrol
boats and craft with a force made up of two types, the Ulsan frigates and Pohang
corvettes. This improved not only practical operational capability but also rationalized education, training, and logistic support. In other words, the Navy made
a successful transition from a posture of many types with a few ships each to the
one with a few types with many ships each.
In general, and though the number of destroyers dropped, the operational capability of the ROK fleet, focused as it was on coastal defense against the North
Korean navy, apparently reached the level that the ROKN had envisioned. With
respect to ASW, however, it was inadequate, even after the introduction of the
three KDX-I destroyers and the Lynx helicopter. The ASW posture of the ROKN
still remains questionable today, in relation to the perceived threat of North Korean submarines and the geopolitical nature of the country. Where the ROKN
had once depended heavily on U.S.-built small patrol craft, in the 1980s and
1990s it made rapid progress in producing its own vessels, building a large number of domestically developed Sea Dolphin–class and Wildcat-class PCFs. A
buildup of the defenses of South Korean territorial waters was continually required, even “demanded,” of the ROKN by clandestine intrusions of North
Korean boats and small craft, which had continued ever since the war.
We can see in these facts a consistent ROKN policy toward the stark realities
of South–North confrontation and East–West rivalry that faced it—that is, friction and tension on the peninsula against the background, in the first part of the
period, of the Cold War and then of the unstable post–Cold War international
order that followed. Judging from statistics, the ROKN needed about a hundred
PCFs, including small PKMs (the Sea Fox class), to take proper measures against
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clandestine intrusion attempts from the sea and suspicious boat movements off
both coasts of the peninsula. In June 1999, for instance, a conflict occurred between small craft of the South and North near the Northern Limit Line off the
west coast of the peninsula. In June 2002 another engagement, including an exchange of fire, occurred in the same waters; the ROKN lost a patrol craft,
PKM-357.
A heavy burden was thus imposed on the ROKN by the nation. In contrast,
the JMSDF is relatively free of this burden, partly because larger distances reduce
the small-boat threat, and partly thanks to Japan’s coast guard. This difference
underlies clear contrasts that can be seen in the force-planning assumptions of
12
these two neighboring navies.
In the area of amphibious warfare, the South Korean navy decommissioned in
these years a large number of U.S.-built LSTs and LSMs. It filled the gap with four
domestically built, higher-performance LSTs of the Alligator class. As for MCM
ships, the navy introduced a minelayer, Wonsan, and several Yangyang-class
MSCs/MHCs, together with Swallow-class MHCs. Finally, the ROKN saw some improvement in its MCM operational capabilities; however, progress was still slow. At
the end of this period, three Korean-built, Chunjee-class AORs, which could steam
with surface forces at high speed, were introduced to the fleet. This improved substantially the fleet’s capability to support operations on the high seas.
In the last two decades of the century, specifically in the late 1990s, modernization in the ROK fleet, both in quality and quantity, was conspicuous. This
trend was supported by a noteworthy change-of-command speech of the twentieth Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ahn Byung-Tae, who made it clear that
13
the ROKN would aim to become a blue-water navy.
THE PRESENT: REALIZING THE GOAL OF A BLUE-WATER NAVY
The ambitious force buildups of the 1990s seem to have given the Republic of
Korea Navy sufficient operational defenses in coastal and regional waters against
the periodic, unpredictable attempts of the North Korean navy. Meanwhile, the
South Korean state and people have developed strong national interests beyond
the northwest Pacific region, especially in extensive trade with foreign nations
and in the sea lines of communications over which that trade is carried. The
South Korean navy has, accordingly, established a basis for a distant-operations
capability of which it had long dreamed; it is safe to say that quest continues today. The progress of the ROKN toward a blue-water fleet merits the attention of
other navies in the region, even the rest of the world (see table 4).
As for submarines, the ROKN has started to construct the Son Won-Il class,
the new German-developed Type 214, with air-independent propulsion. The
U.S.-built DDs have now disappeared from the fleet, and the ROKN has started
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TABLE 4
ROKN STRENGTH 2000–2008 (MAJOR COMBATANTS)
2000

2008

Total personnel

40,000

41,000

SS (209)

8 (Korean-built after fourth boat)

9

SS (214)

1

KSS

11 Korean-built, midget submarines

11

KDX-I

3

3

KDX-II

4

KDX-III

1

DD

5 U.S.-built, 2,500 tons

FFG

9 Korean-built, Ulsan

9

FS/FSG

24 Korean-built, Pohang

24

FS

4 Korean-built, Dong-Hae

4

PG

5 U.S.-built, 250 tons + 4 Korean-built

FAC

54 Korean-built, Sea Dolphin

FAC

47 Korean-built, Wildcat

ML

1 Korean-built, Wonsan

1

MSC/MHC

1 Korean-built, Yangyang

3

MHC

6 licensed production, Swallow

6

MSC

8 U.S.-built, 320 tons

LPD

83 (total number of FACs)

1 Korean-built, Dokdo

LST

6 U.S.-built, 1,600 tons

2

LST

4 Korean-built, Alligator

4

LSM

3 U.S.-built, 800 tons

AOR

3 Korean-built, Chunjee

3

ASR

1 Korean-built, Chunghaejin

1

ARS

2 U.S.-built, 3,000 tons

2

Others

Patrol boats, oceanographic research ship, and various service craft

six KDX-IIs (the Chungmugong Yi Sun-Shin class) and three KDX-IIIs (Sejong
Daewang class), almost in parallel. The KDX-III is equipped with the latest Aegis
combat system. By the time this program is completed, the ROK fleet’s destroyer
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force will reach the level of the leading navies of the world. With respect to small,
fast patrol boats, the ROKN has kept its strength at around eighty units, a number achieved by 2000. These boats have remained in frontline service, with the
main mission of the coastal defense, together with the larger Ulsan and Pohang
ships. However, it is about time for the ROKN to start planning for their replacements; these large and small patrol units will soon be reaching the ends of their
service lives.
For amphibious warfare, the South Korean navy has one LPD, Dokdo, and
four Alligator-class LSTs. Only two of the old U.S.-built LSTs remain today. The
ROKN has also introduced high-speed air-cushion landing craft, which are expected to improve the capability of the amphibious force in terms of quality;
meanwhile, the service seems to be reviewing the strategic concept of its amphibious force and accordingly the number of landing ships it requires.
Underlying all this activity may be an ROKN strategic estimate that South
Korea has substantially surpassed North Korea—thanks to the country’s overwhelming economic growth in recent years—and that the capability and possibility of all-out, full-scale invasion into the South by the North are extremely
low. The navy apparently also thinks that the ROK military, together with U.S.
forces, could surely interdict and repel such an invasion, except in a nuclear scenario. The buildup of the amphibious force in quality at the expense of quantity
may reflect such an estimate.
Also, one aspect of the amphibious program can be seen as a fresh approach
to the international situation. The ROKN is now fully aware of the new missions of international contribution and cooperation, such as peacekeeping
and humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief operations. The South Korean
navy learned a vital lesson from bitter experience when it found itself unable to
participate sufficiently in the multinational relief operations on northern Sumatra, in Indonesia, after the earthquake and tsunami in December 2004.
Memories of this episode may well be reflected in multirole amphibious ships
projected for the future.
In the area of mine warfare, the ROKN has decommissioned all eight of its
outdated U.S.-built MSCs. Its new mine-countermeasures force is composed
of three Yangyang-class MSCs/MHCs and six Swallow-class MHCs, all of domestic construction but carrying new, foreign-developed MCM equipment.
The South Korean navy has apparently improved the quality of its MCM force,
but its quantity seems not yet sufficient for the current security and military
situation around the peninsula. In the realm of underway replenishment,
which is indispensable if the ROKN is to become a real blue-water navy, the
ROK fleet has its three domestically built Chunjee-class AORs. These three replenishment oilers seem to meet the operational requirement today.
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With respect to the naval aviation, the ROKN has replaced its old S-2 maritime surveillance and patrol aircraft with new P-3Cs. Thanks to these new aircraft, the ocean-surveillance capability of the ROK fleet has substantially
improved; however, only eight P-3Cs are now in the inventory. Otherwise, the
navy is introducing new multimission Lynx helicopters, useful for antisurface
and antisubmarine warfare. The strength of the Lynx helicopter force, which
numbers twenty-five today, seems enough for shipboard operations on board
the new KDXs and for land operations (see table 5).
TABLE 5
NAVAL AVIATION 1990–2008
1990

2000

2008

P-3C maritime surveillance and patrol

8

8

S-2A/F maritime surveillance and patrol

8

8

17

12

Lynx helicopter (ASW)

13

13

F-406 (fixed-wing small-size at-sea surveillance aircraft)

5

Lynx helicopter (ASV)

12

With regard to the growing trend toward a navy capable of operations in distant waters, two important new initiatives were taken by the present Lee
Myung-Bak administration in 2009. In March, the government authorized
ROKN participation in international antipiracy operations in Gulf of Aden; in
May, South Korea became the ninety-fifth nation to join the Proliferation Security Initiative. These decisions clearly show the government’s intention to make
the Republic of Korea a nation of greater international responsibility and influence. They also show its determination to use its capable navy as a tool to realize
national objectives. The ROKN today seems to have sufficient capability to support and respond fully to the growing expectations and requirements of its
nation’s government and people.
TO THE FUTURE
The Republic of Korea Navy’s recent emphasis on the construction of a bluewater navy is understandable if its perception of the threat has in fact changed
from that of previous years. As implied above, the military capability of North
Korea to fight a conventional, full-scale war against the South seems to be declining. However, the North is still capable of small but determined intimidating or trap-setting operations along the coast of the peninsula.
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Missions/Resource Allocation: Coastal Defense and Blue-Water Operations
The South–North confrontation still continues, against the background of an
unchanging geopolitical and strategic environment defined by the close proximity of such powerful nations as China, Russia, and Japan. Accordingly, the
ROKN has made coastal defense its main mission since its foundation, and it
may have to do so for the foreseeable future.
The question, then, becomes: How can the South Korean navy improve its
blue-water capability—which is its strongly held goal, perceived as the mark of a
mature navy—and at the same time protect the nation’s coasts? The tempo of
distant operations will surely continue to grow in the future, but an appropriate
balance will have to be maintained—not an easy job for the strategic thinkers
and force planners of the ROKN. Beyond that, every country has only finite resources, especially in terms of budget. The course the Republic of Korea Navy
chooses to take through these obstacles and challenges will be of much interest
to regional navies.
Antisubmarine Warfare
Three factors (strategic, tactical, and geopolitical) bearing upon South Korean
ASW must be taken into consideration, and they lead clearly to an overall conclusion, or implication.
First, the ROKN’s present ASW assets—twelve destroyers, of three types; two
dozen Lynx helicopters, and eight P-3Cs—are not sufficient. Second, the region’s unique geography and oceanography make for a highly complex and difficult ASW environment, one requiring special consideration and measures. The
Korean Peninsula is, by definition, surrounded with water on three sides. The
mountainous east coast faces the deep and steeply shelving Sea of Japan. To the
south a complicated coastline, with scattered small islands and two large ones
farther out to sea (Tsushima and Cheju), faces the east and west channels of the
Tsushima Strait, which in turn connects the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea.
The west coast is also complicated, but its topography is relatively flat; it abuts
the northern part of the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, which is shallow for
long stretches and where a great tide differential exists. Third, the navies of all
the neighboring nations—Russia, China, Taiwan, and Japan—as well as that of
the United States, an allied partner of South Korea, operate submarines in these
waters.
The conclusion is that the ASW capability of the ROKN plainly requires improvement in both quality and quantity.
Quite aside from the threat posed by North Korean submarines (most of
which are obsolete), the need to collect subsurface information on surrounding
waters and on deployed submarines of other navies makes ASW capability for
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the ROK fleet a precondition of status as a navy capable of distant operations.
The ROK-U.S. alliance, with the intelligence exchange it brings, could be of
some help in this context, and certainly the possibility is very small that South
Korea will go to war with any of these nations; nevertheless, the navy must establish its own comprehensive ASW capability, built around adequate ocean
surveillance capabilities.
Additionally, of course, credible tactical ASW capability—search, detection,
tracking, identification, and attack, as well as postattack analysis—has real significance to the ROK fleet today. In fact, a sufficient ASW capability, supported
by underwater surveillance, is a must, a prerequisite for combined operations
under the ROK-U.S. alliance with the American carrier strike groups that would
be deployed in a contingency on the Korean Peninsula or in the northwest Pacific. Also, should a crisis occur involving Japan, a CVSG responding under the
Japanese-U.S. alliance would operate in the same waters as it would in a Korean
crisis per se; the ROKN could not be indifferent to that. In any case, and in any
grave contingency, the protection of an American CVSG operating around the
peninsula or in the northwest Pacific from all kinds of threats, in particular submarines, would become the most important mission of the ROK fleet. In this respect especially, antisubmarine warfare, especially underwater surveillance and
a strong tactical capability, has great significance for the South Korean navy.
Submarines
Today, the ROKN has a robust submarine force composed of nine Type 209 and
several (eventually nine) Type 214 boats. However, the navy’s strategic objectives and operational concepts for its capable submarine force are not clear, at
least from the viewpoint of some foreign experts. In other words, they would
ask: How and against whom would the ROKN use its capable submarines? A tactical question also remains unanswered: “Would the main task of its submarines
be antisubmarine or antisurface warfare?”
If the answer is ASW, the current composition of the ROK fleet seems rather
unbalanced. The strength of the submarine force is disproportionately high in
comparison to that of other antisubmarine assets, such as destroyers, maritime
patrol air, and helicopters. The buildup of the submarine force has been too
quick; too many submarines now exist but too few platforms of other kinds.
But maybe the answer is ASUW, and that would be understandable, given that
the most important historical mission of ROKN has been defense of coastal waters against covert operations by small surface craft from North Korea. However,
the submarine seems generally unsuitable for this type of ASUW. In light of the
importance of ASW capability, the ROKN may have been building its forces in a
way incompatible with its historical position and security needs. That is, if it
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takes seriously the country’s peninsular geopolitical character and what cooperation as a fully reliable partner in the ROK-U.S. alliance requires, it may now
have to strengthen and improve its ASW capability in general, and in particular,
to achieve the best possible underwater situational awareness.
This view is contradicted by a theory now current in China, where submarine
development is a subject of debate. One school of thought in the PLA Navy takes
the operations of British SSNs during the Falklands War, in 1982, as an model
for sea control in distant waters. In this view, the point is the high speed and long
endurance of the Royal Navy’s SSNs, which made it possible for the United Kingdom, a nonglobal power lacking a large network of overseas naval bases, to gain
sea control in a remote and distant operational area—the waters around the
Falklands.14 The attractiveness of this theory to navies like that of China is understandable, but the Chinese rationale raises a further point, a strategic
one—the antisurface (that is, tactical) capability of submarines. In the Falklands
War a British nuclear-powered submarine, HMS Conqueror, attacked and sank a
World War II–vintage Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano. The Argentine navy’s
surface operations ceased totally, and eventually Argentine maritime operations
of all kinds against British forces were substantially contained. With this single
submarine operation, the Royal Navy had gained sea control around the
Falklands. In other words, a tactical action by an SSN—a torpedo attack against
a surface ship—gained an unexpected strategic advantage, by establishing
regional, but total, sea control.
Many navies—notably the Imperial Japanese Navy, the U.S. Navy, and the
Royal Navy itself—have made every effort, over the entire course of other wars, to
achieve such a capability, regardless of casualties or damage to themselves, and yet
have failed. Gaining such a strategic advantage is the very raison d’être of an
armed force, the goal of its nation and people in wartime, the pride of its servicemen and women. Nonetheless, many navies have looked for a key to the true significance of submarines in the single success of HMS Conqueror in the Falklands.
If the ROKN planners dare instead to seek the strategic significance of conventional submarines in the sea surrounding the Korean Peninsula, taking full account of the limitations of diesel-electric-driven boats, they will have established a
good basis for future naval operations and strategy. There are indications suggesting that some answers may become clearer in the near future.
Wide-Area Ocean Surveillance
The ROKN has been continuously modernizing its fleet, but its wide-area
ocean-surveillance capability—which is indispensable to both coastal defense
and blue-water operations—does not look sufficient at present. If the navy is to
achieve these two main missions, it will be necessary to collect and plot precise
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surface and subsurface information and intelligence. It is fundamentally important that the ROKN be able to collect information on the three maritime environments, with strikingly different characteristics, that surround it. The ROKN
has built robust and capable submarine and destroyer forces, which constitute
between them the core of the practical combat power of the fleet—in figurative
language, its “spear.” However, the navy has yet to improve the wide-area ocean
surveillance that it must develop in order to point and thrust this spear. It has already been announced that the ROKN plans to double the number of its P-3Cs,
to sixteen, in the near future. However, two questions remain: What is the plan
for a wide-area ocean-surveillance capability that meets the real operational and
strategic requirements of the Korean nation and its navy? And what is the target
date for its completion?
MCM Capability
Some people might consider the mine-warfare resources of the ROKN modest.
But in a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, mine warfare, especially mine
countermeasures, would be pivotal for the coastal defense of both the east and
west coasts of the country. In addition, it would be crucial to secure SLOCs in
the Tsushima Strait, which connect the southern part of the ROK with Kyushu,
the closest of the four main islands of Japan to the Korean Peninsula, where
most logistic supplies for military operations on the peninsula would be collected, stored, and transshipped. So, safe navigation of the Tsushima Strait is
indispensable to the ability of both ROK and American forces to fight and sustain themselves, and to the U.S. alliances with both South Korea and Japan. The
ROK fleet should be prepared to clear all possible mine threats in at least the
strait’s western channel; perhaps the JMSDF would clear the eastern channel.
In reality however, there is no agreement between the governments of Japan
and the ROK to conduct combined military operations in case of any contingency in either of the two nations. It is true that the lack of a combined operational plan among the Japanese and ROK militaries has been one of most
serious problems for regional security, especially in a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. Of course, it is not a purely military matter; a political decision
by the two governments is needed to resolve this problem. However, apart
from political issues between two governments, the Tsushima Strait will become a SLOC of strategic importance in case of a real-world contingency on
the peninsula. In that case, under the sound bilateral policies that are expected
to be established shortly, it is natural to presume that the JMSDF would take
responsibility in the strait’s eastern channel—that is, the Japanese side, between the islands Tsushima and Kyushu. Similarly, the ROKN would take the
western channel—the Korean side, between Tsushima and the peninsula—as
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its area of responsibility. In this light, the present strength of the South Korean
15
MCM force seems questionable.
A new question therefore arises: How will the navy achieve a balance between
its “spear” (its destroyers and submarines) and its MCM force? The answer to
this question is not apparent now, but construction in the MCM force in the
near future may show the strategic direction of the ROKN in this regard.
The Strategic Mobile Fleet/Strategic Mobile Group
In 2001, the administration of then-president Kim Dae-Jung announced a plan
for building a “Strategic Mobile Fleet” in order to achieve “the protection of the
national interests in the five oceans in the world and the contribution to the
16
world peace.” Later the plan was downscaled from a “fleet” to a “group,” of flotilla size. The first SMG is scheduled to be completed by 2010; according to the
plan, it will be composed of the LPD Dokdo, some KDX-IIIs (Aegis DDGs), and
17
six KDX-IIs.
Additionally, a new naval base for this group is under construction on
Cheju Island off the southern coast. The navy has announced that the mission
of the SMG will be to gain sea control in the waters surrounding the Korean
18
Peninsula. The combination of amphibious assault ships, destroyers, and
guided-missile destroyers—a mix of “L-ships” and “D-ships”—with their different operational requirements and characteristics, seems a little irregular for
a group intended to establish sea control. In fact, the declared employment
concept for this SMG—which resembles a small U.S. amphibious ready group
with escorting destroyers—is a bit ambiguous. The question may naturally
arise: What is the real objective of SMG? Is it amphibious warfare (that is,
power projection) or sea control, or both?
This argument aside, however, the noteworthy point is that this SMG will be
the first major tactical unit in the ROK fleet to focus on operations far from
home waters. The final number of SMGs to be organized is a point worth
watching.
TWO POWERS DESTINED TO COOPERATE
The ROKN grew steadily at first, then rapidly in recent years, overcoming various difficulties and limitations. The navy has set as its first mission the protection of coastal areas, in light of the more than half-century of confrontation
between South and North on the peninsula and also of its geopolitical relationships with the capable navies of nearby nations. The ROKN has endeavored to
build up this capability, aware of its heavy responsibility to its country and the
South Korean people.
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Simultaneously, as the economic development has deepened the country’s interdependence with foreign nations, the ROKN, like the nation itself, became
acutely aware of the necessity to secure its national interests abroad. The importance to those interests of the security of the nation’s SLOCs was fully recognized
as well. Around the year 2000 the ROKN started to turn itself into a navy capable
of operations far from home waters. Since then, the navy has aimed to meet the
needs of both missions, coastal and distant, in its force planning, and as a result
the ROKN has become one of the most notable navies in the region today. There
seem to be many areas that could be improved and shortcomings to be resolved
in the ROKN; no navy in the world is free from such problems.
Nonetheless—and fully recognizing the challenges and issues that exist—there
are many areas in which the capable Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the
emerging Republic of Korea Navy can cooperate in the future. With regard to the
strategic viewpoints of the two navies, the most important factor for both the
JMSDF and ROKN to understand is that a contingency on the Korean Peninsula
could affect Japan and that a contingency in Japan could affect South Korea. The
United States, having independent alliances with each country, will respond to any
contingency involving either state. In such a case, it will expect the JMSDF and
ROKN to cooperate and coordinate between themselves, fully respecting the present situation, current capabilities, and existing limitations and constraints of both
navies. Conversely, inadequate cooperation will not only help the adversary in a
specific contingency but also serve a third party in the region. In the worst case it
would greatly damage the national interests of both nations, as well as those of the
United States.
Without question, the more the ROKN develops as a blue-water navy, the
more conscious it will become of the Japanese archipelago, ranging from the
southernmost Yonaguni Island, immediately east of Taiwan, to Hokkaido and
the northern territorial islands of Japan. If so, the geography and geopolitics of
the region would make it natural for the South Korean navy to strengthen its relationship with the JMSDF. The converse is true for the JMSDF as well. The two
nations, both formidable, regional maritime powers, are destined to cooperate,
in the interest of their common values.
I have undertaken the analysis and evaluation of the development of the Republic of Korea Navy as a maritime defense expert and ex-JMSDF leader who
was involved in the start of official exchanges between the two services. I have
not hesitated to refer to the past, because the ancient history of the Korean Peninsula and the foundational era after World War II form collectively a strong basis for pride in the mind of South Korea’s sailors, judging by my own experience
with them. If we are to have a correct view of the ROKN, we must take into
proper account not only visible equipment of the navy but the “invisible minds”
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of its sailors. For that reason, the promotion of mutual understanding should be
actively pursued by sailors of both the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and
the Republic of Korea Navy, from the lowest to the highest levels. The mutual
understanding they achieve will be the key to the lasting security of the region.

NOTES

This article represents the personal opinion
of the author and not any official position of
the JMSDF or the government of Japan. The
author expresses special appreciation to Mr.
John Niemeyer, a special adviser to the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan (CNFJ),
and Ms. Amiko Imaizumi, a civil-affairs liaison and language specialist in the CNFJ Japan
Liaison Office, for substantial contributions
to the development of the English text of this
article. Japanese names are given in Western
fashion, surname last; Korean names are
given with surnames first.
1. Kim Yan-gi, Monogatari-Kankoku-shi [Korean History] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha,
1989), pp. 123–24, 156.
2. “KDX” means “next-generation destroyer,
designed and built in South Korea.” The
KDX-1 class is the first generation of this
group.

still in the fleet inventory in large number in
the 1950s and ’60s. The program was also
intended to upgrade the ASW capability of
many Gearing- and Sumner-class destroyers
in order to cope with the rapidly growing
Soviet submarine threat. Major new ASW
systems installed on these DDs were the
SQS-23 sonar, ASROC (antisubmarine
rocket), DASH (the drone antisubmarine
helicopter), and Mk-44 torpedo. It also replaced the electronic equipment of these
ships with new radars and electronic warfare
systems and thoroughly overhauled their
propulsion plants.
9. ROKN website.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.

7. Republic of Korea Navy (English-language),
www.navy.mil.kr/english/main/main.jsp
[hereafter ROKN website].

12. For example, the force strength of the JMSDF
since 2000 has been about fifty DDs, sixteen
SSs, twenty-five MCM ships, eighty P-3Cs,
and eighty SH-60s. Of fast small craft for
coastal operation, there are only six PGs. The
JMSDF, which traditionally has laid relatively
light stress on coastal defense, has been allocating most of its national resources instead
to blue-water forces, especially ASW forces,
which the JMSDF thinks indispensable for its
SLOC defense and cooperation with U.S. carrier strike groups. In contrast, the strength of
the ROKN in the early 2010s seems likely to
remain at about twelve DDs, eighteen SSs,
ten MCM ships, between eight and sixteen
P-3Cs, twenty-five Lynx helicopters, and
eighty to a hundred fast small craft of various
types. This difference clearly points to the extremely heavy responsibility of the ROKN for
its nation’s coastal defense.

8. Gyrodyne Helicopter Historical Foundation,
www.gyrodynehelicopters.com. The U.S.
FRAM program was meant to extend, by
five to eight years, the service lives of its
World War II–era destroyers, which were

13. In the fall of 1994, before the start of official
exchanges like the navy-to-navy talks, the author (then a captain, deputy of the Plans and
Policy Division of MSO) escorted then–vice
admiral Ahn on a tour of the JMSDF’s Kure

3. Kim, Korean History, pp. 241–45.
4. Ibid., pp. 247–48.
5. Ibid., pp. 266–73.
6. At the third session of navy-to-navy talks,
held at MSO in January 2002, I (by then a
rear admiral and director of Operations and
Plans Department of MSO) was impressed by
the high morale and strong pride exhibited
by the ROKN representatives. They told me
of this episode, which suggested the spiritual
superiority of South Korean sailors in comparison to the members of the nation’s other
services.
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District and the Etajima education and training complex. Vice Admiral Ahn, the commander in chief of the ROK fleet, was visiting
unofficially, but I was a bit tense and nervous—it was a rare visit by a South Korean
VIP, and I had to escort him alone. I was surprised to learn that Vice Admiral Ahn was
quite familiar with the Imperial Navy and the
JMSDF. Also, during the three-day trip his
frank and honest personality gradually removed my tension. Shown around the headquarters and base facilities, including those of
submarines, the Kure District, and Etajima
(where the historic brick building of the Imperial Naval Academy still stood), the admiral was impressed by the legacy, both physical
and intellectual, of the Imperial Navy to the
JMSDF. During the return “bullet train” trip,
he quietly but emphatically told me of his determination that the ROKN would build a
submarine force and become a blue-water
navy in the future, and of the necessity that it
do so. By chance, this was just prior to his
change-of-command speech. This encounter
is one of the reasons why I, as a captain responsible for JMSDF policy, started

developing the idea of staff talks between the
JMSDF and ROKN, which began three years
later.
14. Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein,
“China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force:
Insights from Chinese Writings,” Naval War
College Review 60, no. 1 (Winter 2007), pp.
55–79.
15. The practical strengths of the MCM forces of
the two navies are in strong contrast. The
JMSDF has two MLs/tenders, three ocean
minehunters and minesweepers with deepwater MCM capability, and twenty-one
coastal minehunters and minesweepers, as
well as a squadron of MCM helicopters. For
its part, the ROKN has one ML, three MSCs
and MHCs, and six MHCs. This difference
may generate serious strategic problems in
securing the two channels of the Tsushima
Strait in case of a peninsular contingency.
16. Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/rok/navy.htm.
17. ROKN website.
18. Ibid.
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ARCTIC SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE U.S.
NAVY’S ROADMAP FOR THE ARCTIC
Rear Admiral David W. Titley, U.S. Navy, and Courtney C. St. John

A

rctic sea-ice melting associated with global climate change has caused leaders
from the United States and the international community to reconsider the
national security implications of the region. Taking into account nearly a century
of experience in the Arctic, new national policy, existing strategy, and geopolitical
implications of the changing environment, the U.S. Navy has developed an Arctic
Roadmap that will guide policy, investment, and action regarding the region.
With key themes of improved environmental understanding, informed investments, increased experience, cooperative partnerships, and support for the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Arctic Roadmap
Rear Admiral Titley is Oceanographer of the Navy and
Director, Task Force Climate Change. Commissioned
is meant to ensure Navy readiness and capability and
as a surface warfare officer, he transferred in 1984 to the
result in recognition of the Navy as a valued partner by
Oceanography community. In afloat assignments as an
oceanographer he has deployed seven times; ashore, he
the joint, interagency, and international communities.
has commanded the Fleet Numerical Meteorological
and Oceanographic Center, Monterey, California, and
the Naval Oceanography Operations Command; his
first tour as a flag officer was as Commander, Naval
Meteorology and Oceanography Command. Rear Admiral Titley holds a PhD in meteorology from the U.S.
Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey.
Ms. St. John is a John A. Knauss Marine Policy Fellow
in the Office of the Oceanographer of the Navy, conducting interagency and international outreach on behalf of Task Force Climate Change. She holds a master’s
in city and regional planning from Clemson University
and is a coauthor of articles on shoreline management
and Chesapeake Bay.
Naval War College Review, Spring 2010, Vol. 63, No. 2

THE CHANGING ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT
The Arctic has long been a dynamic and harsh environment where maritime operations of any kind have
been hazardous, if not impossible. Yet traditional
views of the Arctic as a nonnavigable region are beginning to shift. Relative to the 1970s, the Earth’s temperature has increased sufficiently to cause significant
melting of glaciers and diminishment in Arctic sea ice.
The prevailing and well established scientific view attributes this temperature change to anthropogenic
emissions of “greenhouse” gases.1
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The “greenhouse effect” is the well-known process that keeps the Earth’s temperature above the -18°C temperature it would have if greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere did not absorb the sun’s heat and reradiate it back to the surface.
However, the anthropogenic loading of additional greenhouse gases into the atmosphere since the Industrial Revolution has been massive, accelerating the
2
natural climate change processes. Since the 1880s, temperatures have risen
3
0.8°C—a significant increase in a relatively short period. Greenhouse gases trap
more heat in the atmosphere, thereby increasing the average global temperature
4
of the surface and atmosphere. The Arctic is especially vulnerable to global
warming, because as snow and ice melt, darker land and ocean surfaces absorb
more solar energy. As warming reduces the extent of sea ice, the solar heat absorbed by the oceans in the summer is more easily transferred to the atmosphere
5
in the winter, which makes the air temperature warmer.
As a result, the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the globe. Specifically, scientists are observing retreating sea ice, melting glaciers, and shrinking
6
snow and permafrost areas. The summer ice cap is estimated to be only half the
7
size it was fifty years ago. Sea-ice extent in the Arctic has decreased steadily since
the 1950s and in September 2007 reached a record low that was 39 percent below
the 1979–2000 mean. September 2008 experienced the second-lowest Arctic ice
extent on record, at 34 percent below the 1970–2000 mean. In September 2009,
when the Arctic reached its minimum ice extent for the year, it was recorded at
the third-lowest extent since 1979 satellite measurements began, further demonstrating the declining trend in summer sea ice over the past thirty years (see
8
the figure).
Although estimates for when the Arctic will experience ice-free conditions in
the summer range from 2013 to 2060, the consensus of most models and researchers is that the Arctic will experience ice-free conditions for a portion of
9
the summer by 2030. It is important to point out that no research or model simulations indicate that winter sea-ice cover of the Arctic Ocean will disappear
during this century. This reinforces the point that the Arctic will still be a very
challenging environment in which to operate.
Regardless of the exact year that the Arctic becomes ice free in the summer,
the widespread warming trend will continue. Multiyear sea ice has also declined
rapidly in the central Arctic Ocean; one study based on satellite data for winters
during 1978–98 showed that multiyear sea ice declined at a rate of 7 percent per
10
decade. A second study examined twenty-five years of summer ice minima
(from 1978 to 2003) and demonstrated a decline of multiyear sea ice as high as
11
9.2 percent per decade. The multiyear ice is being replaced by first-year sea ice
that is considerably weaker and thinner. Because ice cover naturally cools air and

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss2/1

NWCR_Spring2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\5399_NWC_Review_Spring2010\NWCR_Spring2010.vp
Monday, March 01, 2010 4:18:38 PM

42

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

TITLEY & ST. JOHN

37

DAILY ARCTIC SEA ICE EXTENT AS OF 9 JANUARY 2010

Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center
Note: Area of ocean with at least 15 percent sea ice.

water masses and plays a significant role in ocean circulation and the reflection
of solar radiation back into space, weaker and thinner sea ice has the potential to
12
change the global climate system significantly. The well observed decline in
multiyear and summer sea ice is a clear indicator that some of the most rapid cli13
mate change on Earth is occurring in the Arctic.
The effects of climate change in the Arctic are observed in the sea, in the air, and
on land. Indigenous Arctic people are facing relocation and loss of communities
as sea-ice melt causes increased shoreline erosion and melting of permafrost. Impacts on Arctic species include the well publicized decline of the polar bear population and a decline in the algae that attach to the bottom of the ice. The algae form
14
the base of the food chain linking microscopic animals and fish to other animals.
In other cases, flora and fauna are experiencing extended growing seasons, and the
Arctic is playing host to new species migrating northward with shifting climate
patterns; changes in fish migrations coupled with intensified sea-ice melt will
yield greater access to fish stocks. These trends clearly demonstrate the need to un15
derstand the complex processes occurring in the Arctic.
However, changes in sea ice, sea-level rise, and ocean acidity and their impacts on ecosystems are not well modeled. Most numerical modeling to date has

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010

NWCR_Spring2010_37.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\5399_NWC_Review_Spring2010\NWCR_Spring2010.vp
Wednesday, March 03, 2010 11:41:28 AM

43

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

38

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

focused on global change predictions, which have greater confidence than regional change predictions, where weather patterns and ecosystem impacts vary
16
considerably. Present climate projections based on the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change Assessment Report (2007) show substantial uncertainty in regional and decadal scales, especially with respect to ice-sheet dynamics and sea-level rise. Data-gathering methods used for climate data are typically
designed for other purposes (like agricultural services, weather prediction, or
water-resources management) and therefore do not accurately reflect the intri17
cacies needed to detect gradual climate trends. Because the Arctic is such a hostile environment, in situ observations are challenging, if not impossible, in
many locations. If it is to understand near- and long-term trends better, the international Arctic science community will need to deploy its resources in the
most effective manner.
Natural Resources
One future change in the Arctic region is greater accessibility to, and availability of, natural resources, including offshore oil and gas, minerals, and fisheries.
The Arctic contains 10 percent of the world’s known petroleum reserves and
approximately 25 percent of its undiscovered reserves.18 The U.S. exclusive
economic zone has a potential thirty billion barrels of oil reserves and 221 bil19
lion cubic feet in natural gas reserves. Minerals available for extraction in the
Arctic include manganese, copper, cobalt, zinc, and gold. Coupled with a rise
in global demand for natural oil and gas resources and improved accessibility,
the Arctic has become a new focus for oil companies looking for untapped resources. Already $2.6 billion has been spent on active oil and gas leases in the
20
Chukchi Sea. Yet the extraction of these minerals and petroleum reserves depends heavily upon development and deployment of resilient technology that
can function in such harsh conditions, marked by lack of infrastructure and
long distances to markets.
The warming experienced recently in the Arctic region may improve the
availability of certain resources, but it will redistribute others. In the United
States alone, redistribution of fish stocks will cause changes for indigenous Alaskans who depend upon the stocks for subsistence. In August 2009 the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) released a fishery management plan for the Arctic waters of the United States, including the Chukchi and
Beaufort seas, which prohibits commercial fishing in the region until enough in21
formation is available to manage the fishery sustainably. Fisheries managers
require an understanding of how to maintain sustainable fisheries while taking
into account likely intensification in commercial fishing operations. Resource
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planners and policy makers will need to examine closely the best ways to manage
newly opened areas of the Arctic, balancing multiple and competing uses.
Transportation Access and Operational Challenges
As for natural-resource availability, shipping and transportation will benefit
from a more open Arctic. The fabled Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route
will both be navigable for greater periods of time during the summer, and may
be utilized more often for commercial shipping. Indeed, the Northern Sea Route
offers a 35–60 percent savings in distance—and therefore in time and money
— for shipping between Northern Europe and the Far East in comparison to the
22
Suez or Panama canals, making it a very attractive option. Surface-vessel access
to “open water” areas within the Arctic will gradually increase from the current
few weeks a year to a few months a year, centered around mid-September (the
minimum ice extent), although better access will be tempered by the challenges
23
that operation in the Arctic environment poses for the shipping industry. For
example, marine insurers are currently offering insurance only on a caseby-case basis, and marine operations are impeded by lack of ice-navigator train24
ing programs, most of which are ad hoc in any case. Sea-ice forecasts are limited by a lack of understanding of the exact interrelationships among ice, polar
oceans, and the atmosphere, and inability to model variables like sea ice at a fully
coupled, regional scale, taking account of complexities that arise from the inter25
actions of global, regional, and local processes. National standards that regulate ship-source pollution vary among Arctic states; shipping companies will
also need to invest substantial amounts of money to develop new icestrengthened vessels and ensure that they operate within environmental compliance guidelines.
Boundary Disputes, Security Concerns
Despite present good relations among Arctic nations, recent media attention
paints the area as a source of potential international conflict as countries flex
their muscles and seek to identify portions of the region to which they can lay
claim. After a team of scientists planted a Russian flag on the seabed of the North
Pole, a well publicized article in Time magazine in October 2007 posed the question, “Who owns the Arctic?” Over the past few years, in the wake of Russia’s actions, the recent years of decreased summer ice extent, and a swell of scientific
reports published on climate change, the Arctic has experienced a rise in media
attention. Media speculation has spoken of the Arctic as the site of a new Cold
War, suggesting that the question of who “owns” the Arctic will cause international conflict. In reality, the “new” Arctic will be one with multiple competing
uses by many countries. Indeed, the likelihood of large-scale international
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conflict is small, and the Arctic environment will continue to be harsh and challenging for much of the year, making operations difficult and dangerous for the
remainder of the twenty-first century.
The legal regime applicable in the Arctic is the customary international law as
reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
While the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, it considers the convention’s
navigation and jurisdiction provisions to be binding international law. The convention advances and protects the national security, environmental, and economic interests of all nations, including the United States, codifying the
navigational rights and freedoms that are critical to American military and com26
mercial vessels. It also secures economic rights to offshore natural resources.
Article 76 of the convention allows nations to claim jurisdiction past their exclusive economic zones on the basis of undersea features that are considered extensions of the continental shelf, if a structure is geologically similar to a nation’s
27
continental landmass. In May 2008 five of the Arctic nations adopted the
Illulissat Declaration, which acknowledges that “the Law of the Sea is the relevant legal framework in the Arctic” and that there is “no need to develop a new
comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic,” committing the
28
signatories to an “orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims.”
Currently there are overlapping, unresolved maritime boundary claims between the United States and Canada, Canada and Denmark, Denmark and Norway, and Norway and Russia. At this time, none of these disputed boundary
claims pose a threat to global stability. While the United States and Canada disagree on the location of the maritime boundary in and northward of the Beaufort Sea, the United States considers Canada a close ally, and the dispute does not
29
jeopardize this relationship. Unfortunately, the United States is the only Arctic
nation that has not joined UNCLOS, despite support from President Barack
Obama and the Bush and Clinton administrations. Because the Illulissat Declaration recognizes the law of the sea as the framework for deciding issues of Arctic territoriality, the United States will likely find itself at a disadvantage when
30
critical Arctic conversations occur.
The U.S. Navy is mindful of other international challenges and opportunities
in the Arctic. There is some concern in Japan that a renewed Arctic emphasis by
the U.S. Navy may lead to a corresponding decrease in western Pacific presence
and security. Conversely, there are unique opportunities for the U.S. Navy to develop “soft” partnerships with other nations, such as Russia and China, on research like hydrographic surveys. While present boundary disputes and security
concerns pose no major risk to international stability and security, the longterm potential for significant change in the Arctic must be recognized and thoroughly assessed.
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THE U.S. NAVY’S ROLE IN A CHANGING ARCTIC
The Navy understands the wide range of security considerations in the Arctic region and that the effects of climate change in the Arctic will influence the
geostrategic landscape. Future maritime activity in the region will encompass
many non-Arctic stakeholders; the potential exists for the overlap of new operations with indigenous uses and for the occurrence of multiple uses in Arctic wa31
ters. The Navy must carefully assess the effects of more severe weather and the
rise of sea level on existing installations, while concurrently determining future
installation needs. Security, stability, and safety have been, and continue to be,
the objectives of the Navy’s Arctic activities, despite a potential shift in the type,
scope, and location of future missions in the region.
The U.S. Navy has been operating in the Arctic for nearly a century, beginning
with Admiral Richard E. Byrd’s historic flight over the North Pole in 1926. The
Navy sustained its presence in the Arctic during and immediately after World
War II, a presence that peaked in 1958, when the USS Nautilus (SSN 571) performed the first submerged transit of the North Pole. Navy submarines have remained active in the region ever since and continue to use the area for research
and training. Surface assets routinely operate in subarctic conditions. In the
1990s a program known as Science Ice Expedition (SCICEX) used Sturgeonclass (SSN 637) nuclear-powered attack submarines to conduct collaborative
scientific cruises carrying civilian specialists to the Arctic basin. Six SCICEX
missions took place from 1993 to 2000. The missions allowed scientists to gather
data on the biological and physical properties of the northern waters and placed
emphasis on understanding the dynamics of sea-ice cover, circulation patterns
32
in the water, and the structure of the Arctic Ocean’s bathymetry.
Navy surface, aviation, and special warfare forces have participated in joint
and combined exercises, such as NORTHERN EDGE, and will continue to do so.
Navy surface vessels are able to operate up to the marginal ice zone but will require ice-strengthening to operate in higher ice conditions; Navy aircraft are capable of operating in the Arctic, but the lack of divert fields limits their duration
and range. The Navy’s Arctic Submarine Laboratory leads the ICEX series, Arctic research-and-development missions whose activities include temporary
33
Arctic ice camps on the edge of the perennial ice. The most recent camp was established in the spring of 2009 on a piece of Arctic pack ice approximately two
hundred nautical miles north of Prudhoe Bay, Alaska; it supported about sixty
34
personnel. Great Britain’s Royal Navy shares the use of these camps, and cooperative operations involve both U.S. and British submarines. After military operations are concluded, ice camps have on occasion been turned over to civilian
researchers, allowing them to take advantage of facilities that would otherwise
be beyond their budgets.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010

NWCR_Spring2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\5399_NWC_Review_Spring2010\NWCR_Spring2010.vp
Monday, March 01, 2010 4:18:38 PM

47

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

42

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

While the Navy has a rich history in the Arctic, several challenges must be met
to ensure successful operations in the future. These include the lack of support
infrastructure and logistics support, environmental hazards such as drifting sea
ice and icing on exposed surfaces, and communications difficulties. Antiquated
nautical charts, drifting ice, low visibility, and the paucity of electronic and visual navigation aids hinder safety of navigation. A lack of coastal installations
also contributes to the difficulty of search and rescue (SAR) operations. The
only American-owned deepwater port near the Arctic basin is Dutch Harbor, in
35
the Aleutian Islands.
The Navy and other federal government agencies are taking steps to address
some of these challenges. The U.S. State Department recently hosted a conference of representatives from the Arctic Council nations to begin development of
a memorandum of understanding for SAR in the Arctic. Senators Mark Begich
and Lisa Murkowski of Alaska have recently supported bills that would study the
feasibility of a deepwater port in the Arctic. Also, of course, the U.S. Navy has developed a roadmap to ensure its own readiness and capability in the region.
THE U.S. NAVY’S ARCTIC ROADMAP
Despite uncertainty in scientific projections and operational challenges, the
time line for change in the Arctic points to a challenge, not a crisis. The Navy’s
role in the Arctic is to foster and sustain cooperative relationships with other
Arctic nations and, within the joint, interagency, international, and academic
communities, to improve its understanding of the Arctic environment, enhance
its ability to predict changes to it, and prevent or contain any regional instability,
through the creation and maintenance of security at sea.
Drivers
In October 2007 the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps released “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”—commonly referred to as the “Maritime Strategy”—which states: “Climate change is gradually opening up the
waters of the Arctic, not only to new resource development, but also to new shipping routes that may reshape the global transport system. While these opportunities offer potential for growth, they are potential sources of competition and
conflict for access and natural resources.” The Maritime Strategy clearly identifies freedom of navigation as a top national priority. Preserving the rights of
navigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports the Navy’s ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, including transit rights in strategic
straits.
The Maritime Strategy applies fully in the Arctic as it does in other regions of
the globe; it sufficiently addresses the opening Arctic and the potential
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challenges and opportunities that phenomenon represents. The core capabilities
of the Maritime Strategy that are most applicable to the Arctic are forward presence, deterrence, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
(HA/DR), through the formation and sustainment of cooperative relationships
with international partners. As in every other region, the naval services must be
prepared to prevent or limit regional conflict when required.
In January 2009, President George W. Bush signed National Security
Presidential Directive-66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25
(NSPD-66/HSPD-25), which established Arctic-region policy priorities for the
nation. The policy declares that the “United States is an Arctic nation, with var36
ied and compelling interests in that region.” The directive takes into account
altered policies on homeland security and defense, the effects of climate change
and increasing human activity in the Arctic, the work of the Arctic Council, and
37
the increasing awareness that the Arctic region is fragile yet rich in resources.
The Arctic Region Policy directs the departments of State, Homeland Security,
and Defense to develop greater capabilities and capacity as necessary to protect
U.S. borders; increase Arctic maritime domain awareness (MDA); preserve
global mobility; project a sovereign American maritime presence; encourage
peaceful resolution of disputes; cooperate with other Arctic nations to address
likely issues arising from greater shipping activity; establish a risk-based capability to address hazards in the region, including cooperative SAR, basing, and
logistical support; and evaluate the feasibility for using the Arctic for strategic
sealift. These requirements do not promulgate new Navy missions but imply
that the service must be prepared to increase Arctic engagement.
In May 2009 the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Gary Roughead,
convened a CNO Executive Board to answer questions about the Arctic centering on the changing environment, past and present Navy activity in the Arctic
region, future Navy investments, security requirements, fleet capabilities and
limitations, and activities of other Arctic nations. The result was the establishment of the Navy’s Task Force Climate Change (TFCC) to address Navy implications of climate change, with a near-term focus on the Arctic.
TFCC is directed by the lead coauthor of this article—the Oceanographer of
the Navy, Rear Admiral David Titley—and is composed of representatives from
offices within the CNO’s staff, the fleet, NOAA, and the U.S. Coast Guard. TFCC
also includes representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and various interagency, international, scientific, and academic organizations, acting in advisory
capacities; the task force consists of a flag-level steering committee, a Navy Climate Change Coordination Office, and several action-oriented working groups.
TFCC was initially tasked to develop a document to guide Navy policy, investment, and public discussion regarding the Arctic.
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The Vice Chief of Naval Operations approved the resulting Arctic Roadmap
in November 2009. The document is synchronized with a science-based time
line, provides a framework for Navy discussion of the Arctic, and lists appro38
priate objectives and actions, tempered by fiscal realities. The need for a
science-based time line is clear: if the Navy acts too early it will waste resources, but acting too late will result in mission failure. Understanding the
complex changes occurring in the Arctic region requires sound scientific information, upon which policy, strategy, and operations are based. Greater understanding leads to sound decision making that utilizes assets in the safest
and most efficient manner.
The roadmap features a five-year action plan that implements both the national Arctic Region Policy and the Navy’s Maritime Strategy and lays out initiatives, such as science and technology and combined exercises, to carry out its
goals. The roadmap seeks to answer several questions:

• What is the time line for naval Arctic access?
• What is the national security threat?
• Will the Navy be required to increase engagement in the Arctic?
• In what does the Navy need to invest to meet expected Arctic
requirements?
Objectives
The main objectives of the Arctic Roadmap are readiness, capability, and security. Specifically, the U.S. Navy seeks to gain improved understanding regarding
the current and predicted environment, gain greater experience through established exercises, and make informed investments that will provide the right capability at the right time. The roadmap recognizes that key to its success is
cooperative partnerships with interagency and international stakeholders that
will improve the Navy’s capability to assess and predict climate changes in the
Arctic. To achieve these objectives, the roadmap focuses on five areas: Strategy, Policy, Missions, and Plans; Operations and Training; Investments; Communications and Outreach; and Environmental Assessment and Prediction.
Strategy, Policy, Missions, and Plans. Actions in this focus area include the identification of Navy strategic objectives in the Arctic region and the development
of guidance to achieve these objectives so as to preserve a safe, stable, and secure
Arctic region. Policy and recommendations to operational staffs will be developed to strengthen existing and foster new cooperative relationships.
Operations and Training. Actions in this focus area were identified by U.S. Fleet
Forces Command and the geographic combatant command staffs with the
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intent of providing a Navy enterprise–wide approach for action regarding the
Arctic. Participation in Arctic exercises, operations, and supporting activities is
identified, with the intent of increasing Navy experience in the region.
Investments. This focus area seeks to ensure that Arctic requirements are assessed and included in the development of the Program Objective Memorandum or Navy budget. Investment areas that are addressed include weapons
platforms and sensors; C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance); and installations and
facilities.
Communications and Outreach. This focus area addresses the facts that the
Navy can benefit from exchanging information with the wide array of Arctic
stakeholders and that media attention will grow as the Arctic endures further
rapid and severe change. Targeting organizations within the media, government, Department of Defense, international, scientific, academic, and indigenous communities, actions in this focus area are intended to ensure that the
Navy is recognized as contributing to a safe, secure, and stable Arctic region.
Environmental Assessment and Prediction. Actions in this focus area will foster
a comprehensive and improved understanding of the current and predicted
Arctic physical environment on the tactical, operational, and strategic scales. Because of limited resources and the potential for significant requirements, reducing uncertainty in predictions of the magnitude, timing, and regional location
of Arctic environmental change is essential to efficient and responsible Navy action and investment.
Phasing
The roadmap specifies Navy action over three phases, allowing necessary background studies and assessments to be completed, partnerships formed, and
knowledge cultivated. TFCC will be responsible for execution of the roadmap
and will provide quarterly progress reports to the Chief of Naval Operations.
Phase 1—Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. The first phase of the Arctic Roadmap will include a Fleet Readiness Assessment and an assessment of strategic objectives and
mission requirements in the Arctic region. External studies regarding Arctic security will be reviewed, and an Arctic strategic implementation plan for the
Maritime Strategy will be completed. The Navy will continue working with
NOAA to develop a next-generation, coupled, air-ocean-ice modeling system to
predict accurately Arctic environmental change; the Navy will also perform a
joint hydrographic survey in the Bering Strait with NOAA. The Navy participated in an Arctic tabletop exercise in November 2009 with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and plans to participate in a “Limited Objective experiment”
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with U.S. Northern Command and National Defense University in February
2010.
Phase 2—FYs 2011 and 2012. Significant actions in Phase 2 include initiation of
capabilities-based assessments regarding required Navy Arctic capabilities,
completion of environmental assessments, and support for implementation of
the national ocean policy and coastal and marine spatial planning framework in
39
the Arctic. Recommendations will also be developed to address Arctic requirements in “sponsor program proposals” for the Navy’s Program Objective Memorandum for FY 14 (POM 14). Biennial participation in Arctic exercises such as
ICEX-11 will continue, and the Navy will formalize new cooperative relationships that increase experience and competence in SAR, MDA, HA/DR in the
Arctic, and defense support of civil authorities in Alaska.
Phase 3—FYs 2013 and 2014. During Phase 3, the Navy will oversee execution of
POM 14 budget initiatives while implementing and expanding new cooperative
partnerships. The Navy will commence Arctic environmental survey operations
using unmanned undersea vehicles. In fiscal year 2014 the Arctic Roadmap will
be updated in coordination with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, to ensure that the Navy presence in the Arctic is aligned with the strategic objectives
of the Department of Defense.
{LINE-SPACE}
The scope and magnitude of changes to the Arctic region as a result of a changing climate are great, and they cannot all be identified within the scope of this
article. Overall, continued sea-ice melting will cause shifts in species populations and distribution, more navigable transportation passages, and increased
shipping activity and resource extraction. It also has the potential to modify significantly global circulation patterns around the world, the consequences of
which scientists are just beginning to model and comprehend. Each of these
changes will shape safety and security in the Arctic.
The Navy’s Task Force Climate Change is addressing security considerations
in the Arctic by implementing a science-based roadmap for action. Emphasizing
the key themes of improved environmental understanding, informed investments, increased experience, cooperative partnerships, and support for the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Arctic Roadmap will ensure the Navy’s
readiness and capability to operate successfully and safely in the changing Arctic
environment in the twenty-first century.
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THE U.S. NAVY’S TRANSITION TO JETS
Robert C. Rubel

Definition of an optimist: a naval aviator with a savings account.
QUIP POPULAR IN NAVAL AVIATION

A

s we approach 2011, the centennial year of aviation in the U.S. Navy, the jet
engine and jet-powered aircraft have become ubiquitous. Today millions
travel safely in jet airliners, and the military jet fighter is almost a cultural icon.
However, in the late 1930s the prospect for powering aircraft with anything but
piston engines seemed remote, except to a few visionary engineers in Great Britain and Germany. In the early 1940s their work resulted in the first flights of
jet-powered aircraft, but due to the low thrust of their engines these aircraft were
outclassed by existing piston-engine fighters. Additional advances in engine design in Germany resulted in the fielding of the Me-262 Swallow fighter, which,
although not as maneuverable as the American P-51 Mustang or other Allied
fighters, had a top speed 100 mph faster, due to its jet engines and swept wings,
giving it significant operational advantages. After the
Professor Rubel is Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the
war, aeronautical engineers from all the Allied nations
Naval War College. Before retiring from the U.S. Navy
studied German technical advances and worked to inin the grade of captain, he was an aviator, participating
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corporate them into their new generations of fighters.
War, the 1980 Iranian hostage crisis, the TWA Flight
When the U.S. Navy introduced its first operational
847 crisis, and DESERT SHIELD. He commanded Strike
Fighter Squadron 131 and served as the inspector genjet, the McDonnell F1H Phantom, in 1947, it began
eral of U.S. Southern Command. He attended the
a transition phase that turned out to be extended and
Spanish Naval War College and the U.S. Naval War
very costly in terms of aircrew lives and airplanes
College, where he served on the faculty and as chairman
of the War Gaming Department, in the Center for Nalost. The higher speeds and altitudes of jets presented
val Warfare Studies, before his present appointment. He
a new set of problems to the aircraft designers and
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manufacturers, as well as to the Navy squadrons that
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performance jet fighter needed such appurtenances
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as a stabilator (instead of an elevator); irreversible,
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F8U-2N Crusader
U.S. Navy

hydraulic flight controls with artificial feel; redundant hydraulic systems; pitch
1
and yaw stability augmentation; ejection seats; air conditioning; and others.
Learning these lessons required a trial-and-error process that resulted in the
fielding and rapid obsolescence of a series of different jets, each reflecting solutions to the defects discovered in earlier models.
It is central to the story presented in this article to consider how long this
“transition” to jets lasted. Some histories of naval aviation regard the transition
to jets to be substantially complete with the phasing out of the last propellerdriven fighter, the F4U Corsair, while others maintain that the transition lasted
until the introduction of the F-8 Crusader and F-4 Phantom II—the first Navy
carrier-based fighters that were the equals of their land-based counterparts. Another way of looking at it is through the lens of safety: one might declare the
transition to have been complete when the Navy aviation accident rate became
comparable to that of the U.S. Air Force. The logic behind this reasoning is that
whereas a multitude of factors—technical, organizational, and cultural—constitute the capability to operate swept-wing jets, the mishap rate offers an overall
indicator of how successful an organization is in adopting a new technology.
Using this criterion, the Navy’s transition process lasted until the late
1980s—which was, not coincidentally, the era in which the F/A-18 arrived in
the fleet in numbers. This article argues that tactical jet aircraft design and
technology presented Navy aircrews, maintenance personnel, and leaders with
several major challenges that were in fact not substantially overcome until the
introduction of the F/A-18 Hornet in 1983. These challenges included such
technical problems as engine reliability and response times, swept-wing flight
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characteristics, and man/machine interface issues. The Air Force also encountered these challenges, but the Navy’s operating environment and, indeed, its organizational culture kept it from achieving a fully successful transition until well
after the Air Force did.
Between 1949, the year jets started showing up in the fleet in numbers, and
1988, the year their combined mishap rate finally got down to Air Force levels,
the Navy and Marine Corps lost almost twelve thousand airplanes of all types
(helicopters, trainers, and patrol planes, in addition to jets) and over 8,500
aircrew, in no small part as a result of these issues. Perhaps the statistics for the
F-8 Crusader, a supersonic fighter designed by Vought in the late 1950s, provide
a good illustration of the problem. The F-8 was always known as a difficult airplane to master. In all, 1,261 Crusaders were built. By the time it was withdrawn
from the fleet, 1,106 had been involved in mishaps. Only a handful of them were
2
lost to enemy fire in Vietnam. While the F-8 statistics might have been worse
than those for most other models, they make the magnitude of the problem
clear: whether from engine failure, pilot error, weather, or bad luck, the vast majority (88 percent!) of Crusaders ever built ended up as smoking holes in the
ground, splashes in the water, or fireballs hurtling across a flight deck. This was
naval aviation from 1947 through about 1988. Today, the accident rate is normally one or less per hundred thousand hours of flight time, making mishaps an

F/A-18 Hornet
U.S. Navy
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unusual occurrence. This is in stark contrast to the landmark year of 1954, when
naval aviation (that is, Navy and Marine combined) lost 776 aircraft and 535
crew, for an accident rate well above fifty per hundred thousand flight hours—
and the rate for carrier-based tactical aviation was much higher than that.
During this extended transition period, naval aviation participated in three
major wars and numerous crises, and, of course, many planes and crews were
lost to enemy fire. However, the vast majority of aircraft losses over this period
were due to mishaps, many of which were associated with the technical and organizational problems just mentioned. In other words, the airplanes that populated the flight decks of aircraft carriers from the introduction of the F1H
Phantom through the retirement of the F-14 Tomcat were, with few exceptions,
hard to fly and maintain and would kill the unwary crew. Many men and a few
women gave their lives trying to operate these machines in the challenging environment of the sea. This history is meant to recognize their sacrifice and honor
their service.
THE OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVE
U.S. naval aviation ended World War II at the pinnacle of success; its propellerdriven aircraft were the best in the world, and the requirements of carrier suitability did not compromise their performance versus that of land-based fighters.
By the early 1940s the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics had received word of jet engine developments in Germany and Great Britain and had commissioned Westinghouse and Allis Chalmers to build American versions. However, the high fuel
consumption, low power at takeoff, and poor reliability of early engines did not
make them attractive for use in carrier-borne planes. Moreover, when details of
German aerodynamic advances, specifically the swept wing, became known,
Navy planners felt that high landing speeds and adverse handling characteristics
would make aircraft equipped with them unsuitable for carrier use.
On the other hand, the Navy was faced with a new opponent, the Soviet
Union, that had also capitalized on captured German knowledge. If the Soviets
were to build a high-speed jet bomber, carriers might be defenseless if they could
not launch high-speed interceptors from their decks. As the Cold War came into
being, this knowledge pressurized the development of jet aircraft, adding to the
rapidity with which it took place but also imposing brutal material and human
costs.
An additional source of pressure was the new U.S. Air Force, whose leadership
in the postwar environment believed that the combination of the atomic bomb
and the ultra-long-range bomber rendered naval aviation irrelevant. The Navy
had long regarded strikes against land targets to be a fundamental mission of its
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own air arm, and the prospect of being sidelined in the business of nuclear attack seemed to threaten the very existence of naval aviation. In April 1949 the
secretary of defense, Louis Johnson, canceled the construction of USS United
States, a very large aircraft carrier that had been designed to support a new generation of big Navy jet bombers capable of carrying the large and heavy nuclear
weapons of the day. This cancellation, along with Air Force efforts to push the
huge B-36 bomber program at the expense of the other services, produced in
October 1949 an incident that has been termed the “Revolt of the Admirals.” Admiral Arthur Radford and other aviation flag officers, as well as the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Louis Denfeld, testified before Congress
arguing the need for an atomic delivery capability for naval aviation and alleging
the deficiencies of the B-36—in direct contravention of the secretary of defense’s wishes. Although Admiral Denfeld was subsequently fired by the
secretary, Congress was sufficiently convinced of the Navy’s utility in strike
warfare to authorize in 1951 the construction of USS Forrestal, the first of the
“supercarriers” that could adequately handle the heavy, fast jets. However, the
Navy still needed a jet to perform the mission of nuclear strike, and development
pressures continued.
The early Cold War operational environment was challenging for naval aviation, to say the least. Knowing that the Soviet Union was working on jet fighters
and jet bombers that could carry nuclear weapons and drop them on naval formations, the Navy needed to develop fighter/interceptor aircraft that could defend the carrier and its escorts from attack while sailing into position to launch
its own strike, and also strike aircraft that had enough range to hit meaningful
targets and enough speed to survive enemy defenses. These general requirements propelled naval aviation development efforts from the late 1940s through
the 1970s. During this period, the actual employment of naval aviation in two
wars—Korea and Vietnam, as well as later in DESERT STORM—demanded of
Navy jets the flexibility to conduct conventional bomb delivery, close air support, and dogfighting. Thus carrier jets morphed over time to designs that were
more general in purpose, resulting ultimately in the F/A-18 Hornet, an aircraft
that is a true strike-fighter.
Thus there was no opportunity for naval aviation to rest on its laurels after
World War II. In combination with a massive postwar demobilization, it had to
forge ahead with a program to adopt the new engine and aerodynamic technology. It attempted to reduce strategic risk, by letting multiple contracts to different aircraft companies in hopes that at least one of the designs would be viable.
On the other hand, it accepted a high degree of operational risk, by ordering series production of various models before flight-testing was complete. The net
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effect of this strategy was that between 1945 and 1959 twenty-two Navy fighters
made their first flights, whereas over the following forty-six years only five did
3
so. Some of the designs spawned during the early period, such as the F2H Banshee, were useful machines and had lengthy service lives, while others, like the
F7U Cutlass and F-11 Tiger, were disappointments and saw only brief service.
As mentioned previously, the first years of the jet era in the Navy were disastrous in terms of aircraft and crews lost, but the Navy had little choice but to continue sending jets to sea. The gas-guzzling nature of jets made getting them back
aboard the carrier in a timely manner a matter of utmost urgency and increased
the pressure on carrier captains, admirals, and their staffs to adapt to an operational tempo very different from what had been the norm. In 1950, a future vice
admiral, Gerald Miller, was on a carrier group staff operating F9F-2 Panthers in
Korea. On one occasion the group staff meant to swap sixty-four Panthers from
an outgoing carrier to one just coming into the theater. The weather was bad at
airfields ashore, and heavy seas were causing the flight decks to pitch. The staff
work and planning did not adequately take into account the limited endurance
of the new jet-powered aircraft. Miller’s description of what happened next illustrates the consequences of learning to operate jets in a wartime environment:
We had a lot of these fighters in the air. Then we tried to bring them down and it was
a tough job of getting them on board. They were running out of fuel and there was
no base on the beach to send them to. We had to get them back on board those two
carriers, and we broke up those planes in some numbers.

F9F-2 Panther
Courtesy National Naval Aviation Museum
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It was awful. It was so bad, I can still remember the admiral walking over to the opposite side of the bridge, putting his head down on his hands and shaking. It was so
bad he couldn’t even get mad. It was a horrible mess. Well, that was all because of the
size of the ship, the nature of the airplanes and straight deck operations. We started
from debacles of that kind to get something better.
Considering the upheaval in the navy caused by demobilization and the introduction
of new technologies, it’s amazing that we kept together as much as we did. . . . We
worried, but we did proceed with the jet program.4

At the same time that naval aviators were attempting to master the new jet aircraft, they were also grappling with two new missions that increased the degree
of difficulty even more: night or all-weather operations, and nuclear weapons
delivery. In a sense, these two missions were connected, in that it was felt that
when the call came, weather or darkness must not be allowed to stand in the way
of getting the nuclear weapon to its target. These two missions exerted considerable pressure on aircraft design and on the risks naval aviation was willing to endure to put these capabilities to sea. Coupled with the hazards inherent in
jet-powered aviation in those years, they significantly contributed to the loss of
aircraft. Gerald O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), describes the environment in Composite
Squadron Four (VC-4, based at Naval Air Station Atlantic City, New Jersey), the
Navy’s East Coast night/all-weather fighter squadron in the early 1950s:
All naval aviators are routinely exposed to, or involved in, aircraft accidents. That’s
accepted as almost a hazard of the trade. In carrier work, where dangers abound, accidents tend to be more frequent. In the night carrier operations of those days, accidents were so frequent that they were considered commonplace and unexceptional.
Whenever a det [detachment of four to six aircraft sent out on a carrier] departed,
the aircraft they flew off were more or less written off. No one expected that all of
them would ever come back to Atlantic City. . . . Unfortunately, the same negativism
tended to extend to the pilots as well, whose safe return wasn’t much better than the
aircraft. Between pilots lost, the pilots maimed, and the pilots who decided to throw
in their wings, precious few dets ever returned with the same resources they took
with them.5

NAVAL AVIATION CULTURE AND THE TRANSITION TO JETS
In order to understand the catastrophic price the Navy paid in its march to operate swept-wing jets from aircraft carriers, we must look at the organizational
culture onto which this new technology was grafted. After all, the majority of the
mishaps that occurred were due to aircrew errors of some sort, whether precipitated or exacerbated by design problems or the result of gross error, negligence,
or irresponsibility not connected with design issues.
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Naval aviators always viewed themselves as daredevils. The difficulties of taking off from and landing on ships were unequaled in the land aviation domain,
and naval aviators therefore considered themselves exceptionally skilled—and
expendable. The accident rate (if not the sheer number of mishaps) in naval aviation from its inception to World War II was hardly less than the awful rates experienced in the early jet era. Naval aviators always regarded themselves as a
different breed from their surface-ship brethren, but for all that they shared, and
still do, the Navy’s culture of independence and self-reliance. The simplicity and
relative inexpensiveness of early naval aircraft allowed this culture to thrive;
flight instruction was personal, and aviators had few detailed procedures or
rules to follow in mastering their aircraft. “Seat of the pants” flying and individuality in technique were the orders of the day. Since piston-engine aircraft all operated essentially in the same way and roughly at the same speeds, especially
when landing, and since they rarely flew at night or in bad weather, pilots could
transition between aircraft easily and informally. Mr. Richard “Chick” Eldridge,
a member of the Naval Safety Center staff for several decades, remembers his
Navy flight training in 1943: “To my recollection, there was little emphasis on
aviation safety. What safety information was imparted to the fledgling aviator
came from the primary instructors. Lessons learned usually came in the form of
‘gems of instructor wisdom.’ You were simply told to fly certain maneuvers in a
6
specific way or wind up as a statistic.”
The first thing to change was the technology. Culture change lagged by more
than a decade, and the result was a virtual bloodbath. In addition to the specific
challenges of flying jets must be added greatly increased speeds. Things happen
much faster in jets, and a different mind-set and discipline are called for to avoid
disaster. Pilots who had spent a good deal of time operating at propeller-aircraft
speeds tended to have more difficulty adjusting to jet speeds than those who
were introduced to jets early. The author observed this during the Navy’s transition from the piston-engine S-2 Tracker carrier antisubmarine aircraft to the
jet-powered S-3 Viking. The more senior pilots seemed to have the most difficulty, and indeed a number of them either quit, had accidents, or failed to pass
flight checks. This was a serious issue as well for the fleet introduction of the A-3
Skywarrior. Initially, in addition to carrier pilots, the Navy brought into the A-3
program senior aviators from the land-based patrol community. A series of accidents and difficulties involving former patrol pilots prompted the commander
of the Sixth Fleet to write a letter to the CNO recommending that only carrier7
trained pilots be assigned to A-3 squadrons.
In the early years of the jet transition, naval aviation remained wedded to its
individualistic culture. Structured programs of training, detailed reference
manuals, and disciplined evaluations of pilot performance did not exist in any
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss2/1
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A-3 Skywarrior
Courtesy National Naval Aviation Museum

coherent way across naval aviation. But jets, with their higher speeds, challenging handling characteristics, and ever more complex systems, required just that.
The horrible accident rates eventually drove the Navy to do something. Meanwhile, the Air Force, which had been suffering an increase in mishaps also,
formed a Flight Safety Directorate, with 525 personnel, and undertook to impose discipline on the aviation corps by punishing crews after mishaps when
fault and culpability could be assigned. The Navy’s first effort at a flight-safety
agency was puny by comparison, with only twenty-five personnel. However, in
1953 a war hero, Captain James F. “Jimmy” Flatley, wrote a highly critical and influential report on naval aviation safety that generated organizational and pro8
cedural changes that in turn went far to change the culture. Along with them, a
more structured program of flight training was introduced, eventually culminating in the establishment of replacement training squadrons that provided intensive and detailed instruction for newly “winged” aviators in the aircraft they
would fly in the fleet. These squadrons would also become centers of flight and
maintenance evaluation of fleet squadrons based with them. A variety of other
measures also served to professionalize and discipline the naval aviation culture,
including formal training for squadron safety officers, improved accident investigation techniques, specially trained medical personnel (called “flight surgeons”), the publication of a safety magazine to share stories of accidents and
near misses, and top-down leadership that countered the laissez-faire cultural
heritage.
However the “ready room” culture was resistant to change. Thus the authors
of a 1961 Naval Aviation News article felt compelled to say, “Some people view
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the idea of everyone in Naval Aviation doing everything ‘the one best way’ with
some misgivings. They fear that general use of standardized procedures, while it
may reduce the accident rate, will result in a reduction of a pilot’s ability to
‘think on his feet’ and deal flexibly with emergencies and combat situations. Ex9
perience in other fields has proved that fear unfounded.” A major element of
the resistance to change was the fact that adaptation to the new technology had a
value content—that is, it made irrelevant certain skill sets that had been associated with being a “good” aviator. The issue was not so much the difficulty of
learning new skills as reluctance to abandon old ones that were associated with
professional virtue. The naval aviation culture that had grown up from 1911 to
1947 was intense, parochial, and value-centric. Moreover, likely because of the
acrimonious relationship that developed between the two services in the late
1940s, there was a reluctance to view anything the Air Force did as appropriate
for naval aviation.
The Navy has always placed considerable responsibility and authority in the
hands of the individual officer. An imperative of war at sea, this delegated style
of command and control has both enhanced and afflicted U.S. naval aviation.
Throughout its history, outstanding decision making by relatively junior officers has made the difference in battle, such as when, during the battle of Midway,
Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky decided, in the air, to take his strike
group in the direction a Japanese destroyer was headed and thus found the enemy aircraft carriers. Faced in the 1940s and ’50s with new technology that demanded new types of procedural discipline and centralized management, the
culture was slow to adapt, and many naval aviators lost their lives as a result.
FINDING THE RIGHT COMBINATION OF INGREDIENTS
The development of aviation technology between the Wright brothers’ first
flight and 1947 was amazingly fast. In just forty-five years aviation progressed
from machines that were hardly more than powered kites to jets that pushed the
speed of sound. This rapid development meant that individual models of combat aircraft became obsolete fairly quickly. This had been the case prior to and
during World War II, and it was to be the case over the early years of jet transition in the Navy. The initial echelon of straight-wing jets had an operational life
span in the fleet of only a few years, although some of them had longer, second
lives in the reserves or specialized shore-based uses, such as in training commands. In the late 1940s and the early ’50s, as whole squadrons transitioned
from propeller airplanes to jets, pilots who had developed habits molded to
straight-wing propeller planes that were slower, lighter, and simpler and burned
fuel more slowly were put into fast, gas-guzzling jets. It was a lethal
combination.
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As the centennial of naval aviation approaches, it is interesting to observe that
it has been jet powered for over half of its history. The transition was long and
brutally expensive in terms of life and aircraft. However, it was, by any measure, a
success. Throughout the Cold War and a series of hot wars—Korea, Vietnam,
DESERT STORM, and others—naval aviation has been able to provide effective
tactical airpower from the sea. Its ability to do this despite a long and difficult
process of learning how to operate jet aircraft at sea is a tribute to the brilliance
of various aircraft designers, the ingenuity of countless “airdales,” the sailors
who struggled to keep those complex and touchy machines flying, and the bravery (and perhaps foolhardiness) of the crews who would climb into jets that
were hard to fly and lacked reliability and in those aircraft perform missions that
took them to the edge of what man and machine could do.
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PIECES OF EIGHT
An Appraisal of U.S. Counterpiracy Options in the Horn of Africa
Lesley Anne Warner

O

ver the course of the past five years, maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia has been on the rise as the country has spiraled deeper and deeper into
anarchy.1 The United States responded in late 2008 and early 2009 with a variety
of counterpiracy measures, ranging from strengthening the multinational naval
presence in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean to the signing of a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) with Kenya to facilitate the prosecution of suspected
pirates. However, despite assertions that lawlessness on land allows maritime
piracy to emerge, present counterpiracy methods have failed to address poor
governance and instability within Somalia. Instead, they have dealt only with
the sea-based manifestations of land-based malaise. Ideally, a sustainable counterpiracy strategy would address root causes as well as symptoms, in both the
short and long terms. By disaggregating Somalia’s maritime insecurity from the
insecurity it suffers on land, the United States and its international partners may
well be unable to achieve a sustainable solution to piracy.
This article outlines the causal logic that led to the
Lesley Anne Warner is an analyst at CNA’s Center for spike in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia in reStrategic Studies, in Alexandria, Virginia, where she
cent years. It will then, after an overview of the nafocuses on African security issues, including maritime
piracy and the U.S. Navy’s growing engagement with ture of maritime piracy in this region, highlight the
African countries. She holds an MA in security studies counterpiracy methods employed by the United States
from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service,
and assess their prospects for success or failure. It will
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. She is also
the author of an article on Somali piracy in the Janu- conclude by proposing a comprehensive and sustainary/February 2010 issue of the Journal of Interna- able counterpiracy strategy that targets both the root
tional Peace Operations.
causes of piracy and the symptoms that emerge from
lawlessness on land.
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UNDERSTANDING PIRACY AS A SYMPTOM OF LAWLESSNESS ON
LAND
Since maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia is a result of the absence of governance on land projected out to sea, the unremedied collapse of the Somali state
will be an insurmountable obstacle to a sustainable counterpiracy strategy. Somalia has been in a persistent anarchic state since 1991, when General Mohamed
Siad Barre was overthrown and the country descended into clan-based civil war
for control of the government. Eventually, the Somali state collapsed, destroying social services and the security-sector institutions that might have protected
the country, its resources, and its citizens against internal and external threats.2
The lack of governance and human security created a permissive environment
on land and at sea that offered Somalis not only incentives to participate in
criminal enterprises but also sanctuaries from which to do so. Given Somalia’s proximity to one of the world’s main sea lines of communications through
the Gulf of Aden, Somali fishermen, unrestrained by a functioning coast guard
or navy, seized the opportunity to engage in maritime piracy starting in the
1990s—initially claiming to be protecting Somali waters from foreign vessels
that were fishing illegally off the country’s coast.3 (Current estimates state that
more than three hundred million dollars’ worth of fish is stolen each year from
Somali waters.) 4
To put piracy off the coast of Somalia in its contemporary context, pirate
attacks off the coast of Somalia have increased overall during the course of the
past five years, as shown below on figure 1.
However, pirate attacks decreased in 2006, which many analysts attribute to
the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in the middle of that year. The ICU
was an umbrella movement comprising various factions that had gained control
of much of south and central Somalia, essentially providing a degree of governance that had not existed in these regions since 1991. Asserting that it ran
contrary to Islamic law, the ICU declared a war on piracy during the latter half
of 2006. As a result of the ICU’s grasp on power, attacks on maritime vessels
dropped during these six months of relative order.5 However, this relative order
was short-lived, as extremist elements within the ICU provoked a conflict with
Ethiopia, as a result of which Ethiopia invaded Somalia in December 2006 and
the ICU lost control over the territory it had previously controlled. Pirate attacks
subsequently increased in early 2007 and continue to plague the region to the
present day.6
This chronic lack of governance on land and resultant absence of maritime
security spurred a rash of pirate attacks that escalated in frequency, range, and
cost to global maritime commerce in 2008, as pirate attacks off the coast of
Somalia accounted for 111 of the 293 reported incidents of piracy worldwide.7
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FIGURE 1
PIRATE ATTACKS OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, 2005–2009
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Source: ICC—International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report: Report for the Period 1 January–31 December 2009.

In 2009, attacks in this region accounted for 217 out of 406 attacks worldwide.8
Attempted and successful pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia by month in
2009 are detailed in figure 2.
The trends that appear to be emerging suggest that pirates in this region
have been able to adapt rapidly to their changing environment. In 2009, pirates
greatly expanded their range of operations, operating as far north as Oman and
as far south as the Seychelles and Madagascar, attacking up to 1,100 miles from
Somalia’s coast. In addition, to decrease the chance of detection, pirates have
increasingly operated at night.9
U.S. GOVERNMENT COUNTERPIRACY POLICY
Recent American maritime security strategy and policy documents related to
piracy include but are not limited to the United States Maritime Security (Piracy)
Policy (released in 2007 as a new annex, “Policy for the Repression of Piracy and
Other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea,” to the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security) and Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action
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FIGURE 2
SUCCESSFUL AND ATTEMPTED PIRATE ATTACKS OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA,
JANUARY–DECEMBER 2009

Source: ICC—International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report: Report for the Period 1 January–31 December 2009.

Plan, published in 2008.10 The Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy identifies piracy
as a threat to national security, associating it with such other forms of maritime
insecurity as illegal fishing, smuggling, and terrorism and urging that it be addressed within a multilateral and interagency policy framework. The Partnership and Action Plan outlines three lines of action to repress piracy—preventing
pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain, interrupting acts of piracy, and holding pirates accountable by prosecuting them.11
The week following the MV Maersk Alabama incident in April 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton articulated a new counterpiracy strategy.12
It included developing an expanded and better-coordinated multinational response, exploring the tracking and freezing of pirate assets, working with the
shipping industry to address gaps in self-defense measures, and engaging diplomatically with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and authorities in Puntland to combat piracy in their territories.13 Finally, it addressed improvement in Somalia’s capacity to police its own territory, assistance to Somali
authorities in cracking down on pirate bases, and reduction of incentives for
Somalis to engage in piracy.14
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In spite of the evolving contemporary U.S. maritime security strategy and its
efforts to explore diplomatic, military, economic, and legal means by which to
combat piracy, specific counterpiracy methods have thus far been unbalanced,
with more emphasis placed on addressing the symptoms of instability on land
than on the actual conditions that allowed lawlessness on land to create lawlessness at sea. Nonetheless, it appears that the United States is gradually recognizing the need to adapt to the limitations of current policies and turn its counterpiracy strategy in the direction of conceptually linking efforts to eliminate
insecurity at sea with those to eliminate insecurity on land.
POTENTIAL COUNTERPIRACY METHODS
Eight counterpiracy methods are either currently in use or under consideration
by the United States:
• Accepting piracy as a cost of doing business
• Tracing and targeting pirate finances
• Increasing the defenses of merchant vessels
• Addressing legal impediments to combating piracy
• Continuing multinational naval patrols
• Pursuing kinetic operations on land
• Building local and regional maritime security–sector capacity
• Building local and regional security-sector capacity on land.
The following pages examine these methods, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each.
Accepting Piracy as a Cost of Doing Business
In 2009, of the approximately thirty thousand vessels that pass through the
Gulf of Aden every year, 217 were attacked. Of these, only forty-seven were successfully hijacked.15 Given that only 0.72 percent of the ships that traversed the
gulf were attacked in 2009, it is easy to argue that the international community
should simply accept the payment of ransoms to pirates in this region as an
added business expense.
Despite the fact that there is no universally accepted method for enumerating the various costs of piracy, several analysts have attempted to assess the
cost of piracy to global maritime commerce. Contemporary estimates range between $500 million and $25 billion per year.16 The burdens imposed on governments and the shipping industry by piracy are often passed on to taxpayers and
consumers:
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• Rerouting ships to bypass pirate-infested waters such as the Gulf of Aden,
adding three thousand miles and from two to three weeks to voyages,
incurring additional fuel costs of $3.5 million per year for tankers and $74.4
million per year for the liner trades
• Opting to pay higher insurance premiums, which have increased from only
five hundred dollars in 2007 to approximately $20,000 per ship per voyage,
excluding injury, liability, and ransom coverage
• Paying ransoms, totaling between $30 million and $150 million in 2008
• Paying ransom-delivery costs, negotiation fees, and lawyer fees
• Hiring licensed private security guards (up to $60,000 for the voyage through
the Gulf of Aden), as well as absorbing the additional insurance costs
associated with embarked security teams or armed sailors
• Installing nonlethal deterrent equipment and employing personnel to
operate it, at a cost of $20,000 to $30,000
• Paying higher wages to crews of vessels transiting waters where pirate attacks
are considered likely
• Sustaining a multinational naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and Indian
Ocean, at a cost of between $250 million and $400 million per year.17
To put these figures into context, global maritime commerce ranges in the
trillions of dollars, so current estimates of losses to piracy are comparatively
small.18 Nonetheless, continued piracy off the coast of Somalia poses a grave
threat to global maritime commerce because of the country’s proximity to the
Gulf of Aden, which is a major sea line of communication. With the opportunity to target any of the thirty thousand vessels that transit the Gulf of Aden
every year, pirate attacks would not only continue, but also escalate in range, frequency, and possibly even lethality due to the opportunity for high and reliable
profits from continued ransom payments and the lack of sufficient deterrents
to continuing such activity. Ransoms paid to pirates operating off the coast of
Somalia have increased from 2004 to the present—from about $500,000 per vessel to upwards of $5.5 million.19 Pirates have learned quickly that publicity pays.
For example, publicity from the fall 2008 hijackings of the MV Faina and the
MV Sirius Star, large ships with controversial or valuable cargoes, enabled the
pirates to negotiate higher ransoms—a process for which a clear, yet elaborate,
mechanism has been established.20
Continued piracy off the coast of Somalia also has negative implications for
other littoral states, especially for Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen, whose port cities may receive fewer port calls as a result. Additionally, continued attacks have
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss2/1
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negative effects on Egypt, in terms of forgone revenue from vessels that would
have passed through the Suez Canal and paid tolls but decided not to transit the
pirate-infested Gulf of Aden.21 Furthermore, inland markets in East and Central
Africa that depend on imports from ports on the Indian Ocean may also face
increased costs when many of their economies are struggling to recover from
the recent global financial crisis. Finally, continued pirate attacks off the coast
of Somalia risk disrupting the United Nations World Food Programme’s (UN
WFP) food shipments to Somalia—90 percent of which are delivered by sea, to
feed a third of the nation’s population.22
Naturally, one option would be for shipping companies that own hijacked
vessels to refuse to pay ransoms. By paying ransoms these companies contribute
to further destabilization of the region, because the influx of cash enables warlords to continue their conflicts on land. Additionally, concerns have emerged
regarding the possibility that pirates might cultivate ties to terrorist groups that
may be affiliated with al-Qa‘ida such as al-Shabaab—albeit out of convenience,
not shared ideology.23 However, prohibiting payment of ransoms by shipping
companies may be impractical, because these companies could face pressure
from politicians, the media, and the families of captured sailors to pay in order
to ensure the safety of the crews and cargoes of hijacked ships.24
Tracing and Targeting Pirate Finances
Pirate gangs operating out of Somalia derive funding, among other benefits,
from an extensive network of support.25 One way to erode this network could be
to trace and target pirate finances, much as is being done to counter other illicit
activities, such as drug trafficking and terrorism.
Investigation of pirate finances would reveal information concerning the
structures of pirate gangs, relationships within and among them, and their domestic and foreign financiers. Targeting pirate finances might erode some of
the active or tacit support pirates gain from spreading money to local officials
and relatives, who then become part of the pirates’ logistical and intelligence
networks.26 Since piracy in this region is a crime of economic incentives and not
one of ideology, once the money dries up, this support network is likely to do the
same. Integral to this approach would be increased information sharing regarding pirate financials among local, regional, and international partners.
A limitation of tracing and targeting pirate finances, however, is that not all
ransoms are paid through formal banking processes. In fact, some involve the
transfer of money through informal channels that leave no paper trail; some
have even been paid in cash, parachuted onto the decks of hijacked vessels. Applying pressure on such informal banking methods could have the unfortunate
and unintended consequence of driving them farther underground, making
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them more difficult to trace. The question also arises as to whether authorities
in Somalia or even regional states are capable of targeting and seizing pirate assets.27 Some government officials in Somalia and abroad have been accused of
complicity in networked pirate activity, raising the prospect of pirate gangs being tipped off in time to protect their assets. The country’s cash-based economy
also poses challenges for tracking ransoms or start-up logistical money from Somali businessmen.28 Finally, pirates have proved to be adaptive, and it is safe to
assume that they will learn to adapt to the tracing and targeting of their finances
until the underlying economic incentives—for the pirates and for the communities that provide them sanctuary—are eliminated once and for all.29
Increasing the Defenses of Merchant Vessels
The shipping industry has been an integral part of the search for a counterpiracy
strategy. In January 2009 representatives of twenty-four countries held the inaugural meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, creating
four working groups.30 Working Group 3 is led by the United States, with the
support of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and is working to
strengthen shipping industry self-awareness, security, and commercial industry
coordination. The Contact Group now has nearly forty countries and international organizations as members or observers, including the United Nations,
the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
the African Union (AU), and the IMO. In February 2009 representatives of the
international shipping industry released a document of best management practices, advising vessels transiting afflicted areas on how to avoid, deter, or delay
pirate attacks.31 Finally, at the Contact Group’s May 2009 meeting, Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, and the Marshall Islands—whose flag registries together
comprise more than half of the world’s shipping by gross tonnage—signed the
New York Declaration, stating that they agreed to promulgate best practices to
protect ships against pirate attacks.32
Thus far, nonlethal ship protection against pirate attacks has evolved to include increased surveillance; transit of piracy-prone areas at night, utilizing night
vision equipment for early detection of pirate skiffs; frequent course changes
and evasive maneuvers; transit in convoys, possibly escorted by warships, or
at least in frequent contact with them; operational communications security
protocols preventing disclosure on radio channels of cargoes, intended routes,
or the presence or absence of onboard security, in order to prevent intelligencedriven attacks; use of maximum safe speeds; rehearsal of lockdown procedures
and seclusion of crews in the pilothouse out of the reach of pirates; the lining
of ships with netting, barbed wire, or electric fencing; the spraying of slippery
foam on deck in the event of attack; and onboard training teams for nonlethal
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response techniques, such as long-range acoustic devices, lasers, flares, microwaves, and water hoses.33
Increasing the defenses of merchant vessels generally is certainly a step in
the right direction, since it provides some degree of protection for ships that
have been relatively vulnerable. Particularly, nonlethal techniques have been so
successful that 80 percent of attempted pirate attacks are now foiled without assistance from warships on patrol.34 Nevertheless, they have limitations: they can
still represent delaying tactics at best for the remaining 20 percent of merchant
vessels that were successfully hijacked; also, crew members operating them are
often vulnerable to fire from heavily armed pirates. In contrast, lethal defenses,
such as firearms, could have a deterrent effect on the calculations of pirates, who
might consider the risks of death or capture higher if they know that merchant
vessels may be armed. Possibilities that have been broached are training and
equipping seamen with small arms and embarking private security teams on
board merchant vessels transiting pirate-infested waters.
In June 2009 the House of Representatives proposed two bills designed to increase the security of U.S.-flag vessels against pirates. An amendment to House
Resolution 2647 (signed into law in October 2009 as the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010), requires the Department of Defense to
place military personnel on the approximately fifty-four U.S.-flag vessels that
carry weapons or military supplies through the waters off the Horn of Africa
each year, in order to prevent military equipment from falling into the hands of
pirates. This requirement will last until either 30 September 2011 or when the
Secretary of Defense notifies Congress that there is no longer a credible piracy
threat to U.S.-flag vessels carrying government cargo—whichever comes earlier.35 House Resolution 2984, the “Mariner and Vessel Protection Act,” in committee at this writing, would allow vessels carrying arms to enter international
ports, authorize the embarkation of Coast Guard maritime safety and security
teams on U.S.-flag ships transiting pirate-infested waters, and grant immunity
to civilian sailors who, having received firearms training from the Coast Guard,
wound or kill pirates during attacks.36
On the downside, arming seamen or embarking security teams on merchant
vessels presents a new set of questions. First, arming merchant vessels may well
escalate the violence of pirate attacks by encouraging gangs to invest in the quality and quantity of weapons and to alter their calculations with regard to the use
of force.37 Second, arming crews poses safety and training issues and offers no
guarantee that they would be proficient enough to fend off heavily armed pirates.38 Third, there may be increased insurance costs associated with embarked
security teams or armed sailors, and the shipping industry may calculate that
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it is cheaper to pay ransoms on the odd chance that a ship does get successfully
hijacked.39 Fourth, many international ports do not allow armed merchant vessels to enter, although this obstacle could be overcome by dispatching armed
security teams in separate escort ships, which would stay at sea. Finally, arming
merchant vessels raises legal and liability issues, specifically as they pertain to
whether recognized governmental authorities will provide armed protection or
whether the task will be outsourced to private security firms. The latter opens
the door for very complicated debates regarding rules of engagement, jurisdiction over captured pirates, and the oversight and regulation of private security
counterpiracy operations.
Addressing Legal Impediments to Combating Piracy
The current legal framework for addressing maritime piracy has been one of
the many impediments to combating piracy, with regard to how it addresses issues of state sovereignty, rules of engagement, jurisdiction, and “persons under
control” (PUCs).40 Compounding these difficulties is the fact that the Somali
government is incapable of providing its own legal deterrent to piracy. Nor can
other states in the region process the number of pirates apprehended by navies
patrolling the waters of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and
the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation collectively establish the definition of modern piracy and
the basis of the legal framework, including provisions to render suspected pirates to littoral states (if they are signatories to these conventions) where attacks
take place. In addition, between June 2008 and December 2009 six UN Security
Council resolutions were passed urging states to use the necessary means in
conformity with international law for the repression of acts of piracy, including
authorization for states cooperating with the TFG to enter Somali land or territorial waters to combat piracy.41
Among the many impediments that remain is the fact that multinational naval patrols off the coast of Somalia have occasionally been obliged to “catch and
release” suspected pirates after confiscating their weapons and skiffs, because
no nations would accept them for trial. In some of these countries, penal codes
do not treat piracy as a punishable offence; other countries can arrest suspected
pirates only if their own interests are directly affected.42 Compounding these
challenges, jurisdiction can be difficult to determine, because several countries
might be affected by an actual or attempted act of piracy, such as the vessel’s flag
state, the state of the company that owns the vessel, the state of the company that
owns the cargo, the states of which crew members are nationals, and the state of
the warship that disrupted the attack.43
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The alternative, prosecuting pirates outside the region—in the United States
or in Europe, for example—would bring its own set of complications. Whether
trials of suspected pirates are held in the region of the attacks or further abroad,
adherence to international norms of human rights means that countries that
accept pirates for prosecution must ensure that suspects are not detained for
long periods of time, which could be a problem for countries with overburdened
legal systems or for cases that require the transport of pirates, witnesses, and
evidence over long distances.44 Additionally, suspected pirates may claim asylum if brought to Europe or the United States, asserting that their lives would
be endangered by the continual warfare and desperate human conditions they
would face should they be found innocent and returned to Somalia.45 This latter
factor threatens the legal deterrent effect that an enhanced international legal
framework should ideally have.
One solution to these impediments would be to strengthen the ability of regional states’ judicial systems to investigate and prosecute suspected pirates and
to incarcerate those convicted. Kenya has signed MOUs with the United States,
the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the EU to prosecute captured pirates in
their court systems on a case-by-case basis. Regional states have also explored
the possibility of assembling teams of law enforcement ship riders that can
board warships, begin criminal investigations at sea, arrest suspected pirates in
the name of the teams’ countries, and then send them for trial in those nations
in order to address some of the problems with PUCs, jurisdiction, and regional
legal capacity.46 Such initiatives could be supported through capacity-building
activities coordinated by the U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement detachments
(LEDETs) and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) teams supporting Combined Task Force 151 (discussed below). Finally, an international tribunal for prosecuting pirates could resolve many of the jurisdictional problems
that have arisen, make trials more efficient, and speed up prosecutions that
would have burdened the underdeveloped judicial systems of regional states.47
The evolution of an international legal framework to combat piracy is a positive development, because it seeks to bolster the presently weak legal deterrent
for current and prospective pirates. Kenya, in exchange for agreeing to try some
of the suspected pirates, will receive assistance to strengthen its judicial system,
which should have the broader benefit of expanding the country’s capacity to
enforce the rule of law and address other threats to security and stability. This
method, if applied to other regional states, could have similar impact on their
judicial systems.
However, as things stand now, prosecution of suspected pirates in regional
countries may present bureaucratic and financial burdens, clogging jails and
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courts and even fomenting social unrest. For instance, Kenya’s judicial system
is engulfed in a debate over whether to prosecute those who instigated violence
following the 2007 presidential election; allegedly, the country’s judicial system
already has a backlog of cases.48 In addition, Kenya may wish not to be a dumping ground for captured pirates, because making it the centerpiece of pirate
prosecution efforts could inflame the country’s Somali refugee population, as
well as its own Muslim population.49
Continuing Multinational Naval Patrols
In support of UN Security Council resolutions passed in 2008 and 2009 in response to the rise in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia, the United States and
several international partner nations began to increase air and sea patrols of the
areas where attacks were most likely to take place. In August 2008, the United
States established a movable Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) along the
Yemeni coast to allow a limited number of warships to protect a greater number
of merchant vessels by concentrating the vessels in number and proximity. In
January 2009, ships from over twenty nations joined or otherwise cooperated
with Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) to engage in counterpiracy operations
in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, Gulf of Oman, and Gulf of Aden. CTF
151 is one of three task forces of Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a coalition
of over twenty countries operating in a 2.5-million-square-mile area.50 CMF
had been established in February 2002 by U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command
to “deter destabilizing activities to create a lawful maritime order by defeating
terrorism, deterring piracy, reducing illegal trafficking of people and drugs as
well as promoting the maritime environment as a safe place for mariners with
legitimate business.”51 In order to increase the effectiveness of coordination on
counterpiracy measures at sea, CMF hosts Shared Awareness and Deconfl iction
(SHADE), which involves regular workshop-style meetings of staff-level officers
from the various operational headquarters. SHADE is designed to provide opportunities for navies to share information, streamline tactics, and ensure that
assets are used efficiently and with the desired effect.52
In February 2009, the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
(IRTC), extending 464 miles along the southern coast of Yemen and the northern coast of Somalia, became operational, and coalition warships began to escort merchant vessels through it. The area off the coast of Somalia is patrolled
by approximately thirty warships contributed by CMF, the EU’s Operation ATALANTA, NATO’s Operation OCEAN SHIELD, and navies from such countries as
Russia, India, China, Iran, and Japan.53 In addition, the United States and its
partners monitor pirate activity on the high seas; conduct visit, board, search,
and seizure (VBSS) of suspected pirate skiffs; and provide surveillance of vessels
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that have been hijacked—much as USS Bainbridge and Boxer did during the
Maersk Alabama incident.
As both the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard have the authority to conduct counterpiracy operations, CTF 151 is supported by both Coast Guard law enforcement
detachments and teams of NCIS personnel on board ships in order to address
some of the legal impediments to combating piracy that have arisen.54 LEDETs
are responsible for supplementing Navy VBSS teams in maritime interdiction
operations, training them on issues concerning maritime law, boarding policies and procedures, evidence collection and preparation, and safe and humane
treatment of suspects. Upon encountering a suspected pirate vessel, air and sea
assets attempt to compel it to allow boarding.55 A LEDET team goes on board
first, to secure and search the skiff, preserve evidence, and radio its assessment
of the situation. Once the vessel is secured, an NCIS team joins the LEDET, and
together they perform a crime-scene investigation, collecting, logging, and securing evidence so as to ensure chain of custody until it can be handed over to a
judicial authority. If the CTF 151 commander determines that there is sufficient
evidence to prosecute, suspected pirates are detained until they can be rendered
for trial in a state willing to accept them.56
A naval presence off the coast of Somalia presumably forces pirates to project
their attacks farther out to sea, aside from disrupting or deterring attacks where
warships are close enough to protect threatened vessels. Additionally, depending on weather, naval patrols can be scaled back between May and September
and from December to March, when Indian Ocean monsoons produce swells
reaching ten to fifteen feet and pirate skiffs cannot effectively stalk vulnerable
merchant vessels. (However, pirate attacks tend to increase following periods of
poor weather conditions.) 57 Finally, a measure that has not been taken thus far
but may be under consideration is the establishment of a maritime exclusion
zone adjacent to the Somali coastline.58
Despite the palpable deterrent that a naval presence represents, pirates appear to have developed a fair understanding of the gaps in naval capabilities.
Notwithstanding the MSPA, IRTC, and the patrols of warships from over twenty
navies, pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia in 2009 still accounted for over
half of the attacks worldwide.59 However, on average the success rate for pirate
attacks for this time period was just over 21 percent, compared with 40 percent
for the year 2008.60 Success rates by month in 2009 are detailed in figure 3.
Although pirate attacks had lower rates of success in 2009 than in 2008, coalition maritime forces on the whole simply do not have enough warships to patrol
off the coast of Somalia and protect the tens of thousands of ships that traverse
these waters annually. Responding to an analysis positing that it would take a
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FIGURE 3
SUCCESS RATES OF PIRATE ATTACKS OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA,
JANUARY–DECEMBER 2009

Source: ICC—International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report: Report for the Period 1 January–31 December 2009.

force over three times the size of the entire U.S. Navy to fight piracy effectively,
Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed out that
the Navy has other pressing priorities as well, in other parts of the world.61 Furthermore, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead has pointed
to a need for counterpiracy approaches that complement naval patrols, such as
the combined sea and shore strategy that was so instrumental in curbing piracy
in the Strait of Malacca earlier this decade.62 Both the attack trends and the
statements of Navy leadership highlight the limitations inherent in a purely naval approach to countering piracy.63
There are specific operational difficulties as well. For example, it has been
estimated that escorting merchant vessels between the Red Sea and Mombasa
alone would require seventy-two ships—more than currently operate in the entire region at any given time.64 In any case, organizing convoys under escort
would compel merchant ships to follow schedules that may not meet market requirements.65 Since convoys move at the speed of the slowest member, a containership would have to travel as slowly as a tanker.66 Finally, for many countries,
contributing to a sustained naval presence off the coast of Somalia is extremely
costly and plagued by logistic hurdles.
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Pursuing Kinetic Operations on Land
One of the options to consider in order to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia
might include a range of kinetic methods targeting the land-based aspects of piracy. On the lower end of the scale, the international community could mobilize
to launch air strikes or amphibious raids designed to dismantle pirates’ bases
and infrastructure and to destroy their ability to launch attacks out at sea. At
the higher end, surgical air strikes could be followed by military occupation of
the territories from which pirates launch their attacks, providing security (and
eventually enabling governance) and preventing pirates from operating.
The unequivocal attractiveness of kinetic methods applied ashore lies in the
argument that as pirates and their support networks reside ashore, they should
be targeted there. Furthermore, a credible threat of military force could compel
Somali clan leaders and businessmen to clamp down on pirate activity, reducing
it to a level that may turn a profit but that the international community may be
willing to ignore.67
In reality, the United States is unlikely to launch air strikes or send in troops
for several reasons.68 First, attacks on pirate bases or an outright military occupation would certainly undermine President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed’s TFG,
which already has plenty of obstacles to overcome. Even with—or especially
with—the consent of the TFG, an American attack could provoke greater support among the population for the pirate gangs or even for ideological groups
like al-Shabaab. Second, there is resistance within the United States to reengaging militarily on land in Somalia, as a result of the October 1993 Black Hawk
Down incident, in which eighteen American soldiers were killed while supporting the United Nations Operation in Somalia, known as UNOSOM II, which
was attempting to avert a humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Third, there appears
to be insufficient intelligence to allow pirate infrastructure to be targeted without inflicting civilian casualties, which could further destabilize the country
and energize al-Shabaab.69 Fourth, international norms of human rights dictate
that the United States could not simply kill suspected pirates encountered but
would have to develop a method to capture them, put them on trial within an
acceptable and humane amount of time, and incarcerate those convicted, which
raises legal complications similar to those already discussed. Lastly, were there
to be any sort of military intervention, Western humanitarian relief organizations currently providing services that the Somali government has been unable
to offer since 1991 could be targeted for reprisals.70
Building Local and Regional Maritime Security–Sector Capacity
Building local and regional maritime security–sector capacity may provide a
deterrent against pirate attacks, finally making pirates accountable for their
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destabilizing activities. To make these countries capable of contributing to maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, the United States and its
partners could enhance their engagement with maritime security–sector institutions in Somalia and neighboring littoral countries, such as Djibouti, Kenya,
Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Tanzania, and Yemen.
Somalia has already requested assistance in the form of training and equipment from the international community to establish a coast guard to help tackle
piracy. The TFG has also been training five hundred young men to serve in the
Somali navy, which its chief hopes will eventually have five thousand men.71
However, training has thus far taken place on land, since the force has no operational ships. Although Somalia would like to provide for its own maritime
security, its transitional government is likely to be preoccupied in the short term
with staving off defeat by various insurgent groups and gaining control of its
own capital city.72 Consequently, the maritime security gap will have to be fi lled
by regional and international partners in the meantime.
Regrettably, however, most countries in the region are currently ill equipped
to provide maritime security even for themselves, let alone Somalia; they lack
the requisite training and equipment, and their security forces have traditionally been land focused. In order to build their capacity to deal with maritime
threats, the United States and international partners could augment security
cooperation agreements, offering to train maritime security personnel; equip
and assist in the maintenance of vessels; share best practices for the collection,
sharing, and synchronization of intelligence; provide aerial surveillance; and
coordinate multilateral naval training exercises designed to increase regional
cooperation.73 Ideally, these countries would eventually be able to patrol with
international partners by air and sea; conduct surveillance of the littoral zone;
facilitate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information on possible
maritime threats; encourage interagency and multinational cooperation; and
harmonize maritime doctrines.74
As a step in the right direction, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, the
Maldives, the Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Yemen signed in February
2009 a code of conduct to counter piracy, agreeing to establish counterpiracy
information centers in Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, and Sanaa and a counterpiracy
training center in Djibouti.75 Also, in June 2009, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, and
Yemen agreed upon the formation of an Arab Anti-Piracy Task Force to provide
maritime security for states in the region and enhance cooperation with multinational naval patrols.76 In addition, Kenya and Tanzania have pledged to start
joint naval operations, and in the spring of 2009 the Seychelles became the first
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East African nation to assist in operations carried out by the EU’s Operation
ATALANTA.77
Increased coordination among regional stakeholder states could set precedents for sustained regional maritime security cooperation that could be extended to other maritime security threats, such as arms trafficking, human
trafficking, drug trafficking, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing
(which was arguably what drove Somali fishermen to pursue piracy on a much
smaller scale in the 1990s). Regardless, the present limitations of local and regional maritime capacity mean that the benefits of such regional and international initiatives are more likely to have concrete impact over the long term than
in the immediate future.
Building Local and Regional Security-Sector Capacity on Land
As a result of the security and governance vacuum in Somalia, lawlessness ashore
is likely to continue to create lawlessness at sea unless security-sector capacity
can be built up both in Somalia and in neighboring states. In order to build
this capacity with the intent that these countries would increasingly contribute
to the provision of security in the region, the United States and international
partners could enhance engagement with local and regional security-sector institutions on land.
Given the fact that Somalia lacks functional governing institutions to support a security sector, one will have to be built from scratch, which will require
a costly and sustained whole of government multinational commitment. International security assistance could equip Somalia to develop a police force and
military supported by robust security-sector institutions that could enable the
country to address the security and governance vacuum that allows pirates and
insurgents to thrive. That said, the TFG is currently extremely weak, controlling
little territory within the country it purports to govern. In the meantime, the
United States and its partners could address capability gaps in regional partner
nations like Kenya and Djibouti, in nations that do not share a border with Somalia (such as Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda), and in regional and
subregional organizations like the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development. Ideally, the regional militaries could become more able and willing to build governing institutions in Somalia and help provide security there,
in the event of a more viable and inclusive peace agreement.
However, it is for all intents and purposes impossible to disaggregate Somalia’s problems, whether on land or at sea, from other conflicts in the region, such
as the proxy war often fought on Somali soil between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and
Ethiopia’s internal security concerns in the Ogaden region.78 Though it is important to attempt to maintain dialogues with Ethiopia and Eritrea on the situation
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in Somalia, it might be advisable therefore to exclude them from efforts to build
capacity specifically to address instability there. Furthermore, the international
community will have to remain sensitive to Kenya’s concerns via-à-vis its own
internal security issues. With lucrative foreign investments, a tourism industry
shaken by electoral violence two years ago, and almost three hundred thousand
Somali refugees along the porous border with Somalia, Kenya takes very seriously the threats issued by al-Shabaab to launch terrorist attacks in Kenya if the
country were to become militarily involved in Somalia.79
The international community should also consider concrete financial, logistical, and political support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
and any successor multinational peacekeeping forces so that they might become capable of achieving their strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.80
AMISOM was authorized by a communiqué of the sixty-ninth meeting of the
Peace and Security Council of the African Union, on 19 January 2007.81 One of
just a handful of AU peacekeeping missions, AMISOM was essentially stillborn
in the face of a challenging security environment in Somalia as well as operational and tactical setbacks. It was initially authorized for six months from the
date of the communiqué, with a mandate (set out in paragraph nine of the UN
Security Council Resolution 1772) that included:
• Providing support to transitional federal institutions, to help them carry out
their functions of government
• Supporting dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia
• Providing security for key infrastructure
• Assisting with the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization
Plan, in particular the effective reestablishment of the Somali security forces
• Facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance.82
AMISOM’s mandate has been extended several times, most recently to 31 January 2011, as authorized by UN Security Resolution 1910.83
In addition to a mandate that was restricted to self-defense and the protection of a weak and divided government, AMISOM has encountered several difficulties. AMISOM has suffered from unfulfi lled commitments made by the international community. The original understanding was that AMISOM would
evolve into a UN peacekeeping mission upon the expiration of its initial mandate in June 2007, but as of early 2010 this has not occurred. AMISOM has been
able to muster only 5,200 of its authorized troop strength of eight thousand
soldiers, which have been contributed by Uganda and Burundi, although Nigeria, Ghana, and Malawi pledged troops that were never deployed. Also, the AU,
unable to finance the mission on its own, had to rely on ad hoc international
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financial assistance for training and equipment, which has proved insufficient.
Additionally, although initiated and staffed by African personnel, AMISOM
was perceived in Somalia as a tool of Western interests, and its soldiers were
consequently targeted by insurgents.84 Finally, AMISOM forces were accused of
human rights violations, having used indiscriminate violence to defend themselves against attacks. Only in the spring of 2009 did AMISOM change tactics,
returning fire only if attackers could be visually identified, but by that time their
actions had already further alienated the population from the TFG.85
ADEPT AND CULTURALLY SENSITIVE ENGAGEMENT
Piracy off the coast of Somalia must be analyzed in the context from which it
emerged if a comprehensive and sustainable response is to be crafted. Piracy is
a symptom of instability on land; as such, counterpiracy methods that focus on
the symptoms of lawlessness on land rather than on its root causes do little to
mitigate the conditions that allowed piracy to emerge in the first place. Because
piracy is a land-based enterprise, possible counterpiracy solutions must be assessed in terms of how they would positively impact conditions ashore.
In the preceding paragraphs, the author outlined a variety of counterpiracy
methods. Assuming pirate attacks would escalate in range, frequency, and lethality were they to be accepted as a cost of doing business, this option may be
infeasible. However, the remaining methods could have a positive impact if their
strengths are pursued in concert. In order to reach maximum effectiveness, an
ideal counterpiracy strategy would address the catalysts of instability as well as
its manifestations in the maritime domain.
A comprehensive and sustainable strategy to address piracy off the coast of
Somalia would entail the United States working with regional and international
partners to trace and target pirate finances, albeit with a clear understanding of
the limitations of this approach in Somalia’s cash-based economy. Additionally,
international stakeholders would have to be conscious of the inability of this
method to target the underlying conditions that allowed piracy to emerge in the
first place.
The U.S. government should also maintain its engagement with the shipping
industry, not only to make nonlethal ship defenses more effective and widespread but also to explore how seamen utilizing them could make themselves
less vulnerable while under attack. Lethal defenses of merchant vessels should be
avoided if possible, due to the possibility of escalation of violence during pirate
attacks, as well as the various liability and oversight issues that could arise. In
any case, nonlethal or lethal merchant vessel defenses address only the symptoms of instability on land.
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To alleviate the bureaucratic and financial burdens on regional states willing
to accept suspected pirates for trial, the United States and its partners should
support a regional ship-rider program. In addition, international stakeholders
should emphasize building the capacity of the judicial systems in the region in
order to bolster legal deterrents to those who wish to foment instability in Somalia or elsewhere in the region. Above all, a reliable process by which countries
apprehending pirates at sea can deliver suspects for trial and incarceration is
essential. However, addressing legal impediments to combating piracy fails to
address the conditions from which piracy emerged.
Multinational naval patrols should be continued, sensitive to seasonal fluxes
in pirate attacks and acknowledging the limited ability of these warships to protect the tens of thousands of merchant vessels that transit the region on a yearly
basis. However, such a method should recognize the limitations of a solely seabased approach to countering piracy, as it targets the symptoms of instability
and is no substitute for enhanced regional maritime capacity and law and order
on land in Somalia. Multinational naval patrols may also be unsustainable over
the long term.
However ill advised and improbable it may be in practice, a credible threat
of kinetic military action on land could encourage pirates to reduce their attacks to a pre-2008 level that might not draw the attention of the international
community. If actually put in practice, a U.S. attack on Somali pirate bases or
an outright invasion might address some of the conditions that allowed piracy
to emerge, but at the cost of increasing the level of intensity of the insurgency
in Somalia as a whole. Therefore, this method should be avoided in spite of its
potential to address the security and governance gap in Somalia.
Building local and regional maritime security–sector capacity is an important
area for international engagement, since regional states must eventually bear
some of the burden of maritime security in their region under any long-term
counterpiracy strategy. Specifically, East African and Persian Gulf states should
continue regional maritime security cooperation supported by international
partners. The goal would be to harmonize regional maritime coordination efforts by sharing information regarding suspicious activity and conducting joint
patrols with the support of nonregional partners. Like the multinational naval
patrols, this method is limited by the fact that it only targets the symptoms of
instability. However, it is possible that over the long term increased maritime security in the Horn of Africa could lessen seaborne threats that have contributed
to lawlessness on land in Somalia, such as illegal fishing and arms trafficking.
Although the methods above can contribute greatly to the eventual success
of the counterpiracy campaign, a truly comprehensive and sustainable counterpiracy strategy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean must address the security
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vacuum on land in Somalia that has created the conditions that allow piracy
to thrive. While UN boots on the ground are increasingly unlikely, the international community should continue to support the Djibouti Agreement, although it is arguably handicapped by its lack of inclusivity.86 As an alternative,
the international community could encourage a new round of peace talks, advocating maximum practical participation, encouraging clans and factions to buy
in to a peaceful Somalia where law and order thrive. More inclusive peace talks
may in fact be a prerequisite to any reduction in violence in Somalia, and they
could provide the space necessary to address the governance vacuum.
Flaws notwithstanding, it is crucial that the international community support initiatives such as AMISOM with a strong and sustained commitment to
provide financing, training, and equipment, since it is an attempt to create and
sustain an African peacekeeping force whose mere existence is at the very least a
positive development for African regional security. Stronger international support may make African countries that have pledged troops but have not sent
them more willing to do so. Although peacekeeping is by no means nation
building, the presence of a sufficiently trained and equipped peacekeeping force
could contribute to an environment amenable to political, social, and economic
development in Somalia.
In any long-term diplomatic or military engagement with Somalia, the international community will have to decide how best to deal with nonstate entities
in Somalia. It should be open to abandoning the notion of a unified Somali state
in order to accommodate entities like Somaliland, which declared independence
from Somalia in 1991, and Puntland, which declared its autonomy in 1998. Somalia as it stands now does not act like a state; for the international community
to engage with Somalia as it would with a state presents more complexities than
can be managed in the current security and humanitarian situation. In particular, the United States and its international partners should weigh the costs and
benefits of dealing directly, on a case-by-case basis, with legitimate and effective
local authorities within Somalia, regardless of their affi liation or lack thereof
with the Somali government. In the long run, these alternative identities and
centers of authority may prove capable of providing law and order in Somalia in
a way that a central government has been unable to do for two decades.87 Selecting local authorities for engagement could, admittedly, intensify competition
among them and undermine the authority of the TFG; nonetheless, an adept
and culturally sensitive engagement strategy may reveal that state and nonstate
authorities are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
As a precaution, any support the United States gives to Somalia should not
be too overt, as it could backfire, empowering hard-liners and reversing gains in
governance and security. On one hand, Somali president Sheikh Sharif Ahmed
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needs external support to maintain the TFG’s current position; on the other hand,
he needs broad support within Somalia if his government is to be successful. If he
relies too much on the former, it will compromise his success with the latter.88
In the end, by addressing the security and governance vacuum in Somalia by
building local and regional capacity through a long-term multinational commitment, the United States and international partners may be able to assist in
eliminating insecurity on land and the resultant insecurity at sea that has manifested itself in the recent spike in pirate attacks. The key to success in countering
piracy off the coast of Somalia lies in conceptually linking the positive elements
of current sea-based counterpiracy methods with approaches designed to remedy the underlying instability ashore that produced piracy in the first place.
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by a Senior Department Official, June 26,
2009,” U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in
Action, www.state.gov/.
87. Kraska “Fresh Thinking for an Old Problem.”
88. Alisha Ryu, “Somalia Stability Challenged
by Complex and Shifting Politics,” Voice of
America, 29 April 2009, www.voanews.com/.
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CHINA’S OIL SECURIT Y PIPE DREAM
The Reality, and Strategic Consequences, of Seaborne Imports
Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins

B

etween now and 2025—a widely used strategic planning horizon—the
world’s major economies will likely still depend to a large degree on traditional energy sources. Oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), despite their economic and strategic differences, are the two with inherent naval significance, as
they must be transported by sea to the extent that domestic supplies or overland
pipelines are insufficient.1 Indeed, maritime transport is properly conceived
as a default, as it is almost always significantly cheaper than any overland alternatives, many of which are simply impractical in any case. The recent
global recession has further reduced tanker rates. Private-sector analysts have
produced detailed forecasts of supply and demand for these two critical commodities. But no researchers have yet produced a detailed study of the strategic
and naval implications of Chinese energy access.2 The market focus of energy
intelligence firms and the lack of security and technical information informing
journalists in the energy field have so far precluded analysis of the issue.
This gap must be fi lled. The National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends
2025 report “projects a still-preeminent U.S. joined by fast developing powers,
notably India and China, atop a multipolar international system” that “will
be subject to an increased likelihood of conflict over scarce resources”—one
of them being energy.3 Russia will have great influence as an energy supplier.
“No other countries are projected to rise to the level of China, India, or Russia,
and none is likely to match their individual global clout.”4 More specifically,
“Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and
modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue-water
naval capabilities.”5
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Useful insights into these potential trends can be gained by considering the
physical and economic realities of oil transshipment. This article assesses the
relative dependence of China (as a consumer) on seaborne oil flows between
now and 2025. China’s oil security concerns will help shape its military and
policy priorities fundamentally, with significant implications for the U.S. Navy
in coming years. For the present, it underscores a question of fundamental importance concerning China’s strategic orientation: To what extent will China
seek to transform itself from a continental to a continental-maritime power?6
Chinese oil demand, growing rapidly, has reached 8.5 million barrels* per
day (mbpd), even amid the global recession.7 China became a net oil importer
in 1993 and likely became a net gasoline importer by the end of 2009. While still
a very significant oil producer, China is now the world’s second-largest oil user.
It now imports half of its crude oil, with imports reaching a record 4.6 million
bpd in July 2009.8 Seaborne imports, which overland pipelines will not reduce,
constitute more than 80 percent of this total.9 At present, therefore, 40 percent
of China’s oil comes by sea.
Chinese security analysts and policy makers worry about their nation’s “excessive” reliance on seaborne oil shipments. Many believe that by investing in
pipelines to deliver oil from neighboring oil producers like Russia and Kazakhstan and building additional lines to “bypass” the Malacca Strait, China can
protect its oil imports from possible interdiction during a conflict.
A robust internal debate is being waged within China at multiple levels and
across a number of disciplines regarding how to ensure access to oil supplies.
At stake is the extent to which China should cooperate with international economic institutions versus seeking unilateral military solutions; 10 should develop as a maritime versus continental power; and should focus on defending
against state, as opposed to nonstate, actors.11 Despite this diversity of opinion,
a wide variety of influential Chinese experts, including scholars, policy analysts,
and members of the military, believe that the United States can sever China’s
seaborne energy supplies at will and in a crisis might well choose to do so.12 It
is widely claimed, for instance, that “whoever controls the Strait of Malacca effectively grips China’s strategic energy passage, and can threaten China’s energy
security at any time.”13
Such views are widely cited to justify pipeline construction, which is proceeding rapidly. China already has fifty thousand kilometers of oil and gas pipelines
and will nearly double the amount, to ninety thousand, during the Twelfth FiveYear Plan (2011–15).14
* There are 7.3 barrels of oil in a ton.
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Yet as this analysis will demonstrate, China’s overland oil supply plans may
largely be a “pipe dream,” driven by a combination of a misunderstanding of
global oil market mechanisms, incomplete assessment of security issues, and the
lobbying by sectoral and local commercial and political interests of a massively
overtaxed national energy policy-making apparatus. Some projects—such as
the line from Russia that is now under construction and an existing line from
Kazakhstan—are indeed economically viable overland projects that will bring
at least limited diversity to China’s oil supplies. Others, however, like the proposed lines through Burma and Pakistan, make much less economic and security sense.
In the end, pipelines are not likely to increase Chinese oil import security in
quantitative terms, because the additional volumes they bring in will be overwhelmed by China’s demand growth; the country’s net reliance on seaborne oil
imports will grow over time, pipelines notwithstanding. If we estimate Chinese
oil-import-demand growth conservatively at an average of 2.5 percent annually
over the next five years, Beijing’s imports will still increase by a total of around
650,000 barrels a day—more than the combined volume that the pipelines from
Russia and Kazakhstan will likely be able to bring in by 2013.15 Of that total,
the 300,000 bpd from Russia will not be “new” overland supplies but, rather,
consist primarily of a transfer from rail to pipe as the crude volumes previously
carried into China by train are moved into the pipeline instead. The proposed
Burma–China and Pakistan–China lines are simply “shortcut” routes, not true
overland supply alternatives; oil will still have to be carried by sea in tankers to
the pipelines’ starting points.
A total figure for these two sources, Russia and Kazakhstan, of around
500,000 bpd may seem low, but it reflects the reality that China’s neighbors have
limited capacity to offset its seaborne oil imports. Their reserves are limited in
key potential supply areas (e.g., eastern Siberia), and politics further complicate
the picture. Kazakhstan, for its part, is pursuing a three-vector oil export policy.
It entails shipping oil through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium line to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk; to China through the Atasu–Alashankou
line; and, soon, through the $1.5 billion Kazakhstan Caspian Pipeline System to
a port on the Caspian Sea, from which it will be carried by tanker to Azerbaijan,
there to enter the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline.16 Russian sources say the third
route may ultimately be able to pump up to fifty-six million tons a year of oil.17
Russia, meanwhile, may prioritize oil supplies to the East Siberia–Pacific
pipeline, feeding the port of Kozmino, on the Sea of Japan near Nakhodka; from
there it can be exported to Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, and
other Pacific Basin consumers, not China alone. A spur pipeline from Russia to
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China is now under construction and is scheduled to enter service in the second
half of 2010. Detailed analysis of the project is included later in the study.
Pipelines are more vulnerable to sabotage and military interdiction than
seaborne shipping is. Projects (like the Burma–China pipeline) designed to help
seaborne shipments bypass choke points are expensive, can be blockaded, and
are themselves vulnerable to physical attack by nonstate actors or other parties.
Seaborne shipping, by contrast, is very flexible and can be routed around disruptions. For this reason, pipeline plans predicated on the idea that bypassing
the Strait of Malacca increases oil security are fundamentally flawed. Even if
Malacca were completely sealed off by blockade or accident, tankers could be
diverted through the Sunda, Lombok, or other passages with some disruption
in deliveries and at an additional cost of as little as one or two dollars per barrel.18 Some Chinese analysts now share this conclusion, one noting that “SLOC
[sea line of communication] security is much more important than pipeline
transport lines.”19
Finally, as figure 1 demonstrates, pipelines are far more expensive than tankers
in terms of what must be spent to move a given volume of oil a given distance.20
Certain pipelines—such as the Pakistan, and possibly the Burma, projects—
will likely require substantial subsidies if they are to compete with seaborne
imports. Much of the cost of supporting such uneconomical projects, which are
driven more by politics than profits, will fall on the Chinese government, which
already faces substantial energy-subsidy costs as well as the demands of its fourtrillion-RMB stimulus package.
The first portion of the analysis will examine operational and prospective
pipelines oriented toward China. The projects are arranged chronologically
in the order that they have, will, or might become operational. At present, the
Kazakhstan–China pipeline is operating at partial capacity, a Russia–China line
could become operational by late 2010 (and is likely to be in commercial operation by 2011), the Burma–China pipeline is now under construction, and a
China–Pakistan pipeline remains entirely aspirational.21

FIGURE 1
SAMPLE OIL TRANSPORT COSTS TO CHINA
MODE

ROUTE

DISTANCE (KM)

COST (US$/BBL)

COST (US$/BBL/1000 KM)

Tankera

Ras Tanura–Ningbo

7000

1.25

0.18

Angarsk–Daqing

3200

2.41

0.75

Angarsk–Manzhouli

1000

7.19

7.19

Pipeline

b

Trainc

Notes:
a. VLCC at $150k/day charter, 2 million bpd cargo.
b. Transneft tariff of 15.41 rubles/ton/100 km.
c. Based on weighted average of Russian Railways’ oil tariffs to Zabaikalsk and Naushki.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss2/1

Erickson&Collins.indd 92

98

3/1/2010 4:11:54 PM

Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

ERICKSON & COLLINS

93

The second portion of the study will examine Chinese views of how pipelines
might enhance China’s oil security and assess the potential for, and utility and
disadvantages of, a pipeline-centric oil-security strategy. The final, and concluding, section will suggest how China might enhance its energy security at lower
financial and diplomatic cost.
In the outline that follows of current and possible pipeline projects, fear that
nonstate actors or foreign navies could interdict oil shipments to China will be
prominent as a factor that impels the national government to support overland
supply projects. Yet it should be noted at the outset that national oil companies
may be playing on that fear, the sense of oil insecurity among high-level decision
makers, in order to obtain further state support. Provincial and local officials
are likely doing so to secure projects that could create substantial local investment and job growth.
Indeed, if one averages labor-demand numbers for sample refinery expansion
and newbuild projects in the West and the developing world, a 200,000 bpd refinery, such as that which may be built near Kunming, could create ten thousand
or more construction and engineering jobs while it is being built and at least
several hundred permanent positions to run the plant thereafter.22 Building the
pipeline itself and associated storage and pumping facilities would create additional temporary and permanent jobs.
Understanding the real benefits that pipeline and associated refinery construction would bring local governments makes it imperative to remember in
what follows that local interests and overall Chinese national energy-security
interests must be kept separate. What is beneficial at the local level, or to a certain subset of corporate actors, may not always be the most effective policy for
addressing national strategic concerns. In this sense, significant portions of China’s push for pipelines mirror the “Going Out” oil security strategy, in which the
state oil companies cultivated fears of oil insecurity in Beijing and then turned
around and wrapped themselves in the flag as they sought overseas oil projects.
These projects have boosted their incomes and reserves but have done little to
enhance China’s oil security on the national level; these firms have even damaged China’s image abroad, through their dealings with Sudan and other pariah
states.23
KAZAKHSTAN–CHINA PIPELINE
The Kazakhstan–China pipeline is currently China’s only operational overland
oil pipeline project. China previously imported Kazakh crude by rail through
the entry port of Alashankou, in Xinjiang. To move larger volumes and to lower
shipping prices, however, both sides desired a pipeline. In September 1997, the
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Chinese and Kazakh governments signed the General Agreement on the Project of Oil Deposits Development and Pipeline Construction.24 The initial stage
of the line was built from Kenkiyak to Atyrau during 2002–2004, the second
stage during 2004–2006 from Atyrau to the Chinese border at Alashankou.25
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) funded the construction
cost of $806 million for the thousand-kilometer leg from Atasu to Alashankou,
as well as the cost of a 252 km extension from Alashankou to the refinery at
Dushanzi, also in Xinjiang.26
The pipeline is operated by a joint stock company called MunaiTas NorthWest Pipeline Company CJSC, which is backed by China National Petroleum
Corporation and KazMunaiGaz. Its current capacity is approximately 200,000
bpd. In 2008, however, China imported an average of only 115,000 bpd of crude
oil from Kazakhstan by pipeline and rail.27 In December 2007, the pipeline carried an average of 102,600 bpd—only about half of its total capacity—due to
pricing disputes and problems with supply availability that created gaps, only
partially fi lled with Russian crude from western Siberia. The line has carried
Kazakh Kumkol crude as well as crudes from Russia.28 This situation is due to
the fact that current Kazakh production does not yet completely fi ll the line and
also because lighter, less waxy Russian oils are blended with waxy Kazakh crudes
during the winter to prevent them from solidifying and blocking the line.
Figure 2 shows the current pipeline and future planned additions. Now that
the segment from Kenkiyak to Kumkol is completed, Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea
production (in the Tengiz and Kashagan fields) can enter a pipeline network
reaching deep into China. In August 2007, CNPC opened a 400,000-bpd-capacity
crude oil pipeline from Shanshan in Xinjiang to the refining center at Lanzhou, in Gansu Province.29 This line, and a parallel oil products pipeline, will
allow crude and refined products from Xinjiang to be shipped to Lanzhou and
then into CNPC’s existing pipeline network serving central and southwestern
China. This will permit Kazakh crude to penetrate deep into China, because
as crude oil and products from the Dushanzi refinery can be shipped farther
east, boosting oil supplies to the inland regions that will be a focus of Beijing’s
development program, regional economic disparities will be reduced. The
Kazakhstan–China pipeline will also be integrated with a new strategic petroleum reserve site under construction near Ürümqi, which will store fifty-one
million barrels of crude once completed.30 The line could reach a maximum
throughput capacity of 400,000 bpd in 2011, if its final stage, from Kenkiyak to
Kumkol, reaches its full capacity by that time.
While this pipeline project originated in part due to oil-supply security concerns, it is easily justifiable as the most economic way to bring Kazakh crude
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FIGURE 2
KAZAKHSTAN–CHINA OIL PIPELINE: EXISTING ROUTE

existing

oil into the western Chinese market. China wins, because it gains what it sees
as “secure” oil supplies; Kazakhstan gains a crude export route independent of
Russia and a new market for its oil; and Russian companies gain an additional
route for getting western Siberian crude oil production into the Chinese market.
A RUSSIA–CHINA PIPELINE
China views Russia as a rich and secure oil source capable of delivering crude
overland, far from U.S. Navy–patrolled sea routes. China and Russia first began
discussing a pipeline in 1994. Yukos unveiled plans in 2001 to construct a pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing. These plans were suspended during the Kremlin’s
2004–2007 assault on Yukos and have been superseded by Transneft’s massive
East Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline. The ESPO’s first section, from
Taishet to Skovorodino, is complete and can now pump crude, although as of
September 2009 the line was running in reverse, moving crude into the existing
western Siberian pipeline network. The second half of the line runs 2,100 km
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from Skovorodino to Nakhodka, on the Sea of Japan, and the entire line may
not be fully operational until 2025.31 Figure 3 shows oil pipelines existing, under
construction, and planned from Russia.
In the meantime, China has been importing increasing volumes of crude
from Russia by rail (as well as smaller volumes through the Kazakhstan–China
pipeline). In 2007 and 2008, China imported an average of more than 300,000
bpd of Russian crude.32 Shipping crude by rail can cost twice as much as shipping
it by pipeline, however.33 Driven by this reality and by the fact that regional rail
infrastructure likely cannot handle China’s ultimately desired crude volumes,
CNPC and Sinopec (the primary Chinese buyers of Russian crude) pushed for
construction of a spur pipeline from Skovorodino to Daqing, in Heilongjiang
Province. The entire spur line will run roughly a thousand kilometers (seventy
kilometers on the Russian side and 965 km on the Chinese side) and will cost
around $436 million.34 The Chinese side is financing the majority of the spur’s
length, as it lies largely on Chinese soil. Initial capacity is slated to be fifteen million tons per year (300,000 bpd), with the possibility of later expansion to thirty
million tons annually (600,000 bpd).35
Pricing disputes and a relative lack of profitability restrained Russian pipeline
export plans to China for more than a decade. Until very recently, CNPC and
Rosneft had serious disputes over rail crude-pricing formulas, and it is likely
that similar issues may have affected the pipeline project. This would not be
surprising, as the Kazakhstan–China pipeline has often run at below capacity
FIGURE 3
RUSSIA–CHINA OIL PIPELINES: EXISTING, UNDER CONSTRUCTION, AND PLANNED

under construction

existing
planned
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due to pricing disputes.36 Russian Railways, run by Viktor Yakunin, a Putin acquaintance and former KGB officer, also opposed pipeline construction, which
would erode Russian Railways’ substantial income from hauling oil to China.
The global financial crisis and Russian companies’ need for cash have changed
the landscape, however. In April 2009, Transneft and Rosneft signed an agreement for a $25 billion loan from China Development Bank in exchange for delivering 300,000 bpd of oil to China for the next twenty years and also building a
64 km spur pipeline from Skovorodino to the Chinese border, according to RIA
Novosti. Russia’s powerful railway lobby originally opposed the pipeline plan
but in June 2008 the Russian Railways CEO retracted his prior opposition to the
plan, saying instead that he hopes to ship marginal high-grade crude volumes
of a few million tons per year to China.37 Higher-quality crudes lose value when
blended with lower-quality oils for pipeline shipment.
Russia’s decision to ship oil to China by pipeline was driven in part by economic necessity, as Rosneft and Transneft needed a cash infusion in early 2009.
It was also driven by the imperative of cementing the Sino-Russian energy relationship with a large-scale supply deal. During summer 2008, sources close
to Rosneft indicated that despite the Russian government’s growing desire for a
pipeline to China, the company wanted to stall the spur pipeline for as long as
possible due to the route’s lower profitability relative to other options.38
The immediate economics of crude export from eastern Siberia changed in
July 2009 as the Kremlin ordered a nine-month-long suspension of oil export
duties on production from thirteen key oil fields, including Rosneft’s large new
Vankor field. That said, given Russia’s gaping budget deficit as of December 2009
and resulting hunger for tax revenues, we believe there is a medium probability
that the tax holiday will not be extended for more than twenty-four months,
since it is more politically expedient to raise revenue by ending an oil tax holiday
than by taxing citizens on food, alcohol, and other goods.
While the China–Russia pipeline deal is presently on track, there are still
a number of potential friction points. Rosneft may still worry that near- and
medium-term production from eastern Siberia cannot fi ll the spur line and ensure adequate supplies to the new 400,000 bpd refinery that the company plans
to build near the Pacific port of Nakhodka.
Perhaps of greatest concern to Beijing, Moscow has and will have options to
divert oil from China if it so desires. While the initial capacity of Russia’s line to
China will be 300,000 bpd, and could rise to 600,000 bpd, an alternative pipeline to the Pacific coast (perhaps with initial capacity available within ten years;
and spurred by the potential Rosneft refinery at Nakhodka) could ultimately
offer Moscow oil diversion alternatives that it might possibly use to pressure
China. Russia can also move sufficient volumes of crude oil by rail to the Pacific
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Ocean to allow it to cut off a substantial portion of pipeline exports to China
in the event of a dispute. Transneft does not operate under the normal economic incentives that U.S. and European pipeline operators do, meaning that
if ordered by the Kremlin, the company will favor achieving political objectives
over the need to keep capacity utilization high to maximize earnings and please
shareholders.
A BURMA–CHINA PIPELINE
The proposed Burma–China oil pipeline aims to reduce China’s reliance on oil
shipped through the Malacca Strait. The idea of the pipeline was first articulated
publicly in 2004 by Yunnan University professor Yang Xiaohui.39 Yang argued
that given Burma and Southeast Asia’s historical collective role as a “backdoor”
supply line for China, a Burma–China line would reduce reliance on Malacca
and help secure Chinese oil imports.40
National and local economic development interests then worked to generate
additional support for the project. The Yunnan provincial government subsequently professed its support for the project, and in early 2006 the Burma–China
pipeline emerged on the national radar screen when the National Development
and Reform Commission’s (NDRC’s) 2005 “Refining Industry Development
Overview” named it one of four key oil import channels.41 Figure 4 shows the
proposed pipeline route and facilities that might be associated with the project.
It appears that CNPC will finance the bulk of the line’s construction costs,
in addition to supporting infrastructure. If the project proceeds, by 2010 CNPC
plans to construct an oil wharf capable of berthing tankers of 300,000 deadweight tonnage, as well as storage facilities capable of holding more than four
million barrels of crude.42 The project will be a key element of China’s plans to
promote inland economic development, as its southwest provinces of Yunnan,
Tibet, Guizhou, and Guangxi, as well as Chongqing Municipality, often have
difficulty receiving stable fuel supplies from the refining centers at Lanzhou and
Guangzhou.43
One proposal includes constructing a 400,000 bpd refinery and a colocated million-ton-per-year ethylene plant near Kunming, Yunnan.44 The government of Chongqing Municipality, with the support of Sinopec, has also proposed extending the line to Chongqing and building refining facilities there.45
The pipeline’s initial capacity is slated to be 200,000 bpd, but if it is expanded
to 300,000 or 400,000 bpd both Kunming and Chongqing could build refineries of significant size. It is currently unclear whether or not the tragic May 2008
Sichuan earthquake might cause national and provincial officials to reconsider
locating a large refinery near an active seismic zone.
The NDRC might prefer constructing refineries near both cities, as it allows
both areas to gain economically and would also permit the central government
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FIGURE 4
BURMA–CHINA OIL PIPELINE: PROPOSED ROUTE AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES

under construction
disputed area

to reward both of the main state-owned refiners, CNPC and Sinopec. Southwest
China is currently a zone of competition between the two, with traditional oil
company “spheres of influence” overlapping increasingly as each company seeks
a greater degree of vertical integration and tries to seize market share.46 For example, CNPC and Sinopec competed vigorously in early 2007 to win approval to
build a 200,000 bpd refinery in Guangxi.47 CNPC emerged victorious, probably
because it can use its flagship Sudan project to guarantee crude oil supplies to
the refinery.
From the economic perspective, a Burma–China pipeline may make sense,
as the costs of piping crude to inland refineries in southwest China and then
distributing refined products through the expanding pipeline network likely approximate those of shipping crude by tanker to southeast China, refining it there,
and then shipping products by pipe or rail to southwest Chinese consumers.
A comparative example of overland pipeline crude competing successfully
with seaborne crude in a continental market is that of Canadian oil imports into
the midwestern United States. Recently, the well developed American pipeline
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network has allowed Canadian crude to penetrate almost to the Gulf Coast, the
epicenter of U.S. seaborne crude imports.48 China’s pipeline network for crude
and products cannot compare with that of the United States at present, but the
NDRC and the state oil companies are working quickly to expand China’s domestic pipeline systems for oil and refined products, so regional markets are
likely to become increasingly integrated over time.
The Burma–China pipeline also provides an impetus for enhancing crude
and product supplies by building additional regional refineries and expanding
the area’s product pipeline networks. Oil product demand, particularly for motor fuels, has been growing strongly in southwestern China in recent years as
the area undergoes rapid economic development and consumer incomes rise.
Historically, the region has been short on refining capacity and a refinery at the
terminus of the pipeline from Burma would help to address this deficiency.49
Expanding regional oil-processing capacity will also create significant employment, through construction work and, later, for manning the facilities. As China
reforms its domestic oil pricing system, having refineries in remote southwest
China might give the owner of those plants a high degree of price-setting power
and the ability to charge a premium for fuel produced.
From the security perspective, however, a Burma–China pipeline largely fails
the test. It would allow around 200,000 bpd of oil imports to bypass the Ma lacca
Strait, yet it would be exposed to major security risks in Burma, which is ruled by
a capricious junta and still struggles with ethnic separatism in regions through
which the pipeline will pass.50 Separatism still smolders in Burma’s hinterlands,
as evidenced by the August 2009 clashes in Burma’s Kokang region that sent at
least thirty thousand refugees streaming into China’s Yunnan Province. Transit
countries hosting pipelines gain significant strategic leverage. This leverage can
manifest itself in calculated strategic moves or in disputes over other factors,
such as pricing and transit payments. For example, Ukraine effectively reduced
European natural-gas supplies in the winter of 2005–2006 by siphoning off gas
to replace supplies to Ukraine that Gazprom had cut and was able thereby to put
Russia in a very difficult position diplomatically. The same dynamic unfolded in
even starker fashion when Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in January
2009 and gas supplies actually stopped for several days to a number of Eastern
and Central European consumers of Russian gas.
China would also be seen as directly financing the Burmese junta’s rule and
its repression of the population, since an operational oil line would likely generate direct transit payments of at least fourteen million dollars a year.51 Furthermore, in the event of conflict, the oil port/pipeline terminus at Sittwe on
Burma’s coast would be a concentrated target set, highly vulnerable to blockade
or precision strike.
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A proposed canal across Thailand’s Kra Isthmus, now stalled, appears unrealistic. Zhang Xuegang, a scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary
International Relations, maintains optimistically that it “could . . . provide a
strategic seaway to the Chinese navy” through which “fleets could . . . more
easily protect the nearby sea-lanes and gain access to the Indian Ocean.”52 But
a canal across the isthmus could cost twenty billion dollars or more to build
and, like the Burma–China pipeline, would simply concentrate the target set for
potential blockaders.
A PAKISTAN–CHINA PIPELINE?
Some Pakistani and Chinese analysts have also suggested the possibility of
building an “energy corridor,” including oil pipelines, from Pakistan into western China to diversify China’s oil import routes and avoid the Malacca Strait.53
Yet other Chinese analysts increasingly recognize that geographic and security
barriers render a Pakistan–China oil pipeline unfeasible in the near and medium terms.54
These Chinese analysts express grave reservations about the security situation in Pakistan in light of the country’s perpetual violence and increasing political instability, along with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist
attacks against outsiders. Indeed, Chinese workers have been kidnapped and
killed in at least three separate incidents in western and northwestern Pakistan,
the regions that would be traversed by a Pakistan–China pipeline.55 The pipeline
would also transit a part of Kashmir that, while controlled by Pakistan, is also
claimed by India. Figure 5 shows the currently proposed route of a Pakistan–
China oil pipeline. In addition to security problems, there would also be serious
financial barriers, since oil transport costs could run to at least ten dollars a barrel to achieve payout plus a 10 percent rate of return.
Even at a price above a hundred dollars a barrel, a transport cost of nine
to ten dollars a barrel is very high compared to that of seaborne shipping. If a
Chinese oil company chose to move 200,000 bpd of crude through the Burma–
China pipeline and 250,000 bpd through the Pakistan–China line, it could lose
roughly a billion dollars a year compared to what it would have paid to move the
oil by sea to eastern China.* Beijing would likely have to subsidize such operations, either directly or indirectly. A billion dollars is roughly 6.8 billion RMB at
today’s exchange rates and exceeds by 30 percent the Chinese government’s total
of 4.9 billion RMB in subsidy payments to refiners in 2007.
If the Chinese government allowed fuel to be sold at market prices, companies might have a much higher incentive to build pipelines into remote areas
* This assumes a transport cost difference between pipeline and sea transport of $3/bbl for oil moving
through the Burma–China line and $7/bbl for oil moving through the Pakistan–China line.
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FIGURE 5
PAKISTAN–CHINA OIL PIPELINE: PROPOSED ROUTE

Line of Actual Control
Line of Control
speculative
disputed area

like western and southwestern China; regional fuel deficits could allow them
to charge premium rates for fuels produced by refineries at the end of the pipeline. Under these conditions, pipeline plans might be more financially attractive
than they are now, with Chinese oil product prices lagging international market
prices by 15–20 percent during times of high crude oil prices, such as those of
midsummer 2008.
Geography and cost alone would pose major challenges, however, even under
the best of conditions. The pipeline would have to be constructed in some of
the world’s most challenging terrain. Moreover, it would need to lift oil from
sea level at Gwadar up to the 15,400-foot-high Khunjerab Pass, requiring massive pumping power and steady electrical supplies in remote areas vulnerable
to insurgent activity. By way of comparison, the Trans-Alaska and Baku–Tbilisi–
Ceyhan pipelines climb from sea level to apogees of 2,800 feet and 9,000 feet,
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respectively, before returning to sea level.56 The Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline
(TEP) climbs from a thousand feet above sea level to 13,300 feet above sea level in the relatively short distance of 125 miles, making some cite the TEP as
an example of the “technical feasibility” of a pipeline from Pakistan to China.
However, further analysis causes that comparison to fall short, because at 310
miles the TEP is only about one-fifth the length of the proposed pipeline from
Pakistan to China and does not cross territory rife with insurgent activity and
general instability.
Despite the major challenges, there is still considerable discussion from a variety of Pakistani and Indian sources regarding the latent strategic value of the
new port at Gwadar, in western Pakistan along the Arabian Sea, a likely starting point for any Pakistan–China oil pipeline. For all of the hype about the
development of Gwadar as a facility to support Chinese naval operations in the
Indian Ocean, however, there is in fact very little hard evidence to suggest this
is the case, and the contract for the management of the port was awarded to the
Port Authority of Singapore. In fact, barring a major shift by the Chinese side, it
appears that the main impetus for establishing an “energy corridor” is coming
from the Pakistani side.57 President Pervez Musharraf pushed the idea in June
2006 and apparently raised the issue again during talks with President Hu Jintao
during the April 2008 Bo’ao Forum, but with no apparent results to date.58
DOWNSIDES
The enthusiasm with which some Chinese analysts contemplate these pipeline
projects is based, as we have seen, on a conviction that they will reduce China’s
reliance on seaborne oil imports, which, they fear, may be easily interdicted in
time of crisis. Too many of the (relatively few) analyses of these issues produced
thus far have, however, failed to consider the physical and economic realities of
oil transshipment, which greatly complicate seaborne oil blockade operations.
High Transport and Construction Costs
Importing oil into southwest China through a Burma–China pipeline rather
than through an expanded pipe network serving existing oil ports at Maoming
and elsewhere in South China will be very costly. Pipelines are expensive to construct in frontier regions like Burma, and new deepwater oil-import jetties and
associated storage facilities will have to be built at the pipeline start point on the
Burmese coast. Pipeline shipping will also be very expensive relative to maritime shipping, as pumping oil through the planned Burmese line could cost
more than four dollars a barrel, assuming that CNPC seeks at least a 10 percent
internal rate of return in operating the line.59
In contrast, shipping oil by sea from the Persian Gulf to South China can
cost as little as US$1.00 per barrel for transport costs, and piping it to interior
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refineries in areas likely to be served by the Burma–China line would cost an
additional two or three dollars a barrel.* This represents a substantial cost savings over moving crude through the proposed Burma–China line to refineries
in Yunnan. To lower “stated” project costs, the NDRC might subsidize project
financing or take other measures to reward CNPC, any of which would cost the
Chinese government more than if it relied on seaborne imports to South China
for supplying pipelines to the interior.
At newbuild prices for very large crude carriers (VLCCs), roughly $140 million per vessel, one could build fourteen ships for the two-billion-dollar estimated price of the Burma–China pipeline. Given that each VLCC carries roughly
two million barrels of crude and that the round-trip from the Persian Gulf to
southeast China takes thirty total days, fourteen additional supertankers could
deliver an average of 666,000 bpd of crude, versus 200,000 bpd for the planned
pipeline. The cost disparity between maritime and pipeline shipping would be
even greater for the Pakistan–China line, through which it could cost up to 10
dollars to move a barrel of oil to Ürümqi in western China.60 After reaching
Ürümqi, the oil would have to be piped an additional three or four thousand
kilometers to reach major east coast demand centers, meaning that transport
costs from the Persian Gulf to Chinese end users could exceed fifteen dollars a
barrel, as opposed to closer to US$2.00/barrel (bbl) for oil transported from the
Gulf to eastern China on supertankers as of March 2009 (the peak equivalent
approached $4–$5/bbl in July 2008; during this time, however, pipeline operators raised rates as well).61
Growing Demand in Pipeline Terminus Region
Driven by earthquake reconstruction in Sichuan, the rapid development of
Chongqing, and other regional growth, oil product demand in interior southwest
China is on the upswing and will continue to grow strongly as the government
promotes further growth of domestic consumption. Chongqing’s mayor says the
city, which is analogous to “China’s Chicago” for its position as a linchpin inland
economic powerhouse, will see 14.5 percent year-on-year gross domestic product growth in 2009.62 Building more local refining capacity and expanding the
domestic pipeline system into underserved areas would be a more secure and
lower-cost way of ensuring oil and product supplies while still creating jobs.
Physical Security Risks
Pipelines face substantial physical security risks. In fact, with the Burma and
Pakistan pipelines, there would be a twofold vulnerability. First, oil would have
* Based on costs of moving oil and refined products from the sea to and from inland Russian refineries,
which are at a distance from seaports similar to that at which plants at the terminus of the Burma–China
line would be.
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to be brought by sea to the pipeline terminus via long sea-lanes, concentrating
the target set for an enemy force.63 Then, it would have to be pumped through a
long line traversing remote terrain in potentially insecure areas.64
Pipelines are typically more vulnerable to sustained disruptions than are
ships. Tankers at sea can be rerouted, while pipelines are fi xed links between a
producer and consumer. Terrorists and insurgents have mounted only a handful
of successful attacks on oil tankers (for example, Limburg, off Yemen in 2002;
and Sirius Star, off Kenya in November 2008). However, nonstate actors in Colombia, Nigeria, Iraq, and other countries have been able to disrupt oil pipeline
operations on a consistent basis despite preventative efforts by local security
forces. As for China, CNPC reports that from 2002 to 2006, thieves “have illegally drilled into” its pipelines “18,382 times . . . causing the company a loss of
more than 500 million RMB ($72 million).”65
Pipelines offer a wealth of targeting options to nonstate actors and opposing
militaries.66 Destroying or damaging the pipeline itself is relatively simple; an attacker simply needs to know where the line is, dig down to it if necessary (some,
though not all, pipelines are buried), and use explosives to rupture it.67 Such
attacks typically cause only brief disruptions, as spare line is relatively cheap
and simple to stock, and repairs can usually be carried out quickly—although
repair crews would have more trouble working in remote areas, whose populations in Burma or Pakistan might be armed and hostile. More critical pipeline
vulnerabilities include pump stations, storage facilities, pipeline termini, and
the power supplies that run pumps and other key equipment.68 On one hand,
most of these facilities would be more difficult for nonstate groups to target
successfully, because government forces could concentrate their resources on
protecting such discrete facilities, as opposed to several thousand kilometers of
pipe. On the other hand, electrical power generators, transmission towers, and
buried cables can be attacked as readily as pipelines. Disrupting power supplies
would reduce throughput in the best case and could halt it completely if attacks
became sufficiently severe (e.g., were conducted simultaneously at different
points). According to Li Wei, director of the center for counterterrorism studies
at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, “Though terrorists are more likely to aim at causing a large number of casualties instead of
attacking pipelines in China, there is still the possibility.”69
During an interstate conflict, however, the dynamics would be quite different.
Modern military forces equipped with precision-guided munitions could target
pumping stations and other vital points, many of which run through remote
areas with low populations, and rapidly disable pipelines carrying oil or gas into
China. A maritime blockade, on the other hand, would be extremely difficult
to conduct effectively. Oil cargoes in normal commerce may change ownership
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ten or more times while a ship is at sea, which reduces the effectiveness of a
distant blockade since it is challenging to identify a cargo’s final destination.70
Moreover, if implementing a close blockade of the Chinese coast would solve
the destination-identification problem, it would also bring the blockader’s forces
within range of numerous and capable Chinese access-denial systems, including
ballistic and cruise missiles, naval mines, and submarines.71 In short, the flexibility of modern maritime oil transport confers far greater oil-supply security
benefits than would pipelines supplied by sea or traversing unstable regions.
A BAROMETER OF CHINESE TRUST IN MARKETS
Absent discovery of an economically viable large-scale substitute for crude oil,
pipeline development will likely be insufficient to offset China’s rising seaborne
oil import demand. A simple comparison of planned oil pipeline supply additions to China’s likely overall demand growth in coming years bears this out, as
demand growth will very likely outstrip overland supply additions under even
the most optimistic scenarios.
Some projects (e.g., the Burma line) make sense from local and corporate
perspectives but not that of national oil security. The Burma line will be expensive to build. The numbers can be “massaged” to ensure that officially tabulated project costs remain near the stated figure of two billion dollars, but the
real costs could be much higher. Also, given Burma’s high political risk and
the fact that placing a pipeline terminus along the poorly defensible Burmese
coast might invite interdiction during wartime, relying on shipments through
the Burma line would not enhance China’s oil security. This increases transport
cost and concentrates the target set for an adversary during a conflict but does
not provide the same supply security gains that a pipeline from Kazakhstan or
Russia can deliver.
A more secure approach might entail building a more comprehensive pipe grid
connecting southern Chinese oil ports in Guangdong to the interior southwest
provinces. Construction costs would likely be similar (possibly lower, without
the political and security risks inherent in Burma). In addition, the immediate
and long-term economic benefits could be high, since enhancing China’s internal oil and products transportation grid would boost and stabilize fuel supplies
to Guangxi and other relatively impoverished inland provinces in which Beijing
hopes to catalyze development.
Other lines are simply unviable from nearly all perspectives. The very idea of
a Pakistan line, with its formidable geography, its regional instability, and the
absence of a major demand center at the terminus, exemplifies this chimera.
That is not to say that there is no logical role for pipelines in China’s oil import
portfolio. Some pipeline projects are driven by geographic reality (e.g., the line
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already delivering oil from Kazakhstan and the line under construction from
Russia). The fields fi lling these lines are so far from the sea that an overland line
is the most effective way to transport their oil into the Chinese market. Pipelines
move oil much more cheaply than rail can. But, as happened in the early years
of China’s “Going Out” strategy, special interests also appear to be playing the
security card to benefit themselves in the face of more rational, comprehensive
calculations of national interest.
At the strategic level, a productive area for future research concerns the naval implications of Eurasian energy access, taken more broadly. This could be
investigated by methodologies similar to those employed in this study to assess
the relative dependence of China and India (as consumers) and Russia (as a
supplier) on seaborne energy flows between now and 2025. It might be expected
that Russia’s preponderance of overland energy transport routes will tend to
reinforce that nation’s traditional continental orientation, whereas increasing
reliance on seaborne energy imports in China and India will further the bluewater naval development cited in the Global Trends 2025 report.72
A continued quest for higher overland oil deliveries will not enhance China’s
oil supply security substantially but will rather be a barometer of Chinese trust
in global oil markets and maritime oil transport security. As this article has
demonstrated, however, Chinese decision makers will ultimately have to face
the fact that their nation’s dependence on seaborne oil imports is likely only to
increase. This reality and China’s other growing overseas interests have already
stimulated debate concerning the extent to which China should develop a bluewater navy to defend its commerce on the high seas.
Before Beijing commits firmly to such a substantial investment, which is likely
to have tremendous geopolitical ramifications—some of them likely to involve
counterbalancing by regional nations discomfited by such ambitious Chinese
naval growth—it would be wise to see if China and the United States can come
to a better understanding of their respective roles in the Asia-Pacific as well as
work to clarify areas ripe for mutually beneficial energy security cooperation.
Such strategic dialogue would be difficult to pursue, and it would not in itself
resolve the substantial differences in national interests. But the economic interdependence between the two nations and the potential costs of miscommunication are so high that repeated efforts must be made.
This is a critical time in China’s naval development, and the events of the next
few years will have disproportionate influence. As a Chinese analyst at a highlevel government institution told one of the authors recently, China’s naval development will hinge on “China’s understanding of the international system. If
China feels that it is possible to rely on the international oil market, at least some
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in China believe that a larger navy is unnecessary.” A good first step would be to
encourage Beijing to join two related international organizations. Washington
should take the lead in trying to bring Beijing into the International Renewable
Energy Agency (IRENA); as well as the International Energy Agency (IEA), as
it meets the requirement to store 90 days of import reserves, so that strategic
petroleum reserve inventories can be tracked and reported.
Even these modest measures may require time. The Chinese government is
unlikely to immediately initiate a detailed oil inventory reporting system. Recent steps—such as the decision in late 2009 to stop publishing PetroChina and
Sinopec’s refined products inventories—are worrisome. The growing acrimony
over proposed carbon emission restrictions in the wake of the disappointing
December 2009 Copenhagen climate meetings also does not bode well for quick
progress on diplomatic initiatives seeking Chinese oil inventory transparency in
the next one to two years.
Despite these ongoing challenges, there remains room for optimism. The October 2007 issuance of a new maritime strategy by the U.S. sea services suggests
that Washington is eager to support cooperative, collective approaches to maritime energy security. Discussion among China, the United States, and other key
energy market stakeholders may facilitate adoption of energy security measures
far more effective and mutually beneficial than expensive, limited-capacity, and
vulnerable pipelines.
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FORMAL MENTORING IN THE U.S. MILITARY
Research Evidence, Lingering Questions, and Recommendations
W. Brad Johnson and Gene R. Andersen

M

entoring is a developmental relationship in which a more experienced
person serves as a guide, role model, teacher, and sponsor for a less experienced person—usually in the same organization. A mentor typically becomes
invested in the career progression and development of the protégé or mentee
and often provides such essential functions as counsel, challenge, and support.
At times, mentorships evolve into enduring friendships, even after the active
1
phase of the relationship has ended.
In the last several years, mentoring has become a hot
Dr. Johnson is professor of psychology in the Departtopic
among military leaders. The U.S. Army’s field
ment of Leadership, Ethics, and Law at the U.S. Naval
Academy and a faculty associate in the Graduate School
manual series now includes a specific publication on
of Education at Johns Hopkins University. A clinical
the development and effective conduct of mentorships
psychologist and former lieutenant commander in the
2
with subordinates. In his 2003 “Guidance for the
U.S. Navy Medical Service Corps, he served as a psychologist at Bethesda Naval Hospital and the Medical
Navy,” the Chief of Naval Operations at that time,
Clinic at Pearl Harbor. Dr. Johnson is the author of nuAdmiral Vernon Clark, specified that mentoring sailors
merous publications, including ten books, in the areas of
should be a preeminent focus of the Navy; Admiral
mentoring, professional ethics, and counseling.
Gene R. Andersen is associate professor of leadership
Clark went so far as to direct that a mentor be assigned
3
education in the Naval War College’s College of Operafor every service member on active duty. In the last
tional and Strategic Leadership. A retired naval aviathree years alone, formal mentoring programs and ontor, he is a former director of leadership education in the
Department of Leadership, Ethics, and Law at the U.S.
line e-mentoring matching services have proliferated
Naval Academy and project leader for the Primary Prowithin the armed forces.
fessional Military Education course at the Center for
Why has mentoring so captured the military’s atNaval Leadership. He edited two leadership texts for use
at the Naval Academy. He is a graduate of the U.S. Natention? There are several good reasons. Evidence in
val Academy and the U.S. Naval War College.
the civilian world suggests that effective mentoring reNaval War College Review, Spring 2010, Vol. 63, No. 2
lationships can enhance corporate recruitment and
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retention efforts, help to bring new hires up to speed, support diversity initiatives, enhance employee satisfaction and promotion success, support strategic
succession planning, and improve communication and knowledge transfer
4
within organizations. In the military, anecdotal evidence and survey research
suggest that flag officers often report having been mentored by senior officers at
key junctures in their careers; mentors play a role in getting new talent noticed
5
and promoted.
Perhaps even more important, extensive literature reviews of three decades of
research on mentoring outcomes in civilian organizations reveal that mentoring
6
clearly fosters career success. Across organizations, settings, and research designs, those who report having had a mentor enjoy more rapid promotions,
greater productivity, better professional confidence, higher competence, lower
levels of job-related stress, more positive attitudes toward work, more career satisfaction, and even a greater perceived chance of becoming eminent in their
fields. What’s more, mentored employees are more committed, both to their or7
ganizations and to their careers. The most extensive meta-analytic crossdisciplinary review of mentoring research to date reviewed 15,131 articles and
8
reports on the topic. Findings from 112 studies that satisfied the rigorous
inclusion criteria of that review revealed that mentoring had significant positive correlations with work performance, retention, organizational citizenship
behavior, positive work attitudes, personal health, quantity of interpersonal relationships, greater career recognition, and general career competence. Although a variety of other variables clearly influence career success (e.g., ability,
personality, motivation), it is clear that the positive effects of mentoring are per9
vasive and consistent.
In light of the success of mentoring in the business arena, many organizations
have instituted formal mentoring programs. “Rather than leave mentoring to
happenstance, formal programs give the organization control over who is
10
mentored, when they are mentored, and even how they are mentored.” Considering the “war for talent” in the contemporary business environment, institutions such as the military are well served by programs that attract, retain, and
11
develop top-notch talent. Further, recent survey research indicates that new
college graduates are more attracted to organizations depicted as having formal
12
mentoring programs.
Although formal mentoring programs are multiplying in the military and
other organizations, there is relatively little research evidence bearing on the de13
sign, key ingredients, and ultimate efficacy of these programs. Further, very
few organizations have strategically aligned their mentoring programs with
14
long-term objectives; like other organizations, the military has implemented
formal mentoring programs in the absence of a corporate- or command-level
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss2/1
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mentoring strategy. Getting the programmatic cart before the strategic horse
may help to explain the negative emotional reactions that the term “mentoring”
15
tends to elicit in some surveys of military personnel.
The purpose of this article is to review evidence related to mentoring in organizations, particularly military organizations. The authors specifically emphasize the literature bearing on formal mentoring programs and highlight the
salient variables linked with program outcomes. The article concludes with numerous recommendations for military leaders who wish to integrate formal
mentoring programs into their strategic planning.
MENTORING IN THE MILITARY
There are relatively few published studies of mentoring prevalence and outcomes in military organizations. Two studies of Naval Academy midshipmen,
with sample sizes of 568 and 576, show that between 40 percent and 45 percent
of midshipmen report having significant mentoring relationships at the Acad16
emy. Female midshipmen are more likely (63 percent) than male midshipmen
(45 percent) to be mentored, and mentors are most often military officers (41
percent), civilian faculty members (30 percent), or more senior midshipmen (28
percent). Although having a mentor was not correlated by these studies with academic standing, students mentored at the Naval Academy are significantly
more satisfied with their education and significantly more likely to mentor oth17
ers in return.
A large survey of mentoring in the Army (N = 3,715) revealed that 84 percent
of both senior noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers report
18
having at least one mentor in the course of their careers. There were no disparities in prevalence or perceived value of mentoring based on gender or race of respondents. The most recent study of mentoring in the military surveyed 305
19
senior military officers attending the National War College. Findings revealed
that 91 percent had been mentored during their military careers and that 87 percent had mentored other military members in turn. These officers reported benefiting from both career and psychosocial mentoring functions or mentor
behaviors.
Finally, there is one published study on the mentoring experiences of
20
flag-rank officers in the Navy. Six hundred ninety-one retired admirals responded to a Navywide survey of their mentoring experiences while in the fleet.
A full 67 percent reported having at least one salient mentor during their careers
as officers, and most had had at least three important mentors. In most cases, the
mentorships formed due to the mentors’ initiative or through mutual interest.
Admirals who had been mentored were extremely satisfied with the experience,
more satisfied with their Navy careers than were nonmentored respondents,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010

NWCR_Spring2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\5399_NWC_Review_Spring2010\NWCR_Spring2010.vp
Monday, March 01, 2010 4:18:45 PM

121

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

116

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

and significantly more likely to rate mentoring as extremely important for the
Navy.
The sparse published research on mentoring in the military shows that the
probability of finding a mentor increases the longer one serves and that
mentoring seems to bolster satisfaction with one’s military education or career. Mentoring also begets mentoring; mentored military personnel are more
likely to report mentoring others. Mentoring appears to be an equal-opportunity
relationship in the military, in that women and minority respondents are
mentored at rates equivalent to men and majority-group members. Finally,
when mentoring occurs, it is often because a senior person in the military initiates the relationship; it is possible that hierarchical elements of the military
culture make mentee-initiated relationships less likely.
FORMAL MENTORING PROGRAMS
Formal mentoring programs are now ubiquitous features of most organizations
and institutions. Informal, or traditional, mentoring relationships emerge slowly
and naturally through informal interactions between junior and senior members
of organizations; without any external intervention, these relationships are often
21
spontaneous, rooted in shared interests, and mutually initiated. In contrast, a
formal mentoring relationship is instigated by an organization and usually in22
volves formal assignment or matching of mentee to mentor. One researcher recently distinguished formal from informal mentorships using four salient
23
dimensions. Intensity is the first dimension; informal mentorships are more intense emotionally, because both members are committed naturally and intrinsically. Visibility is the second dimension; while formally assigned mentorships are
known and accepted by the organization, informal pairings are less visible and often operate without the endorsement or even awareness of the organization. The
third dimension is focus. In formal mentoring programs, the organization often
prescribes who can mentor, what training will occur, and what the focus of
mentorship shall be; this is in contrast to informal dyads, which tend to be more
generally focused on the mentee’s career and psychosocial development. Finally,
formal and informal mentorships vary on the basis of duration. Whereas informal
relationships are unconstrained with regard to parameters and are therefore
much longer in duration, formal pairings usually operate within clear guidelines
for meeting frequency and have expectations about termination. Many formal
mentoring programs share common goals, such as socializing new members into
organizational culture, planning succession, lowering attrition, or retaining more
24
women and minority employees.
What does the outcome research show about the efficacy of informal versus
formally assigned mentorships? Both traditional and meta-analytic literature
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss2/1
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reviews consistently indicate that when formal and informal mentoring relationships are compared, informal mentoring is superior to that formally as25
signed. In fact, not a single well-controlled study has shown formal mentoring
26
to be superior to informal mentoring. In several studies, formal mentorships
result in equivalent or even superior levels of psychosocial support (e.g., emotional encouragement), but formal programs rarely produce equivalent career
support. The fact that formal mentorships are limited in duration may help to
explain why there is less time for the mentor to offer career-related functions.
“The difference between how protégés in informal and formal programs were
selected could explain the improved success of informal mentoring. In informal
mentoring, mentors and protégés select each other naturally as part of a mutual
27
attraction and similarity of interests and personality characteristics.”
Similarly, it has been noted that in formal programs, perfect strangers may be
paired on the basis of little data or with little communication about the matching process: “Finding a mentor in a formal program may be like trying to find
28
true love on a blind date—it can happen, but the odds are against it.”
One of the problems with evaluating the efficacy of formal mentoring programs is the wide heterogeneity across programs with respect to program design
and implementation. Programs vary wildly with regard to rigor of the matching
process, recruitment and training of mentors, promulgation of clear program
expectations to both members of the dyad, level of mentor commitment, and
29
ongoing organization oversight and support. When formal mentoring programs are compared on the basis of level of facilitation by the organization—high-facilitation programs provide thorough training for both parties,
monthly oversight meetings, etc.—outcomes indicate that employees in
high-facilitation programs report greater levels of satisfaction and organizational commitment.
In spite of the fact that U.S. military commands have instituted broad and
sweeping requirements for mentoring, including formal mentoring programs in
many locations, a careful review of the literature reveals not a single published
evaluation of the efficacy of formal military mentoring. The only outcome report evaluating mentoring with American military personnel was presented at a
conference in 1998; it generally supported the conclusions of researchers in civilian organizations. Compared to a small sample of Medical Service Corps officers in a formal mentoring program, officers in informal mentorships had
slightly higher job satisfaction and firmer intentions to remain in the Navy;
however, officers in both formal and informal programs were more satisfied and
30
more likely to remain in the Navy than those reporting no mentor relationship.
In a broad survey of formal mentoring programs in six Taiwan service academies (N = 1,083), participation in a formal mentoring program led to greater
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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satisfaction, greater career commitment, and decreased stress than was the case
31
for students with no mentors; there was no comparison to students who were
informally mentored. Finally, it has been reported that a formal peer mentoring
program in the British Royal Marines was used successfully to identify and ameliorate trauma-related mental-health problems. This program, however, had little connection to mentoring as commonly conceptualized and more to do with
32
trauma risk management and peer support.
A survey of officers in the U.S. Army revealed that although many officers
want mentorships, they do not want formal programs to legislate these relationships.33 For many in the military, mentoring has become a faddish buzzword; a traditionally meaningful developmental relationship has slowly
become saddled with the baggage of programmatic requirements and checklists. Various authors have warned organizations about the pitfalls of instituting formal mentoring programs in the absence of a thoughtful strategy: “The
absence of a corporate mentoring strategy can lead to inconsistencies and inefficiencies across formal mentoring programs within an organization. This ineffectiveness can lead to formal mentoring programs being attacked,
34
discredited, and ultimately, discontinued.”
MILITARY MENTORING: VEXING PARADOXES AND LINGERING
QUESTIONS
The foregoing literature review sets the stage for a survey of the ongoing questions and perennial tensions regarding efforts to formalize mentoring in the
military. We now summarize the most pressing of the lingering issues and unanswered questions.
Few Mentoring Programs Operationally Define the Term “Mentoring.” Even a
cursory review of the formal mentoring–program research reveals that researchers and program administrators employ a heterogeneous collection of
mentoring definitions or, worse, fail to define the term altogether.35 Within the
military, the term “mentoring” is used so cavalierly and applied to such a wide
array of command programs and initiatives that service members—including
program participants—may have little idea what mentors are supposed to “do”
and what these dyads are supposed to accomplish; this, of course, may elicit a
36
range of reactions to formal programs, from enthusiasm to cynicism. Although the Army’s Field Manual 6-22 now differentiates mentorship from
counseling and coaching, defining it as “the voluntary developmental relationship that exists between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience that is characterized by mutual trust and respect,” we suspect that this
definition and the subsequent discussion in the manual only scratch the surface
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37

when it comes to helping the average soldier execute an effective mentorship. It
will behoove senior military leaders to operationalize clearly such terms as
“mentor” and “mentoring” and to differentiate the mentor relationship from
sponsorship, coaching, counseling, and leadership more broadly.
For Better or Worse, the Term “Mentoring” Comes with Baggage in the Military.
Perhaps more than many organizations, the U.S. military—owing to a high degree of functional specialization—contains a wide array of distinct subcultures.
A number of groups within the military harbor entrenched negative views regarding the mentoring construct. For instance, some officers equate mentoring
38
with exclusivity, unfairness, and cronyism. Nowhere was this negative reaction
more evident than in reactions to the “Green Bowlers,” a secret fraternity of Naval Academy graduates whose members aroused fierce condemnation in the
39
early twentieth century by helping one another gain promotion in the fleet; to
this day, many senior naval officers equate mentoring with favoritism. In contrast, recent interviews with a large sample of U.S. Navy admirals revealed that
40
mentorship is associated with meritocracy in the minds of many. That is, many
admirals believe that star-quality officers get mentored and that such extra attention is well deserved and even essential if the Navy is to achieve sound succession planning in its leadership. Either way, a successful military-wide mentoring
program must address the historical baggage.
Does Everyone Deserve to Be Mentored? Many formal mentoring programs are
rooted in the assumption not only that everyone deserves to be mentored but
that everyone will benefit from it. In fact, however, traditional mentorships are
by nature exclusive and designed to nurture and promote the rising stars in any
41
organization. If high-quality and purposeful mentoring offers one avenue for
military leadership succession planning, the military will need both to encourage broad career-development programs for all military members and to craft
more intensive and selective mentoring pipelines for its most promising junior
talent.
Mentoring Is Only One Predictor of Career Success in the Military. At times, organizations are smitten with the idea of mentoring; charging ahead with mandatory mentoring programs for all employees, program administrators can easily
forget that mentoring—while profoundly helpful to many—is just one of several variables predicting career success. For instance, various strands of organizational research indicate that—in addition to being protégés—persons who
have more need for achievement, intelligence, goal orientation, career motivation, self-confidence, and flexibility are likely to achieve greater career success
than those with lower scores on those variables.42 It is important to keep in mind
that mentoring accounts for only a portion of the explained variance in career
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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success for military personnel. In addition to developing mentoring programs,
military leaders should consider educational and skill-development modules
designed to enhance career self-efficacy, initiative taking, and goal orientation in
military personnel.
Developmental Networks Are More Powerful than One-on-One Mentoring
Alone. Although most human resources leaders still think in terms of traditional
one-on-one mentoring when formulating mentoring programs, recent theoretical and empirical developments support the comparative virtues of developmental networks or mentoring constellations. One team of researchers defines a
developmental network as “the set of people a protégé names as taking an active
interest in and action to advance the protégé’s career by providing developmen43
tal assistance.” Rather than place the entire burden for career and personal development on a single mentor, military organizations should recognize the value
of multiple short-term mentors, peer mentors, mentoring groups, and online
support communities. The more diverse an individual’s developmental network, the greater the depth and breadth of career support.
Not All Mentoring Is Effective Mentoring. Officers and senior enlisted personnel
often bemoan programmatic efforts aimed at making mentoring universal and
mandatory. These leaders know that merely assigning everyone to a “mentor”
does little to ensure effective and helpful developmental relationships. There are
two primary problems here. First, there is tremendous variation in the motiva44
tions, interests, and skill levels of prospective mentors; frankly, not just anyone
can become an effective mentor. Many military members possess strong technical skills but poor interpersonal ones; they will probably not be effective mentors. Second, disgruntled, indifferent, or hostile mentors can wreak havoc on the
lives and careers of junior personnel. Even a marginal mentor—one who disap45
points or ignores protégés—can be worse than no mentor at all. Military leaders must become selective when inviting personnel to become formal mentors;
careful vetting and selection should be followed by thorough training and ongoing supervision and support.
Extrinsic Rewards Don’t Work as Well as Intrinsic Rewards. Like many organizations, the military has failed to appreciate the power, and the fragility, of intrinsic motivation to mentor. In any organization, the most powerful, effective,
and valuable mentors are those who are naturally invested in and personally
46
committed to developing junior talent. Intrinsically motivated mentors undertake the task for the internal pleasure of seeing protégés develop and succeed.
But when an organization requires these same people to mentor and even makes
performance appraisals contingent upon it, the magic, pleasure, and satisfaction
47
of mentoring declines and may even be lost entirely. It is clear that, in what is
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known as the “overjustification effect” in behavioral science research, extrinsic
rewards or requirements may temporarily increase frequency of the behavior
while decreasing long-term interest and commitment; what was once done for
48
pleasure now becomes drudgery. Military leaders must wrestle not only with
selecting excellent mentors but also with nurturing their intrinsic motivation
and protecting them from burnout.
The Paradox of Program Oversight. Should military mentoring programs employ stringent program oversight or a hands-off approach? The answer to this
question remains elusive. When protégés perceive strong management support
for mentoring, they often report more positive career and psychosocial benefits
49
and fewer negative outcomes. Further, when formal mentoring programs
adopt high-level facilitation strategies, engaging and overseeing the mentoring
dyads frequently, protégés report higher levels of job satisfaction, organizational
commitment, and even job performance. But here is the paradox: the more
mentors perceive that they are being held accountable and scrutinized, the less
willing they are to serve as mentors. Thus while greater perceived management
support for mentoring predicts better outcomes, perceived mentor accountability results in less willingness of potential mentors to volunteer. “The negative relationship with mentor willingness to mentor, coupled with the likely low base
rate of serious problems with mentors suggests that increasing mentor accountability may backfire on organizations by turning off potentially good mentors to
50
mentoring.” Clearly, military program strategists will have to find the “right”
balance among public support, oversight, and accountability.
NOT EVERYONE HAS WHAT IT TAKES
Mentoring matters; several decades of empirical research confirm that
mentorships in nearly any setting offer measurable benefits to both protégés and
those organizations that employ them. In comparison to their nonmentored
peers, protégés are more rapidly promoted, better compensated, more confident, more competent, more likely to achieve leadership positions, and more inclined to serve as mentors in their turn.51 But the vast majority of mentoring
research pertains to more traditional or informal mentoring relationships, and
there is nearly no published evidence regarding formal mentoring efforts in the
military.
In this concluding section, we offer several recommendations for military
leaders and human resources personnel tasked with developing, managing, and
evaluating programmatic mentoring efforts for military personnel. These best
practice considerations are designed to provide a way forward notwithstanding
the sparsity of empirical evidence and of answers to lingering questions.
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Develop a Master Strategy before Implementing Mentoring Programs. Rather
than charge ahead with mentoring programs—especially those of the mandatory variety—wise leaders will first enter into a process to envision a corporate
or military-wide mentoring strategy. A successful mentoring strategy will take
into account organizational dynamics such as culture, hierarchical structures,
traditions, and resources, as well as mentoring objectives specific to an entire
military branch or a local command. An overarching military mentoring strategy will provide a clear rationale and framework for mentoring and, subsequently, a sense of cohesion among the varied programs within the military.
Such a strategy will also help to reduce the probability that mentoring programs
will be seen as passing fads, ultimately phased out.
Avoid Mandatory Programs: Facilitate a Sense of Choice. Nothing undermines
the efficacy of a formal mentoring program more quickly than the sense that one
has no choice about participating. The evidence is clear: when mentors and
mentees both feel that they have clear choices—about both participating and
52
whom with—both parties report more positive outcomes. When third parties
match mentoring dyads, matching criteria may be unrelated to interpersonal
compatibility or, worse, entirely haphazard. Military program planners will do
well to make participation in formal mentoring programs entirely voluntary.
Moreover, they should solicit input from participants regarding preferences for
specific interests, values, or characteristics in prospective mentoring partners.
“By perceiving that they have a voice in the matching process, mentors and
protégés may start to invest in the relationship prior to its official beginning; accordingly, both parties are likely to feel greater motivation to maximize the rela53
tionship.” This will require a culture shift in many military organizations. At
present, many commands require each new member to be assigned a formal
mentor; participation is not voluntary, and little consideration is given to issues
of match. Further, few of these programs articulate an overarching strategy, desired outcomes, or relationship “contours,” such as anticipated duration or frequency of contact.
Demonstrate Top-Down Support for Mentoring. Mentoring relationships will
occur naturally in any context; mentoring in the military has flourished for centuries without command intervention. But if the military is serious about enhancing the quality of mentoring and extending the benefits of these
relationships to a wider swath of the military population, it will be critical for
key leaders to support mentoring efforts publicly. Organizational evidence
shows that when leadership clearly communicates commitment to developmental relationships and even models effective mentoring behaviors itself,
54
mentoring frequency and quality increase. Nonetheless, and although vocal
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public leadership support for mentoring, backed by appropriate resources, is
key, military leaders must take care to avoid micromanaging mentors and requiring participation in formal mentoring programs.
Develop a Mentoring Continuum. Heretofore, many military programs have
operated under the assumption that developmental relationships are dichotomous—that a person is either being mentored in a traditional one-to-one
mentorship or that person is not being developed. In fact, considerable theoretical and empirical research supports a developmental network or mentoring
constellation model that helpfully broadens definitions of mentoring. A continuum model bearing on talent development and retention in the military should
focus on a range of programs designed to facilitate and reinforce career and personal growth. At one end of the continuum are career-development classes,
short-term sponsorship at new duty stations, and other soft-sell approaches. At
the other end of the spectrum are formal mentoring programs involving pairings between protégés and mentors designed to endure for substantial periods
of time. However, even in the case of formal programs, it will behoove military
planners to support flexibility and culture-specific program development in local commands; mentoring programs should be customized to cultural expectations, participant preferences, deployment schedules, and other relevant
variables. Finally, the continuum should include mentoring tools, such as online
and in-class training opportunities, and access to social networking communities to facilitate good communication over time.
Select Mentors Carefully. Not everyone has what it takes to mentor effectively. In
the military culture, where frequent duty-station changes and expectations for
equity in the workplace are fixtures, it is often assumed that personnel can easily
be plugged in to new jobs and work settings with only cursory training. Although this strategy may be effective in technical situations, the same is not the
case for interpersonal roles. Interpersonal skills like communication ability, empathy, listening, and emotional intelligence forecast greater success in the men55
tor role. When developing formal mentoring programs, planners should
consider vetting mentors and deliberately selecting those with demonstrated efficacy in other interpersonal relationships. Formal mentors who are disengaged,
unreliable, exploitive, or lacking in essential communication skills may cause
considerable harm to protégés and to the military’s efforts at retention and talent development.
Develop High-Quality Training Programs for Mentors. It is unreasonable to expect military leaders—no matter how experienced—to understand fully the
form and function of mentorship. Research in varied organizations indicates
that the quality of mentor-training programs can literally make or break them. If
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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the military is serious about developing an excellent mentoring continuum, it is
essential to create cutting-edge training in the art and science of mentoring at a
central setting. In order to ease the burden on individual local commands, mentortraining workshops, online skill-development modules, and other resources
should be created and distributed through the services’ Web portals. Excellent
mentor training can also be integrated into periodic leadership training often
required in various schools required for promotion throughout the military.
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REFLECTING ON FUCHIDA, OR “A TALE OF THREE WHOPPERS”

Jonathan Parshall

It is fitting that I first set pen to pixel for this article on 4 June 2009 (the sixtyseventh anniversary of the battle of Midway), because Midway will forever be
tied to the name of Mitsuo Fuchida. As I write this, I confess to feeling a sense of
ambivalence. It is true that in this article I hope to bury Fuchida, not to praise
him. Yet it is equally true that as a student of the battle I would have loved to have
had a beer with him, too. Fuchida was, by all accounts, lively, intelligent, and
charismatic—qualities well reflected in his writing. Yet unlike, say, the case with
a Civil War historian, the fact that there was at least some overlap in our lives
(I was thirteen when Fuchida died in 1976) means that my fantasizing about
knowing Fuchida is perhaps not completely far-fetched. So, while I am sure I
would have asked him some rather pointed questions while hoisting that beer, I
am equally certain that I would have had a wonderful time and would have been
personally enriched by meeting him.
Sadly, however, this article has less to do with beer than with the use of personal accounts in the study of naval history, since it is doubtful that any one person has had a more deleterious long-term impact on the study of the Pacific War
Jon Parshall is the coauthor of Shattered Sword:
than Mitsuo Fuchida. Because of his misstatements,
The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway and the
the American study of the Japanese side of such batowner of a website on the Imperial Japanese Navy,
tles as Pearl Harbor and Midway (particularly the latwww.combinedfleet.com. Mr. Parshall has been published in such periodicals as the U.S. Naval Institute
ter) was probably set back by decades. His untruths
Proceedings, World War II, and this journal, and he
also demonstrate the tremendous power of selfhas made frequent television and guest lecture appearserving ideas that may be wrong, but subtly support
ances on the topic of the Imperial Navy in World War
II. He is also an adjunct lecturer for the Naval War Colnational self-images, particularly when carried forlege. Mr. Parshall is currently in the software industry.
ward by the mass media. This is a theme I will explore.
I hope it will be instructive to other historians.
Naval War College Review, Spring 2010, Vol. 63, No. 2
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It was during the research for our book Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of
the Battle of Midway that my coauthor, Anthony Tully, and I gradually became
aware of Fuchida’s half-truths. Our quest was not to discredit Fuchida or to malign any historian who used him as a source. Rather, we were motivated by curiosity, our great interest in the Japanese Imperial Navy, and our wish to learn the
truth. However, during the process of building a new foundation for our Midway study, it became clear to us that an important part of the old foundation had
to be destroyed, for the simple reason that it was rotten. Things might have
ended there, had it not been for Fuchida’s other misstatements regarding Pearl
Harbor, as well as his later war activities. It was only in the past few years that I
became aware that Fuchida’s mistruths actually spanned the entire conflict.
Likewise, I have been constantly questioned in the course of giving presentations on Midway as to what Fuchida’s likely motivations were for his actions.
This has led to considerable ruminating, and not a little scratching of my balding
pate. This article will hopefully answer some of those questions.
The bottom line is that Fuchida was a complex individual with complex motivations. What is clear is that his impact on the history of the Pacific War has been
enormously damaging, in that his elaborations have been parroted for years and
handed down as truth on the big screen, on television, and in countless Internet
chat rooms. What makes this even more surprising is that although Fuchida was
not a high-ranking officer, he created and influenced more of the postwar history
of the Pacific War than perhaps any admiral on either side of the conflict. Let us
turn to the three whoppers.
The first of Fuchida’s tall tales concerns the attack on Pearl Harbor, which
might be called “The Tale of the Missing Tank-Farm Attack.” Down through the
years, Western writers have duly noted that the Japanese navy let slip a potentially crucial opportunity to cripple the U.S. fleet at the outset of hostilities. In
the months leading up to the war, the U.S. Navy carefully amassed 4.5 million
barrels of fuel oil at Pearl Harbor, reasoning correctly that it would be the life1
blood of any future naval war against Japan. The oil was stored at the base’s two
tank-farm complexes, primarily in aboveground tanks.
On the morning of 7 December, Japan’s carrier striking force, the Kidô Butai,
struck Pearl Harbor. In the course of their two attack waves, the Japanese accomplished two important goals. First, they crushed American land-based airpower,
destroying or damaging around 350 of the 400 American aircraft on Oahu. This
essentially eliminated the ability of the Americans to strike back effectively
against the Kidô Butai. Second, the Japanese sank or badly damaged the majority
of the American battleships in the harbor, thereby accomplishing (or so they
presumed) their overall goal of destroying the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s striking power.
Such a victory, it was felt, would give the Imperial Navy free rein in the Pacific to
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss2/1
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drive into the southern resource areas of Malaya, Borneo, and Java. Thereupon,
having accomplished these key goals, the Japanese task force came about and
headed home, ending the attack. However, the controversy over whether the
Japanese should have attempted a follow-up strike was already beginning.
As the overall tactical commander in the air, Mitsuo Fuchida loitered in the
area to assess the damage that his forces had caused. In Gordon Prange’s landmark At Dawn We Slept, Fuchida is quoted as making the claim that during his
return to the carrier Akagi he “mentally earmarked for destruction the fuel-tank
farms, the vast repair and maintenance facilities, and perhaps a ship or two
2
bypassed that morning for priority targets.” Upon landing, he allegedly
pressed vigorously for a follow-up attack aimed at these targets, becoming “bit3
ter and angry” when Admiral Chu- ichi Nagumo instead turned for home. This
same scene was mirrored in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora! thereby passing into the
4
American collective memory. In fact, it would appear that none of these events
ever took place.
H. P. Willmott and his coauthors Tohmatsu Haruo and W. Spencer Johnson
must be given credit for introducing these important clarifications into the
Western literature. They noted in 2001 that the targeting priorities for the attack were as follows: land-based airpower; aircraft carriers; battleships, cruisers, and other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land
5
installations. In other words, fuel tanks were at the very bottom of the list, and
during the first two attack waves the Japanese had barely begun chewing their
way into item number three on that list.
Despite postwar American incredulity, these targeting priorities made
perfect sense in the context of the ultra-Mahanian Japanese fleet. Enemy
combat assets were axiomatically more important than the logistical apparatus
supporting those assets. Sea control devolved from sinking warships, not blowing up fuel tanks. While it is true that the Japanese were perhaps shortsighted in
not having gauged the value of Pearl Harbor’s fuel tanks and logistical facilities,
they were also fighting a deliberately shortsighted war. If they could not bring
the United States to the bargaining table in 1942, they were going to lose the war
regardless. Yet there is little in the historical record on the American side to suggest that the immolation of Pearl’s fuel stocks would have made the United
States any more willing to bargain with the Japanese in the short term—the very
nature of the initial assault precluded negotiation. All in all, it is clear that if a
follow-on attack had been launched by the Japanese, it almost certainly would
have been aimed at the large numbers of American cruisers, destroyers, and submarines left in the harbor.
With respect to Fuchida’s tale, Willmott correctly points out, there was, first
of all, no independent confirmation of Fuchida’s claim that he had “earmarked”
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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logistical targets. Indeed, had he actually done so, this would have represented a
complete renunciation of all his prior naval training and indoctrination. Second,
Admiral Ryu-mosuke Kusaka (Admiral Nagumo’s chief of staff) made no men6
tion of Fuchida’s protestations in his own postwar account. Instead, Kusaka
states that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s alleged unhappiness over the result of
the attacks, as well as condemnations from others regarding the failure to attack
cruisers, other vessels, and the base’s fuel tanks, were all criticisms heard later,
7
nothing more than “afterthoughts of poor strategists.” Third, Commander
Minoru Genda, the First Air Fleet’s staff air officer, acknowledged in his own
memoirs that he was aware of the Tora! Tora! Tora! scene but explicitly denied
that such an incident had actually taken place or that any such proposal had been
8
put forward by Fuchida. Finally, Willmott notes that Fuchida had been interrogated in 1945 by the Americans and had been asked point-blank why there had
been no follow-up attack at Pearl Harbor. Fuchida responded that at the time the
extent of the degradation of American airpower on Oahu was unknown (and
hence the potential threat to Japan’s carriers was unknown) and that the destruction or damage to eight American battleships constituted success, as far as
9
Combined Fleet was concerned. He made no mention of the fuel tanks. Yet in
1963 he delivered an account to Prange that made himself appear a great deal
more prescient than he apparently had been willing to reveal in 1945.
Interestingly, Fuchida’s story continued morphing even after 1963. I was
amused recently by a posting to an Internet group dedicated to the study of the
battle of Midway. One of the group’s members, a gentleman who knew many
Midway participants personally, commented on the tank-farm oversight at Pearl
Harbor as follows: “Over the years I got to know a retired captain who was
aboard the USS Enterprise shortly after Midway. In his retirement years he became well acquainted with Reverend Fuchida. [Fuchida had become a Christian
evangelist after the war.] [He] spent many hours with [Fuchida] and learned a
lot that few were privileged to know. One of the things [he] learned is that the
Japanese did not bomb the oil tanks because they planned to use them after they
10
invaded Oahu.”
This is not the first time I have run across this particular spin on the oil tanks,
and it is a truly incredible misstatement on Fuchida’s part. John Stephan’s well
researched Hawaii under the Rising Sun makes it clear that during the decades
leading up to the war the Japanese had intermittently mulled the notion of capturing Hawaii in the event of war. It is equally clear, though, that there were no
concrete plans to this effect at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Such operations had been discussed during planning for the attack but rejected by
Yamamoto as too risky.11 It is unlikely that the Imperial Army would have agreed
to such a gambit in any case, given its general disinclination for operations
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss2/1
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outside of China and its keen awareness of the lack of available assault shipping.
Finally, of course, even if there had been such plans on the grand strategic level, a
mere air group commander like Fuchida almost certainly would not have been
privy to their details on 7 December. Yet Fuchida’s “privileged” statements to
this retired American captain played nicely to the whole American psychology
relating to this battle.
Being on the receiving end of extremely nasty surprises is the nature of war.
Sometimes, though, the enemy overlooks a temporary weakness and does not
inflict quite as awful a beating as it could have. Such was the case with the tank
farms at Pearl. In such cases it is tempting—after the fact, and when the war is
safely won—to call the enemy stupid for having overlooked the obvious. Had
the Japanese actually attacked and destroyed these facilities, the more pointed
question would have been why the tanks were devoid of antiaircraft defenses,
nonhardened, and relatively undispersed? While many postwar commentators
would have us believe that these tanks were the very key to victory or defeat in
the Pacific, apparently no one on the American side recognized that fact before
the attack either. Yet Fuchida provided his listeners with a plausible lie that made
U.S. oversights seem unimportant while simultaneously making himself appear
smarter and more privy to inside knowledge of Japanese strategic deliberations
than he actually was.
Regarding the treatment of source material, Fuchida’s first whopper illustrates an important point that my coauthor, Anthony Tully, has repeatedly emphasized—witnesses’ first accounts are often their best accounts. These reports
tend to be terser, less embellished, and more to the point. This is especially important to note here because within the next decade the voices of most of the
World War II veterans, the men and women who have firsthand insight into that
incredible era, will be gone. It seems clear that Fuchida’s most reliable account
regarding Pearl Harbor was the first one he gave to his interrogators in 1945. Intriguingly, the very mode of questioning used by them may well have given
Fuchida the clue that the fuel tanks were of larger interest to the Americans.
Certainly by 1963 his story had changed dramatically. Fuchida was never slow to
detect the sort of tales his audiences liked to hear.
The second whopper might be called “The Tale of the Fallacious Five Minutes,” as it has to do with the climactic American dive-bomber attack at Midway.
This stunning attack caught the Japanese completely by surprise, crippling three
of their four carriers and effectively deciding the battle in America’s favor. The
events leading up to this attack can be roughly summarized as follows. Prior to
the battle, the Kidô Butai had been instructed by Admiral Yamamoto to keep
half of its aircraft ready for an antiship strike in case an American fleet was
present in the area. Several hours into the proceedings on the morning of 4 June,
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however, Nagumo ordered those reserve aircraft rearmed with land-attack
weapons to deliver a second blow against Midway. Barely half an hour later, one
of the two American carrier task forces, under Admirals Frank Jack Fletcher and
Raymond Spruance, was detected, whereupon the Japanese reserve force’s armament was ordered switched back to antiship weapons. A series of American air
attacks then occurred, which were roughly handled but managed to keep the
Japanese off balance. By 1020 on the morning of 4 June, according to Fuchida,
the Japanese were finally ready to counterattack the Americans. A famous passage in Fuchida’s Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan, entitled “A Fateful
Five Minutes,” describes the scene as follows:
One after another, planes were hoisted from the hangar and quickly arranged on the
flight deck. There was no time to lose. At 1020 Admiral Nagumo gave the order to
launch when ready. On Akagi’s flight deck all planes were in position with engines
warming up. The big ship began turning into the wind. Within five minutes, all her
planes would be launched. Five minutes! Who would have dreamed that the tide of
battle would shift completely in that interval of time? . . . At 1024 the order to start
launching came from the bridge by voicetube . . . and the first Zero fighter gathered
speed and whizzed off the deck. At that instant a lookout screamed: “Hell-divers!” I
looked up to see three black enemy planes plummeting toward our ship.12

This rendition of events—wherein Japanese carriers, their flight decks
packed with attack aircraft just moments from takeoff, are caught at the last second and destroyed—has been echoed in every Western account of the battle
since 1955, when Fuchida’s book was first published in the United States. It is
part of the common psyche concerning Midway, creating a mental image for
every American who has ever studied the battle. Unfortunately, it is a mental image that is incorrect.
During the course of the morning’s operations the Japanese carriers came
under attack no fewer than five times by nine separate groups of American
aircraft. Not surprisingly, Japanese flight decks were quite busy with combat
air patrol (CAP) requirements. These activities, as well as the interspersed
American attacks, made it nearly impossible for the reserve strike force to be
readied on the Japanese flight decks—a process that took around forty-five min13
utes. It was not until the publication of Shattered Sword that all these factors
were brought together. In the course of our research, Tully and I were able to use
the Japanese air group records for the carriers to show that the Japanese had
been recovering CAP fighters aboard Akagi a mere fifteen minutes before it was
14
bombed. Recovering aircraft meant that its flight deck had to be empty aft,
which in turn meant that there was no reserve strike force spotted. The official
Japanese war history on the battle, Senshi So-sho, explicitly states that at the time
of the American attack there were no attack aircraft on the Japanese flight decks,
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only combat air patrol fighters. Indeed, the Zero fighter whizzing off Akagi’s
flight deck in Fuchida’s dramatic passage can be shown in Akagi’s own air group
records to have been a CAP fighter, sent aloft to foil the ongoing American air at15
tacks. We even know the pilot’s name.
Thus, Fuchida’s entire rendition of the climax of the most important naval battle in American history was a lie. The Japanese were nowhere near ready to counterattack at this time. The truly stunning thing about this, however, is that it
essentially paralyzed the American study of this pivotal battle for the better part of
fifty years. Fuchida’s tale was in English, while the operational records that belied
it were in handwritten Japanese stored on microfilms. For this reason, American
historians (perhaps not surprisingly) simply accepted Fuchida’s account verbatim
and declined to look further. It did not help matters that Fuchida had become
great friends with Gordon Prange, whose best-selling Miracle at Midway (1983)
became, hands down, the most important English-language account of the battle,
one whose details were subsequently incorporated into many other Western
histories. Intriguingly, Fuchida’s reputation as a reliable witness was demolished
in Japan as soon as the Senshi So-sho volume on the battle came out in 1971. Again,
because of the difficulty of the source materials, most American historians were
not even aware of the value of Senshi So-sho, let alone what it said about Midway in
particular, until around the turn of the twenty-first century.
I am convinced that one reason why Fuchida’s tale endured in American literature is that it tapped into an underlying national self-image that we Americans
have of the battle. Americans have always identified with tales of plucky underdogs prevailing against the odds. The story that Fuchida fed us was oriented
along those lines. With such a “reliable” witness providing ready-made images
for any screenplay, why would anyone think to look further into the (incredibly
difficult and tedious) Japanese sources? At the same time, Fuchida subtly shifted
the causes for Japan’s defeat away from individuals and more toward what might
be termed a “fates of war” explanation, which is more acceptable to Japanese
societal sensibilities. This made sense in a book written immediately after the
conflict by a former Japanese naval officer trying to salvage some honor from the
wreckage of both a career and a lost war. Indeed, Fuchida’s motivations were
probably along the same lines as those of individuals like Major General F. W.
von Mellenthin, whose famous book Panzer Battles (1956), along with memoirs
by other former Wehrmacht commanders, not only helped orient the terms of
study of the eastern front along essentially German lines for the better part of
fifty years but also implanted the myth of outsized German martial prowess that
reverberates in some audiences to this day.
Fuchida’s second whopper illustrates an important point in the use of
sources—that operational records (dull as they are) form the bedrock of any
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military historical account and must be given weight at least equal to that given
individual observations. If individual observations provide the narrative material, operational records should provide the foundation for understanding the
larger picture into which the narrative must fit. Had American historians had
the good sense to use the Japanese operational records that were available to
them as early as the 1960s, Fuchida’s tales would never have been as pervasively
accepted. Instead, his word was accepted essentially as holy writ until 2005.
Fuchida’s third whopper is “The Tale of the Privileged Observer.” In some
ways it is the most egregious of the three, because unlike his tales from the Kidô
Butai there were literally thousands of potential American witnesses to this particular story, who might have come forward to debunk it. Yet this particular
whopper was the last of the three to be uncovered, having been exposed only in
2009. In 2008 I was a consultant to a writer working on a screenplay for a motion
picture, a major portion of which deals with the life of Fuchida and his postwar
conversion to Christianity. As part of that effort, I came across Fuchida’s claim,
made in Prange’s God’s Samurai, that he had attended the surrender ceremony in
16
Tokyo Bay aboard the USS Missouri. This statement triggered my by-now
finely honed Fuchida radar. Why, I asked myself, would Fuchida have been
aboard the Missouri? What possible business did he have there?
Fuchida’s explanation was that he had been in charge of arranging transportation for the Japanese surrender delegation and had then been allowed to come
aboard with a group of Japanese army and navy liaison officers to observe the
proceedings from a perch in Missouri’s superstructure. This flew in the face of
common sense. The photographic evidence of the ceremony makes two things
quite clear. First, except for the honored Allied dignitaries whose direct participation was required, this was an almost exclusively U.S. Navy affair. Second, it
was standing room only, with Missouri’s sailors jammed into every available
space to observe the proceedings. What possible motivation would any American
sailor have had to offer up his perch on this grand event (one that he had left
home and family for to fight for months or years) to some unknown Japanese
officer who happened to show up at the last minute? Likewise, why would anyone have allowed someone like Fuchida, presumably in the company of other
Japanese military officers, to wander into the command spaces of the flagship of
the U.S. fleet? If he was there, why were there no photographs of him or the rest
of the liaison party, when we have numerous photographs of the surrender delegation coming aboard? The more I thought about it, the more I came to believe
that no other Japanese besides the surrender delegation could have been there.
However, it turns out I was wrong. While looking over some of the photographs of the event, an image surfaced of someone who was clearly a Japanese
male, dressed in tropical military garb and sporting a camera, who was not a
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member of the surrender delegation. The acquaintance who uncovered this image
argued that since we now had photos of at least one Japanese outside the delegation, perhaps Fuchida could have been there as well. This, in turn, raised the ugly
prospect of having to try to identify every face in every photograph of the ceremony to prove that Fuchida was not there, when in all fairness the onus should
have been on Fuchida to prove his rather incredible attendance claim.
Salvation in this case was provided by Martin Bennett, the screenwriter, who
very sensibly wrote to the Battleship Missouri Memorial on the matter. Michael
Weidenbach, the museum’s curator, returned the following testament of the
Missouri’s commander, Stuart Murray, that not only verified Fuchida’s absence
but also provided the identity of the unknown Japanese in the photographs.
Captain Murray noted,
The Japanese were allowed to have a newsreel photographer. My recollection is only
one, but there might have been two. But my orders since they only had the limited
number, he was assigned a position on the 40mm gun platform on the starboard
wing of the verandah deck [sic]. Two Marines had been assigned him to keep an eye
on him because I felt there was a possibility he might try to pull a fancy trick with his
camera or something and be a hero or a kamikaze by taking with him some of the
central people. So these two Marines each had a hand on his leg and put him in his
place and told him to stay there. . . . [T]hey had their other hand on the butt of their
Colt .45. . . . [T]here was no question that [he] got the word.17

Captain Murray’s account also makes it clear that security aboard the
ship—even for Allied guests—was very tight, reflecting (in the words of historian Alan Zimm) the Navy’s “corporate culture” for handling such events, which
18
emphasizes positive control and overorganization. Indeed, during the ceremony itself, a Russian photographer who tried moving to a different position in
order to get a better view was physically tackled by one of the Marine guards and
19
escorted back to his appointed spot. As Weidenbach pointed out, if Fuchida
had been aboard the Missouri in any capacity whatsoever, “his presence would
have been noted, and his placement would have been noted in the official
20
records . . . and would have been strictly monitored and recorded.”
The lesson from the third whopper is yet another reminder (if any were
needed) that proving a negative is oftentimes a lot harder than proving a positive. However, it is the historian’s job to produce positive evidence to support the
claims that are made by the participants in our narratives. In this case, the onus
was on Fuchida to support his rather incredible claims. His story, while superficially plausible, failed when subjected to the weight of the other positive evidence we have on this highly documented ceremony. Despite the presence of
literally thousands of Americans who might have seen him, photographed him,
or recalled his presence, we still have nothing more than his word that he was
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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there. Thus, by any reasonable measure of proof, Fuchida was not aboard the
USS Missouri for the ceremony.
The reader would be right to ask at this point: Why did Fuchida make this stuff
up? What was the motivation? Here we must set aside strictly objective historical
enquiry and venture into amateur psychology (a prospect that always makes me
queasy). However, as someone who has “lived with” Fuchida now for a number
of years I would make the following observations. A glimpse into the inner character of the man is revealed in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora! for which both Prange
and Fuchida were technical advisers. During one scene, near the beginning of
the movie, Fuchida lands his plane on the carrier Akagi. Dismounting, he is immediately surrounded by other aviators. Fuchida tells them they’d better treat
him well, because he is their new air group commander. Surprised by this news,
one of the pilots asks how he rated another promotion. Fuchida responds, to the
general hilarity of all assembled, “Well, exceptional people get exceptional treatment!” I believe this illustrates something central about the man. Fuchida considered himself exceptional. Above all else, he wanted to be perceived as being
intelligent and insightful, and if that meant depicting himself as armed with
wisdom that could only have been developed in hindsight, so be it.
After the war, Fuchida enjoyed the company of Americans, attending many
Pearl Harbor and Midway events. Indeed, Fuchida may have been more popular
in America than in Japan. Furthermore, by his conversion to Christianity and
ordination, Fuchida was vested with the aura that we typically confer on all
clergy. We are taught in Sunday school that priests do not lie, that their quests for
higher truths compel them to convey mortal truths faithfully as well. These
societal beliefs are particularly in evidence with members of the war generation.
I have been called to task more than once by World War II veterans who express
incredulity that a man of the cloth like Fuchida could have lied about his wartime experiences, despite the many sordid modern examples we have of clerical
misadventures. Furthermore, in the eyes of veterans, Fuchida, despite being an
enemy during the war years, was still (as Bill Mauldin put it) a member of “The
Benevolent and Protective Brotherhood of Them What Has Been Shot At,”
21
whereas historians of the postwar era are decidedly not. Such beliefs are difficult to overturn.
Fuchida was hardly alone in having falsified the record, of course. Veterans of
every war, either intentionally or unintentionally, have misrepresented the
events they participated in, until the very term “war story” is interchangeable
with a tale of dubious veracity. Any military historian who has interviewed
veterans has learned to be cautious in accepting their narratives. Time, distance,
and the stress of combat can all distort a participant’s recollection of events,
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even setting aside the possibility of intentional misstatements. However, it is not
often that a veteran has the chance to distort the history of the two most important battles of the Pacific War, throwing in the surrender ceremony for good
measure. Nor do many veterans get to see their personal versions of history
enshrined in not one but two major motion pictures (Tora! Tora! Tora! and Midway),
thereby ensuring that their distortions will be incorporated into the common
wisdom of the most important conflict of the twentieth century. In this sense
Fuchida was unique and his impact absolutely unprecedented.
How can historians prevent this? The great French historian Marc Bloch
wrote in The Historian’s Craft that “from the moment when we are no longer
resigned to purely and simply recording the words of our witnesses . . . crossexamination becomes more necessary than ever. Indeed, it is the prime neces22
sity of well-conducted historical research.” Fuchida’s fables are a reminder of
what happens when this sort of basic “blocking and tackling” is neglected.
Yet additional narrative accounts are not necessarily required for this crossexamination. In the case of Midway, it was not another person calling our attention to Fuchida’s “fateful five minutes” invention by giving a contradicting
report but rather ships’ flight records, as well as a sufficiently detailed understanding of how Japanese flight deck operations were conducted, that led to the
inevitable conclusion that Fuchida had not told the truth. Ships’ logs, technical
plans and diagrams, maps and geographic-information databases, weather reports, photographs, radio intercepts, personnel records, and military doctrinal
tracts—all of these and more are sources that can be used to augment (and
cross-check) narrative sources. The key to combating overreliance on a single
source remains, as ever, the development of a portfolio of varied sources that can
be compared to each other.
It is unlikely that Fuchida’s legacy will be overturned any time soon, perhaps
not even within my lifetime. Yet as Bloch said, “The knowledge of the past is
something progressive which is constantly transforming and perfecting it23
self.” Therein lies the promise of a brighter future. The fundamental goal of
history rightly remains not the discrediting of Fuchida but rather the perfection of our collective knowledge about the events he witnessed. Pearl Harbor
and Midway still deserve study and will receive the attention they rightly deserve. That attention, however, will be increasingly directed via an array of
methodologies and sources, not just a simplistic compilation of narrative accounts whose wellspring is now quickly running dry. The legacy of this most
profound and complex of wars deserves no less sophisticated and holistic a historical approach.
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ISRAEL: A REVOLUTIONARY MIRACLE IN PALESTINE

Mackubin Thomas Owens

Adelman, Jonathan. The Rise of Israel: A History of a Revolutionary State. London: Routledge, 2008. 269pp. $37.95
Cohen, Stuart A. Israel and Its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion. London: Routledge, 2008. 210pp. $39.95

For much of the world, Israel remains a controversial, indeed reviled, state. It has
been described as a “racist, colonialist” nation; the subagent of American or
Western imperialism; a “stepchild” of the Holocaust or the Jewish Diaspora; the
“brutalizer of Arabs”; and an intransigent enemy of regional peace in the Middle
East. However, as Jonathan Adelman shows in The Rise of Israel, there are serious
shortcomings in all these descriptions of the Jewish state.
Adelman does more than merely debunk the negative stereotypes of Israel
arising from the “Arab victimization narrative” and post-Zionism. In this interesting and informative book he argues that the creation and survival of the
Jewish state constitutes something of a miracle. The fact is that over the past
several centuries, only some 5 percent of the four thousand peoples (“nations”) of the world have achieved statehood. Most
Dr. Owens is associate dean of academics for electives
and directed research, and a professor of national sehave done so because they had large populations
curity affairs at the Naval War College. He also is edconstituting demographic majorities within given
itor of Orbis, the quarterly journal of the Foreign
regions, populations that possessed a common culPolicy Research Institute. His numerous articles on
national security affairs have appeared in a variety of
ture, language, history, and religion. Accordingly,
publications, and he is currently working on a book
they were able to predominate in single areas for
about American civil-military relations. Dr. Owens
many centuries. The Jews who created the State of
served in the Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve 1964–1994, and in both the executive and legisIsrael lacked these normal attributes of statehood. So
lative branches of the U.S. government.
how did Israel come into being, and why did it flourish against all odds?
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One of the strengths of this work is its treatment of Israel in a comparative
context. Some of the most telling questions that Adelman seeks to answer are
these: Why was it that among all the minorities of the Ottoman Empire (the Palestinian Jews, Lebanese Christians, Armenians, and Kurds), only the Jews were
able to obtain a powerful state, when the others seemed better situated in 1917?
Why did a state besieged by powerful and numerous enemies avoid becoming an
authoritarian, militarist society, such as Prussia or Sparta?
The fact is that if in 1900, 1917, or 1942 it had been predicted that Israel
would emerge as a first-world regional power, the idea would have been laughed
to scorn. Even in 1948, after Israel had achieved its independence, the CIA predicted that the Jewish state would not survive for more than two years. Indeed as
late as 1967 and 1973 (when, on the third day of the Yom Kippur War, Defense
Minister Moshe Dayan had expressed his fear that “the Third Temple is falling”),
Israel’s survival was not assured.
Adelman reminds the contemporary reader that the Jews had to overcome
immense obstacles to establish and maintain the State of Israel. The Jews themselves were a weak and disempowered people, dispersed over the face of the
earth. For the most part, they did not possess anything resembling a martial tradition. They faced numerous, powerful, and determined enemies: the great
powers (tsarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union,
and even the British Empire, from 1937 to 1949); the Arab states; strong transnational religious movements (the Roman Catholic Church, the World Council of
Churches, Islam); international organizations, especially the United Nations
after 1951; most of the third world after 1967; and, most potently, global antiSemitism.
However, not all obstacles to the creation and survival of Israel were external.
Many arose from among the Jews themselves. Indeed, Zionism—the movement
calling for a return of the Jewish people to Palestine—was not universally accepted among Jews. Even Zionism itself suffered from internal divisions.
Nonetheless, Israel survived and flourished. Adelman attributes this outcome
to several factors. The first of these was a unique socialist revolution. Because of
the conditions facing the Jews during the mandate period and the early years of
independence, Israel was able to avoid the radical, violent, and repressive nature
of central state–socialist revolutions such as those that took place in Russia and
China. However, a second revolution also took place in Israel, beginning in the
1990s, this one capitalist. The impact of this second revolution is illustrated by
the astounding fact that oil-poor Israel, with only 2 percent of the population of
the oil-rich Arab-Persian Middle East, accounts for 33 percent of the richest
people in the region.
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Other factors contributing to the survival of Israel include the greatness of
such Israeli leaders as David Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir, and the Jewish will to
survive, reinforced by the Holocaust and the proclaimed intention of the Arab
states to drive Israel into the sea. The democratic nature of Israel was a blessing,
especially since the Arabs sided time and again with authoritarian, repressive,
and ultimately losing powers, from Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union. Ultimately, argues Adelman, Israel came into existence and flourished “because of
the creativity, drive and determination of the Jews” themselves.
One of the anomalies that Adelman points out is the fact that the small State
of Israel, surrounded by enemies bent on its destruction, has remained a vibrant
democracy rather than devolving into an authoritarian or militaristic polity.
Much of the answer is to be found in the role of a key institution within Israel,
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which is the topic of Stuart A. Cohen’s Israel and
Its Army.
Civil-military relations in Israel differ greatly from those in the United States.
For Americans, the preferred relationship between civilian policy makers and
the uniformed military is what the late Samuel Huntington called “objective
control” of the military. In this arrangement—an ideal type that is rarely attained in practice—civilian authorities grant the professional officer corps autonomy in the realm of military affairs, in return for which the professional
military remains politically neutral and voluntarily subordinate to civilian
control.
Even allowing for the fact that U.S. civil-military relations rarely correspond
to Huntington’s ideal type, Israel’s civil-military boundaries are far more porous
than those in the United States; the IDF has played parts in education, nation
building, and land settlement. The traditional role of the IDF has been more
central to Israeli life than that of the U.S. military to American life in general.
The creation of a national army from preindependence military arms like
Haganah and Palmach was, like the creation of Israel itself, something of a miracle. To begin with, there was no Jewish military tradition upon which first the
Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) and later Israel could draw, at least
since biblical times. In addition, many of those who had to be absorbed and acculturated by the IDF were illiterate immigrants with nothing like military experience. Nonetheless, the IDF prevailed in the War of Independence and gained a
reputation for near invincibility in 1967. Its reputation was tarnished a bit in
1973, when it suffered a serious strategic surprise, but the IDF recovered the initiative and once again prevailed.
Cohen traces the decline of Israel’s love affair with the IDF, the reputation of
which reached its nadir in the summer of 2006 in the wake of the Second Lebanon War against Hezbollah. That war revealed many deficiencies in the IDF;
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however, these problems had become apparent long before that conflict.
Cohen attributes them to the changing operational landscape—the shift from
state-on-state warfare to irregular conflict, such as the intifada; an overreliance
on technology, a mistake the U.S. military also made during the 1990s; and, most
significantly, societal changes within Israel, the post-Zionist version of “the
routinization of charisma,” in which “unquestioning commitment to ideals that
in the past seemed sublime gives way to frustration with the ordinariness of the
new order, which therefore itself becomes the butt of critical inquiry.”
After offering a no-holds-barred critique of the IDF, Cohen ends on a note of
optimism. While problems are likely to persist, he believes, reforms make it
likely that the IDF can correct their deficiencies. That is a good thing, because
the threats that Israel faces are not likely to disappear soon.
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NODES, NETWORKS, PLATFORMS, AND PICTURES
Friedman, Norman. Network-centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter through Three Wars.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009. 424pp. $32.95

Norman Friedman’s latest book,
Network-centric Warfare, should find a
place on the shelves of all students of
naval warfare. It provides a wealth of
insights into contemporary and future
wars, by focusing on networks—the
connection between weapons and systems, the front line and the rear echelon, decision makers and analysts, and
domains of warfare from land to sea to
air to space to cyberspace. Friedman’s
central thesis is that network-centric
warfare (NWCW) as articulated by advocates like the late vice admiral and
former Naval War College president
Arthur Cebrowski is really “picturecentric warfare”—that is, as he explains,
warfare is “based on using a more or
less real time picture of what is happening.” Friedman then demonstrates the
evolution of picture-centric/networkcentric warfare by examining naval programs from British admiral Sir John
Fisher’s Mediterranean surveillance
program at the beginning of the twentieth century to the sound surveillance
system (SOSUS) in the latter half of
that century.

Whether one agrees with Friedman or
not, his account challenges many past
and current conceptions of warfare and
represents a frontal challenge to theorists of network-centric warfare. As
such, this work deserves to be read and
responded to by scholars and analysts
alike.
Network-centric warfare and its precepts, for better or worse, acknowledged or not, are now embedded in
much of current thinking about military operations in both the United
States and countries as diverse as the
United Kingdom, Sweden, Singapore,
and China. At the most basic level, proponents of NWCW urge strategists,
planners, operators, and even members
of the acquisition community to think
about war fighting in terms of nodes
and networks rather than of weapons
platforms. At its most simple, this
means that developing, sustaining, and
protecting connectivity (i.e., networks,
ranging from radios to fiber optics) is at
least as important as ships, tanks, aircraft, satellites, and sensors. Everything
from combat power and combat effectiveness to logistical efficiency is
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improved by taking full advantage of
the computer and telecommunications
advances made over the last halfcentury. Friedman challenges NWCW
proponents by redefining their central
arguments about the relationship between nodes and networks. In effect, he
argues that the “picture” is more important than the network itself for conducting military operations. The
network serves the development of ever
more complex and, presumably, accurate “pictures” available to operators
and analysts.
If I have a problem with Friedman, it is
with his definition and explanation of
network-centric warfare, at least the
variant espoused by Vice Admiral
Cebrowski. (Full disclosure: Vice Admiral Cebrowski was the president of the
Naval War College when I was hired
there, and I enjoyed more than a few
hours hashing out the intricacies of
network-centric warfare in his presence.) I do not agree that picturecentric warfare is equivalent to
network-centric warfare: the “pictures”
highlighted by Friedman constitute
only one dimension (albeit an important one) of the theory and practice of
network-centric warfare. Another relatively minor quibble is that although
the book’s title refers to three world
wars, and indeed the narrative contains
analysis and examples from all
three—World War I, World War II,
and the Cold War—this is somewhat
misleading. As the table of contents
suggests, the real structure underlying
the work is instead three technological
eras, those associated with radios, radar,
and computers.
Network-centric Warfare is not an easy
read. It is filled with jargon and focuses

largely on relatively obscure developments. It is not a popular history or an
anecdote-filled volume designed to
thrill devotees of warfare. It lists nearly
fourteen pages of acronyms!
These complaints aside, this book is
worth buying, reading, and studying. It
is a most useful corrective to histories
focusing on specific wars, campaigns,
battles, personalities, or weapons
systems.
PETER DOMBROWSKI

Naval War College

Finkelstein, Sydney, Jo Whitehead, and Andrew
Campbell. Think Again: Why Good Leaders Make
Bad Decisions and How to Keep It from Happening
to You. Boston: Harvard Business School, 2008.
204pp. $27.95

Bad decisions are common, but bad decisions by good leaders are perplexing.
This book delves into the root causes of
faulty decisions made by leaders who
should have known better. The reader
will be intrigued by the cognitive dynamics underlying defective decisions.
Neuroscience is making aspects of traditional wisdom about decision making
obsolete. It turns out that rational decision making is not really all that
rational.
The book’s lead author, Sydney
Finkelstein, teaches at Tuck School of
Business, Dartmouth, and has written extensively on leadership. His coauthors
both earned their MBAs at Harvard and
teach at the Strategic Management Center
at Ashridge Business School, outside London. Finkelstein also authored Why Smart
Executives Fail.
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The authors identify two common
components in the flawed decisions
they studied: judgment error and the
absence of a corrective process. One example given is the case of Matthew
Broderick, a retired Marine Corps general who was a seasoned decision maker
in the Federal Emergency Management
Agency’s Operations Center during
Hurricane Katrina. His experience had
taught him that initial reports from a
crisis area are often exaggerated and inaccurate. Twelve hours after the hurricane hit New Orleans, Broderick
received conflicting information about
breached levees and extensive flooding.
His rational analysis was that the situation was not dire, and he went
home. By the following morning,
the magnitude of the catastrophe was
unequivocal.
Broderick was a competent leader with
proven crisis experience, so why did he
assign great validity to one source of information while dismissing data from
other credible sources? The authors
contend that his misjudgment resulted
from two cognitive errors: he incorrectly assumed that the Katrina situation “pattern-matched” his prior crisis
experiences; and he exacerbated the error by “emotionally tagging” the information from his preferred source, the
Army Corps of Engineers. Pattern recognition and emotional tagging are
powerful subconscious influences on
decision making.
Based on the authors’ research, four
“red flag conditions” are evident in defective decisions: misleading experiences, misleading prejudgments,
inappropriate self-interest, and inappropriate attachments. A red-flag condition forecasts vulnerability to
cognitive bias. Notable examples of
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flawed decisions made by exceptional
military, business, and government
leaders richly illustrate the latent peril
in red-flag conditions.
The elements at play are subtle and subconscious. For example, the persistent
tug of personal self-interest is hard to
detect, because a self-serving bias is implicitly acceptable in our culture.
Self-interest becomes inappropriate
when it is unacknowledged and there is
no self-awareness. It corrosively distorts
the decision process. The authors’ research found that inappropriate selfinterest contributed to flawed strategic
decisions in more than two-thirds of
their research cases.
The book is repetitive at times, but that
minor distraction is more than offset
by its insightful advice and practical
decision-process safeguards. The authors refer extensively to academic
cognitive research and challenge the
invincibility of “rational and analytic”
decision making, especially for leaders
in complex situations where information is ambiguous.
HENRY KNISKERN

Naval War College

Horner, Charles. Rising China and Its Postmodern
Fate: Memories of Empire in a New Global Context.
Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 2009. 224pp.
$34.95

This book connects China’s past, present, and future and places them in a
larger, evolving context. Horner’s work
is nothing short of a tour de force of
world intellectual history as projected
and contested on the canvas that is
China. Eloquent and engaging, it is
pointed without being overly
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judgmental, incorporating an absorbing
literature review that is surprisingly cogent, considering the sheer amount of
information conveyed.
Horner takes a bold and transparent
approach: his “hypothetical history of
the future” analyzes the past in the context of contemporary politics and debates, as post-1978 market reforms
have opened up intellectual discourse.
He explores the international dimensions and domestic discourses of sinology: “China’s intellectual scene is now
among the most vibrant in the world,
bringing together . . . competing ideas
both foreign and domestic.” The author
likewise reveals his own intellectual
journey. This self-conscious approach is
valuable, since perhaps nowhere other
than in China has history been so
mined, misused, analyzed, exploited—
and remained a subject of such fascination and debate.
Horner explores longtime Chinese bureaucratic practices of devising norms
and lessons from history, offering examples from the Yuan, Ming, and Qing
dynasties. Although all are invoked as
positive or negative models today,
“What they stand for now is very different from what they were once thought
to be.” More broadly, “China once interpreted its own past in light of yesterday’s failures, but now it is coming to a
new appreciation of its past in light of
today’s successes.” China’s usable past
includes long if uneven “maritime and
naval traditions” that generated national prestige and support for the ruling regime, supported vigorous
shipbuilding and trade, and incorporated Taiwan. It is hard to overlook the
relevance, and resonance, of such issues
today. In a useful comparative example

of the influence of history, Horner likens Zheng He’s voyages to the Apollo
moon landings in the long-term transformations they brought in domestic
opinion regarding national capabilities,
despite their abrupt terminations.
Strategic debate in the Qing dynasty regarding the value of China’s western
territories reveals enduring tensions in
its strategic orientation between continental and maritime frontiers and between factions advocating their
respective emphases. Horner quotes
one official, whose vividly expressed
viewpoint carried the day (perhaps to
Beijing’s detriment, in retrospect): “The
maritime nations are like a sickness of
the limbs, far away and light, but Russia
is like a sickness of the heart and stomach, nearby and dangerous.”
Horner tackles the enduring puzzle of
why China’s leaders failed to anticipate
maritime threats from Western powers
and finds that the Qing government devoted insufficient attention to diplomacy and intelligence abroad and failed
to consult knowledgeable overseas Chinese. Nevertheless, by the dawn of the
twentieth century, China’s intelligentsia
had achieved a deep understanding of
the sources of Western power and
“self-understanding.” Significant
bureaucratic-curricular reforms proved
insufficient, however: a “painful consensus” emerged that “a new intellectual
regime . . . would have to consolidate its
power before the country’s recovery of
national power could begin in earnest.”
Then, as now, there is widespread determination to make China a prosperous great power but uncertainty
regarding how to do so. Questions
abound: How should China relate to
the international system? How should it
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work with the existing hegemonic
power of the day? Also, to what extent
can, and should, Beijing further its interests militarily? Horner sees this as
part of a more fundamental question
and cites a Chinese intellectual: “Do we
Chinese have the possibility or necessity
to form our own discourse of modernity, or do we open a ‘branch office’ of
the Western discourse of modernity in
China”?
I commend this book to general readers
in search of intellectually stimulating
but accessible material, to teachers of
survey courses at the advanced undergraduate or graduate level, and to specialists seeking insights into their own
studies of Chinese history.
ANDREW ERICKSON

Naval War College

Alterman, Jon B., and John W. Garver. The Vital
Triangle: China, the United States and the Middle
East. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2008. 144pp.
$16.95

In The Vital Triangle Jon Alterman and
John Garver present a compact analysis
of relations among China, the United
States, and the countries of the Mideast.
Alterman directs the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Garver is a
professor of international affairs at
Georgia Tech. They deliver a focused,
133-page narrative, peppered with
charts illustrating statistical trends in
the energy and arms trades. Based on
interviews and conferences with scholars in China and the Mideast, a review
of English- and Chinese-language secondary literature, and news reporting,
this study is the first attempt at a
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comprehensive, “three-dimensional”
study of Sino-U.S. relations in regard to
the vital Middle East.
Most important, the authors explain
how Beijing’s keen awareness of its limited power and its recognition of the
importance of Sino-U.S. trade significantly restrain Chinese opposition to
U.S. Mideast strategy. Despite China’s
growing economic stake in the region
and declaratory opposition to U.S. “hegemony,” Beijing gives avoiding direct
clashes with Washington higher priority
than it does its relations with regional
states. A key example is China’s decision in 1997 to scale back significantly
cooperation with Iran on nuclear and
missile technologies in response to
pressure from the Clinton administration. The authors demonstrate how
Beijing paradoxically combines a practical policy of risk avoidance with the
rhetoric of antihegemonic solidarity,
allowing China to reap economic and
political profits from Western protection of the flow of Mideast energy and,
simultaneously, from regional resentments of that same Western intervention.
Beijing’s observations of rough Soviet
and American experiences in Mideast
geopolitics reinforce its belief in the
cost-effectiveness of a low regional
security profile.
The book concludes with some reasonable, if not exactly groundbreaking, recommendations for managing frictions
in the China–United States–Mideast triangle. Of particular interest to the naval
community are those focused on securing the maritime domain within the
Persian Gulf. Alterman and Garver advocate collaboration among China and
Western and Persian Gulf littoral states
on ship identification protocols, cargo
security initiatives, and multilateral
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search-and-rescue operations. The authors argue that because these steps are
limited, practical, and focus on the interests of all sides, China may be willing
to engage here, and that further, because of Tehran’s desire to stay on good
terms with Beijing, Chinese participation might induce some restraint on
Iran’s part.
The Vital Triangle is well worth reading.
It provides a useful contextual framework for placing in perspective overhyped news reports on Sino-U.S.
disputes over Chinese arms deals with
countries in the region, Beijing’s growing concerns about ensuring the security of its oil imports, threats from
Egypt and Saudi Arabia that they may
seek Beijing’s political-military support
as an alternative to Washington, and attempts by Iran to appeal to China as a
counterweight to Western pressures.
Because the book cogently illustrates
Beijing’s reluctance to take risks or
choose sides and thereby diminishes the
credibility of China as a counterweight,
Americans working diplomatically in
the Mideast could even find it useful to
provide copies to their host-country interlocutors the next time they try to
play “the China card.”
ROBERT A. HARRIS

Defense Intelligence Agency, Burke, Va.
(The views and opinions expressed in this review are
the author’s alone and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
Department of Defense, or U.S. government.)

Jones, Seth G. In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan. New York: Norton,
2009. 414pp. $27.95

In an August 2009 Wall Street Journal
article, Seth Jones described meeting
villagers in Afghanistan who had never
heard of President Hamid Karzai and
even thought the U.S. military forces he
was traveling with were Soviets, “not realizing that the Soviet army withdrew in
1989.” This lack of knowledge may
seem implausible in an era of cell phone
and Internet communication, but Jones
offers a detailed narrative of the historical and modern-day challenges in Afghanistan that makes this ignorance
believable. He describes a country populated by diverse ethnic tribes with
strong aversions to central governance.
As the title implies, he recalls the failure
of foreign forces time and again to tame
and govern this disparate Afghan populace. From Alexander the Great in 330
BC to the British Empire in the nineteenth century, to the Soviet invasion of
the 1970s, Afghanistan has been seemingly unconquerable. Against this background Jones demonstrates the
monumental challenge that the United
States faces as it attempts to do what
other “empires” could not—“create a
new order” in Afghanistan. He clearly
demonstrates that “the lessons from the
past empires provide a stark lesson.”
A well-respected political scientist at
RAND, Seth Jones clearly has the credibility to take on the task of breaking
down and explaining the complicated
Afghan environment. Jones is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, has taught at the Naval
Postgraduate School, and has visited
Afghanistan numerous times since 11
September 2001. In the Graveyard of
Empires is painstakingly researched,
with over a thousand notes citing interviews, documents, books, news articles,
video clips, and written statements
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from numerous U.S. and international
figures who have played prominent
roles in Afghanistan since before and
after 9/11. In fact, Jones’s many citations and his approach of listing diverse
players with one-line, anecdotal physical descriptions or personality traits can
be overwhelming and even detract from
the narrative.
Nonetheless, this book does a superb
job of filling in the details of Afghanistan’s complex politics for scholars who
are interested in gaining a better understanding of the history, the state and
nonstate actors involved, and the many
civil and military leaders who have attempted to calm the political upheaval
in Afghanistan. Jones ably explains
how, after the United States and its allies quickly knocked the Taliban from
power, routed al-Qa‘ida, and set up a
popularly elected central government,
the country nonetheless failed to establish an adequate justice system and security for its populace—instead
allowing a robust insurgency to develop. With the experience of someone
who has walked the ground and talked
to the leaders on all sides, Jones effectively argues that the drug trade, highlevel government corruption, and the
lack of resources could, if not resolved,
lead to one more headstone in Afghanistan’s graveyard.
DOUGLAS J. WADSWORTH

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Naval War College

Zatarain, Lee Allen. Tanker War: America’s First
Conflict with Iran, 1987–1988. Philadelphia:
Casemate, 2008. 388pp. $32.95
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Lee Zatarain, an attorney, has crafted a
compelling and immensely readable account of one of the least-known chapters
of the U.S. Navy’s maritime combat operations, the tanker war of 1987–88. The
tanker war was fought by three now very
familiar foes—Iran and Iraq (who had
been at war with each other since 1980),
and the United States, which became
embroiled in the conflict when an Iraqi
aircraft attacked and nearly sank one of
its frontline warships in 1987. Using new
information gained from the U.S. Navy
and other U.S. government sources, as
well as extensive interviews with the officers and crew who served in the Persian
Gulf during the fifteen-month war,
Zatarain examines and explains with
lawyerly precision the events that constituted the U.S. Navy’s combat operations
against Iranian naval forces.
Tanker War begins with a detailed account of the Iraqi attack on the guidedmissile frigate USS Stark in May 1987;
the first successful antiship-missile attack on a U.S. Navy warship, it resulted
in thirty-seven deaths. That attack,
however, precipitated no military response against Iraq by the United
States, largely because it was considered
to have been an unfortunate accident,
and Iraq was more of a friend than Iran.
Iran’s subsequent actions—laying
mines in the heavily trafficked channels
of the Gulf to interrupt the flow of Iraqi
oil and attacking civilian oil tankers—
forced the United States to side with
Iraq. As Zatarain explains in straightforward fashion, the conflict that ensued nearly cost the U.S. Navy another
warship, USS Samuel B. Roberts, and
subjected the Navy to several antishipmissile attacks by the Iranian military.
In retaliation, the U.S. Navy destroyed a
good part of the Iranian navy and
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effectively established the American
maritime dominance in the Persian
Gulf that exists to this day.
Among the key issues that Zatarain
raises in his gripping account of the
various battles fought between the
United States and Iran is the controversial claim by many U.S. Navy commanding officers that Iran used
Chinese-made Silkworm antiship missiles against American ships. Their
claims were discounted by senior military commanders, who refused to acknowledge that any such attacks had
occurred, despite extensive evidence to
the contrary—such attacks would have
required a military response that the
United States and the U.S. military were
neither willing nor able to undertake.
As political tensions have continued to
rise in recent years between the United
States and Iran, Tanker War is a mustread for those who have a desire or a
duty to understand how recent history
may shape perceptions of these protagonists in the future.
RON RATCLIFF

Naval War College

Graham, Bradley. By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald
Rumsfeld. New York: PublicAffairs, 2009. 803pp.
$35

In a speech given to Pentagon employees
on 10 September 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the
“adversary that poses a threat, a serious
threat, to the security of the United
States” is not “decrepit dictators” but
rather “the Pentagon bureaucracy.” The
blunt message of this speech was very

soon to be bound together in a tensionfilled relationship with the ensuing wars
initiated by the terrorist attacks of the
next day. This tension gives dramatic
shape to the career of Donald Rumsfeld
as portrayed by Bradley Graham in his
well researched book By His Own Rules.
A veteran Washington Post correspondent, Graham intends that the title be regarded literally, as his detailed story
focuses on Rumsfeld as a master bureaucratic infighter who did indeed work by
his own rules. (The rules encapsulated
Rumsfeld’s views on serving and surviving in government and were eventually
printed in the Wall Street Journal.)
Rumsfeld applied the rules in his intense commitment to the type of U.S.
military President George W. Bush had
called for during his campaign, an “agile, lethal, readily deployable” armed
force. To build this force required a significant transformation of the outsized
and ponderous military developed during and immediately after the Cold
War. Graham portrays Rumsfeld as a
reformer who “had never met an organization he didn’t want to change” and
who had come well prepared to transform the Defense Department, but for
two untimely wars.
Rumsfeld’s personal goal of transforming the military seemed to overshadow
his responsibilities for prosecuting the
wars. Graham describes at length how
Rumsfeld’s missteps in managing the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan caused
him to become the “personification of
the arrogance and misjudgments of the
Bush Administration,” from damaging
interagency power struggles to intolerance of differing viewpoints, to a lack of
ability to acknowledge mistakes or
change strategies.
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Yet Graham also well portrays
Rumsfeld as a complex man who got
things accomplished. A tenacious collegiate wrestler at Princeton and a Navy
pilot, Rumsfeld was elected to Congress
at age thirty. He served four terms before President Richard Nixon appointed him as head of the Office of
Economic Opportunity and then as ambassador to NATO. Under President
Gerald Ford, Rumsfeld would serve as
White House chief of staff and as the
youngest-ever secretary of defense. In
Rumsfeld’s business career, he was a
CEO responsible for the successful
turnaround of several major corporations. With his appointment in 2001, he
would also become the oldest to serve
as secretary of defense. In all of his
many appointments and responsibilities, Rumsfeld comes across as an intense, capable, and ambitious operator
with a “deep moral streak.”
Graham’s well written and comprehensive narrative implies an answer to the
question of why an administrator
known for his diligent and rational approach to resolving complex issues ultimately presided over a deeply dysfunctional policy-making process. In
Rumsfeld, overconfidence eventually
converted a healthy skepticism about
thorough organizational procedures
into near contempt for them. Transforming the military, like countering an
insurgency, proved to be more about
changing minds than about building
new weapons or using old ones. Graham concludes that Rumsfeld’s “biggest
failings were personal—the result of the
man himself, not simply of the circumstances he confronted.”
WILLIAM CALHOUN

Naval War College
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Barlow, Jeffrey G. From Hot War to Cold: The U.S.
Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955.
Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2009.
710pp. $65

The U.S. Navy that patrolled the
world’s oceans with such unquestioned
dominance in the 1990s did not spring
into existence full-blown, nor was its
creation a smooth evolution based on
dispassionate analysis and national consensus. The early years of that postwar
Navy, particularly its first, crucial decade, were marked by storms, impassioned debate, and bitter political
battles. This turmoil had started before
the end of the Second World War and
would continue into the mid-1950s.
Unfortunately, there has been far too
little written about this period in the
U.S. Navy’s history.
Jeffrey Barlow, a noted naval historian
and author, has done much to close
that gap and in the process has produced a stunning book. Meticulously
researched and scrupulously documented, From Hot War to Cold is a
gripping account of how the modern
Navy was formed in the crucible of the
first ten years after the war. As a history, this volume is first-rate. As a study
of decision making, it is superb.
Barlow consistently reminds the reader
just how important this decade was. As
he relates, military and government
leaders wrestled with critical emerging
technologies, tectonic political shifts,
and ferocious internal battles. He examines every aspect of these times, tracing
how military organizations were shaped
and affected by a series of defense reorganization acts, and how the Air Force
and Navy battled for a role in the nation’s nuclear strategy. Over time,
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deployment patterns were established
that would last for half a century.
This book not only speaks knowledgeably about technical, organizational,
and doctrinal shifts over a tumultuous
decade but gives full attention to the
personalities of the day. From the president on down, Barlow examines the debates, discourse, plots, and planning, as
well as the passion and emotion that
went into these decisions. There are giants in these pages, including Ernest J.
King, Forrest Sherman, James Forrestal,
Harry Truman, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. There is also a myriad of other
officers and leaders whose names
should be more familiar, such as Admirals Richard Conolly and Edward C.
Ewen.

Barlow has captured the flavor of political infighting at its best and worst.
Among the more dramatic accounts is
the tale of how Secretary of the Navy
Charles Thomas fired Admiral Robert
B. Carney, who, as Chief of Naval Operations, had tangled with the secretary of
state, infuriated President Eisenhower,
and refused to exchange message traffic
with Thomas.
If there is a flaw with Barlow’s book, it
is the flaw to which every writer aspires—to instill in the reader a feeling
of regret when the last page is turned
and the book is finished. It is profoundly to be hoped that this volume
will be followed by a second and a
third.
RICHARD NORTON
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
CALL FOR PAPERS: THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS
The editorial board of The Journal of International Security Affairs invites
submissions of papers for its Fall 2010 issue. The Journal (ISSN 1532-4060),
published twice yearly by the nonprofit, nonpartisan Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, covers the U.S. military and global security issues affecting the United States and its allies abroad. All articles submitted to the
Journal are confidentially refereed. Submission guidelines can be found at
www.securityaffairs.org.
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REFLECTIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s manager for the
Navy Professional Reading Program.

T

here are sixty great books in the complete Navy Professional Reading Program (NPRP) library. Sailors interested in participating in the NPRP often
ask where they should begin. While you can’t go wrong reading any of the carefully selected books, this article will give you just a “taste” of several books,
which may tempt you to read further. For example:
They were gone for five minutes, and they came back together. Ben Sharmak stood
for a few moments staring at me, and then he climbed away, back to his army. Gulab
walked down the hill to me and tried to explain Sharmak had handed him a note that
said, Either you hand over the American—or every member of your family will be killed.
Gulab made his familiar dismissive gesture, and we both turned and watched the
Taliban leader walking away through the trees. And the village cop offered me his
hand, helped me to my feet, and once more led me through the forest, half lifting me
down the gradients, always considerate of my shattered left leg, until we reached a
dried-up riverbed.
And there we rested. We watched for Taliban sharpshooters, but no one came. All
around us in the trees, their AKs ready, were familiar faces from Sabray ready to defend us.

What happens next? Find out by reading Lone Survivor, by Marcus Luttrell with
Patrick Robinson (New York: Little, Brown, 2007).
{LINE-SPACE}
I once watched a man being kidnapped in Beirut. It took only a few seconds. I was on
my way to Beirut International Airport when my taxi became stalled in traffic. Suddenly I saw off to my right four men with pistols tucked into their belts who were
dragging another man out his front door. A woman, probably his wife, was standing
just inside the shadow of the door, clutching her bathrobe and weeping. The man
was struggling and kicking with all his might, a look of sheer terror in his eyes.
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Somehow the scene reminded me of a group of football players carrying their coach
off the field after victory, but this was no celebration. Just for a second my eyes met
those of a hapless victim, right before he was bundled into a waiting car. His eyes did
not say, “Help me”; all they spoke was fear. He knew I couldn’t help him. This was
Beirut.

Want to know more about this exotic city? Read: From Beirut to Jerusalem, by
Thomas Friedman (New York: Anchor Books, 1990).
{LINE-SPACE}
Captain Copeland picked up the intercom mike and addressed the Roberts’s crew.
That he was speaking for himself struck Ens. Jack Moore as unusual and urgent. Normally seaman Jack Roberts was the public address voice of his namesake warship. His
southern drawl was all but unintelligible to anyone not acquainted with Dixie’s
rhythms and diphthongs. But the skipper’s diction was as crisp as a litigator’s. He was
talking fast and sounding more than a little nervous.
“A large Japanese fleet has been contacted. They are fifteen miles away and headed in
our direction. They are believed to have four battleships, eight cruisers, and a number of destroyers.
“This will be a fight against overwhelming odds from which survival cannot be expected. We will do what damage we can.”

Did the men of the USS Roberts survive? Find out by reading The Last Stand of
the Tin Can Sailors, by James D. Hornfischer (New York: Bantam Books, 2004).
{LINE-SPACE}
The Enterprise marked her combat debut by launching twenty-one Phantoms and
Skyhawks in a strike against Vietcong installations near Bien Hoa, South Vietnam.
There were rough spots in that first day at war for the “Big E.” A Phantom pilot, obviously shaken by his first exposure to combat, was forced to eject after making seven
unsatisfactory landing approaches and then being unable to plug into an airborne
tanker for emergency refueling. The pilot was picked up by the carrier’s plane guard
helicopter and returned to the Enterprise. He was uninjured in the parachuting but
was flown off on the first available carrier on-board delivery transport for transfer
back to the States and a naval career in an assignment that did not involve flying. A
second Phantom was lost when a premature bomb explosion put holes in the fuel
tank and the pilot and radar intercept officer (RIO) ejected over South Vietnam
when the tanks ran dry. Soldiers of the Army Special Forces group at Hon Quan arrived thirty-five minutes later and brought an Air Force rescue helicopter to evacuate
the aircrew. By the afternoon, operations had smoothed out and the Enterprise and
Air Wing 9 had completed every mission on the daily flight schedule. CVW-9 flew
125 strike sorties on that date, unloading 167 tons of bombs and rockets on the
enemy.
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Find out more about the “Big E” by reading Aircraft Carriers at War, by Admiral
James L. Holloway III (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007).
{LINE-SPACE}
Have we captured your interest? Go to the NPRP library at your command and
get the whole story!

JOHN E. JACKSON
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